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ABSTRACT 
. On lO_May 1994 the European Union offeredSouth Africa a package of measures to ... send a 
strong political signal to the incoming govemme;;t cmd to the South African population, thus 
proving its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness 
to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South _Africa after the 
elections. This package consisted of two parts: 
1. A series of short term implementations to take place with immediate effect to help South 
Africa's development and transition, and 
2. An offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should the 
new government so request. 
South Africa accepted the European Union's offer to negotiate a long-term relationship, and in 
response requested membership of the structure governing the Union's relations with the rest 
of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, namely 
the Lome Convention. Due to various incompatibilities South Africa was not allowed to join 
this organisation. In its place the European Union offered to negotiate an agreement with 
South Africa that would lead to a Free Trade Area. This agreement was in keeping with the 
rules as laid down by the World Trade Organisation. It envisaged the lowering of tariffs and 
trade barriers between the Union and South Africa over a period not exceeding 12 years, 
allowing for asymmetry in terms of time constraints in implementation only. South Africa saw 
this type of agreement as inconsistent with the desire expressed by the European Union to 
support the countries development and the integration of the Southern African region. In its 
place the South Africa proposed a new concept in trade agreement, this concept, known as the 
Trade and Development Agreement, embodied both trade liberalisation and support for 
development. This agreement would introduce a new paradigm of thought to govern trade 
between developed countries and developing countries within the World Trade Organisation's 
rules. 
This paper explores the events that unfolded in these negotiations. It attempts to discover 
whether, in the current global environment, it is possible, or beneficial, for the developed 
world to act in an altruistic manner towards another state in order to assist its development. 
Vlll 
PREAMBLE 
. This research covers the time frame of the negotiation process to formulate a long-term 
comprehensive relationship between South Africa and the European Union from its inception 
in 1994 to the re-opening of negotiations in January 1997. 
The first part of the title: Negotiating a Comprehensive Long-term Relationship Between 
South Africa and the European Union is taken from the European Union's Luxembourg 
Declaration to ... offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa 
should the new government so request (European Council 6294/94Artic1e 2: 5-6). The 
second part of the title: From Free Trade to Trade and Developmentis taken from the offer of 
the European Union to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement and the development of a South 
African negotiating mandate to form a Trade and Development Agreement. 
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No nation was ever ruined by trade. 
(Benjamin Franklin) 
That trade's proud empire hastes to swift decay, 
As ocean sweeps the laboured mole away, 
While self-dependent power can time defy, 
As rocks resist the billows and the sky. 
(Samuel Johnson) 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Trade between countries in the North and those in the South, I in the post-colonial era, has 
been highly disproportionate, facing large inequalities in balance of payments and balance of 
trade. The countries of the South have not been able to break their colonial mould, and have 
been unable to either develop or diversifY their economies. The typical situation that presents 
itself is one where the countries of the North buy raw materials, primary products and 
agricultural produce from the countries of the South. In return the countries of the South buy 
manufactured goods and an increasing amount of services from the countries of the North. 
This leads to substantial trade deficits for the countries of the South, as the manufactured 
goods they are buying are a lot more expensive than the primary products they are selling. 
This phenomena has been tackled by a group of theorists within a framework known as 
Globalism.2 The starting point of analysis in this approach is the global context within which 
-
states and other entities interact. The Globalists outline four key points that guide their 
thinking: 
1. Globalists emphasise the overall structure of the international system, believing that in 
order to explain behaviour, one must first grasp the essence of the global environment 
within which such behaviour takes place. 
2. The importance of historical analysis is also stressed. It is only through tracing the 
historical evolution of the system that it is possible to understand its current structure. In 
doing so the globalists recognise the current international system as a whole as capitalist, 
and that the international actors have to act within this realm. This particular economic 
system works to the benefit of some individuals, states and societies, but at the expense 
of others. Even sO~ialist states have to operate\v'ithin this global system. 
3. Globalists assume that a particular mechanism of domination exists that keeps Third 
World (sic) states from developing and that contributes to world .wide uneven 
development. To understand these mechanisms requires an examination of dependency 
relations between the northern industrialised states and their poorer neighbours in the 
southern hemisphere. 
4. Finally, globalists assume that economic factors are absolutely critical in explaining the 
evolution and the functioning of the world capitalist system and the relegation of Third 
World (sic) states to a subordinate position. 
(Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 9-11) 
2 
The case of South Africa's relations with the European Union is interesting to ~examine 
following the guidelines set out by the Globalists. After the breakdown of apartheid in South 
Mrica, and the installation of a new democratic regime, the country has sought closer trade 
relations with the developed world. This follows years of classification as a pariah state under 
the abhorrent policies of the apartheid regime. During this period the South African economy 
suffered tremendously, and was actively sanctioned by the global community. This burden 
now has to be carried by the new government, who has sought international support to help 
successfully work off the apartheid legacy. Included in this is the development of a closer 
trading relationship with the European Union, which as South Africa's largest trading partner, 
accounts for 49% of her exports and 47% of her imports (Stewart 1996: 26). On the day of 
I North refers to those countries primarily in the northern hemisphere that have developed economies based on 
manufactured products and services. South refers to those countries primarily found in the southern 
hemisphere, whose economies are undeveloped and are based on primary products or single products. 
2 The term Globalism is used to refer to that group of international theorists drawing on the influence of Karl 
Marx. Globalism is used in preference to Marxism as there are both Marxists and non-Marxists working 
within the paradigm of Globalism. The Dependency theorists and world system theories are included in the 
broader term of Globalism. 
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the inauguration of the new South African President, Mr. Nelson Mandela, the EU offered SA 
a package of measures to develop closer relations, as a symbol of their support for the new 
. government. Included in this package was the Qjf~r of a short term trade agreement under 
which South Africa would get a small amount of preferential access to the EU market. More 
importantly the package included an offer to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive 
~. -
trade agreement. 
When the offer of this package was conceptualised within the European Union, the reasoning 
behind offering SA this support was to 
.... send a strong political signal to the incoming govemment and to the South African 
population, thus proving its (the EU's) firm determination to support the transition 
towards democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic 
development of South Africa after the elections. 
(Article 1, European Council 6294/94: 5) 
Two years later (in January 1997) the two parties have not made any concrete moves to 
establish a medium to long term trade and development relationship. The process has been 
marred by various stumbling blocks inhibiting both parties from reaching an amicable 
agreement. What became known as South Africa's window of opportunit/ in the aftermath of 
apartheid, has now practically closed. The country is now finding it increasingly difficult to get 
the international support it requires. The likelihood of a trade agreement with the EU that is 
beneficial to South Africa is steadily decreasing. 
3 The window of opportunity was a tenn used to refer to the period when the world opened its anns to the new 
South Africa. This period was characterised by offers of closer relations to assist South Africa's development 
by various countries in the world 
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This paper examines the process of these negotiations as a case study of the development of a 
North-South trade agreement under the guidelines laid down by Globalism. It traces the 
. relatiooship between the EU and SA from shortJ.y, before the 1994 elections to the present 
(January 1997), examining the factors that contributed to this process. The central question is 
whether the international system, as it exists, will allow for the altruistic behaviour of states -
~. ~ 
or in this case, regions. That is, will Europe be able to follow up on its rhetorical support for 
the development of South Africa? For the purpose of this paper the EU~ will be treated as a 
single entity, that is, the negotiations are viewed as taking place between two parties: The 
European Union and South Africa. The influences of the individual member states will be 
taken into account, as will the influences of the Southern.African states on a South African 
negotiating position. 
In conducting an analysis of a North-South trade relationship under the theoretical guidelines 
laid down by the globalists it is important to first describe the global context in which such a 
relationship exists. Here the global context is examined briefly in order to locate both the EU 
and South Africa's positions in the global economy. More specifically, the context of the ED's 
relations with other developing countries is examined, focusing on the Lome Convention: the 
institutional framework that governs trade and development relations between the EU and a 
group of 70 developing countries. 
The historical background analysis as set out in point 2 of the Globalist guidelines is discussed 
in brief, but is not the focus of this paper. The histories of the two negotiating parties are 
taken as a given. Instead, an historical look at the relations of the EU with the Lome 
signatories is the subject of closer examination as it impacts integrally on the relations between 
4 The tenn European Community was replaced by the European Union after the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. This paper makes primary use of the tenn European Union, although the older European 
5 
the two parties. Further, the events that have transpired recently, with regard to the South 
Mrican negotiating position, indicate that the EU-SA agreement could impact heavily on the 
. future--of the Lome Convention. This double edgeg t:tature of the relationship is also discussed. 
Finally, point 4 of the Globalist guidelines assumes that economic factors are critical in 
explaining the subordinate position of the developing States within the world system. For this 
reason this paper deals primarily with economic factors mentioning other areas of EU-SA and 
North-South relations in brief 
1.1.1 Creating the Framework - the global environment 
The global environment that presents itself to the case study is one which has been facing, and 
,,> 
has recently emerged from, a dramatic period of transition. With the end of the Cold War in 
the early 1990s, what George Bush referred to as the New World Order changed the paradigm 
within which states interacted, as well as the units of power in global interaction. The Cold 
War concept of high vs low politics - where geo-strategic and security issues based on military 
might (high) were seen as more important than geo-economics focusing on trade and 
economic interaction and power (low) - has been reversed. In essence, economic factors are 
rapidly taking precedent over strategic issues, especially as the nature of conflict moves from 
inter-state to intra-state. 
The end of the Cold War also allowed the United States to take on the role of global hegemon. 
This role applied to both the military and security power of the US, as well as to economic 
might. The counter-weight to this was an emphasis on regional integration and regional 
trading bases. What developed were three large, powerful, regional trading blocs that 
Community is also used on occasion. 
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dominated the global economy. These were the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 
the European Union and the East Asian-Pacific rim countries. These three regions dominated 
. global- trade and between them competed fiercely< t? command it. The levels of integration, 
and the nature of these three blocs, were not the same. The EU was by far the most integrated 
of the three, sharing a common market that foresaw the implementation of a corn.mon currency 
by 1999. NAFTA was a free trade area, under the conditions laid down by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), while the Asian-Pacific rim countries formed a bloc that included the so 
called Asian Tigers5 and Japan. In this global economic battle the availability of markets was 
paramount. The trading blocs attempted to forge links with individual states in order to gain 
preferential access to their markets, thereby having an. established advantage over their 
competitors. 
While this global division into trading blocs is important in understanding the nature of the 
global system, perhaps a more important development, in the post-Cold War world, for this 
case study, was the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a development crisis 
in Eastern Europe. The ACP group's previously held vantage point with the EU had -b-een 
drastically undermined from 1990 to 1996, as the EU experienced the direct effects of their 
undeveloped, and conflict stricken neighbours in Eastern Europe. EU development aid, and 
the focus of the EU development community, shifted to this area of contention that was more 
relevant to them. This served to further marginalise the African states, apparent in more than 
just the economic assistance given to Eastern Europe: The lack of support from the 
international community with regard to the Rwandan and Burundese genocidal conflicts is 
dishonourable in the face of the amount of support and money spent by NATO and other 
Northern organisations on the Peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia. The EU 
5 The Asian Tigers is the name given to a group of four states: Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan); that experienced extremely high rates of growth in the 1980s. 
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significantly side-lined the ACP after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of conflict in 
Eastern Europe in the early to mid 1990s. With regard to the South African situation, much of 
. the support that the country would have received}T?m the EU, as well as from the r-est of the 
developed world, was redirected to Eastern Europe. 
The existence of international bodies regulating trade also has to be considered. The World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) came into being in January 1995 to replace the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is the legal and institutional foundation of the 
multilateral trading system It provides the prinCipal contractual obligations determining how 
governments frame and implement domestic trade legislation and regulations. And it is the 
platform on which trade relations among countries evolve through collective debate, 
negotiation and adjudication (The Foundations of the World Trading System: 
http://www.wto.org). The WTO did not merely replace the -GATT, but reformed ifin many 
ways. For example, the WTO acts more along the lines of an international trade policy 
policeman than the GATT did. The WTO was agreed upon in the Uruguay round of the 
GATT in December 1993, and much of it was derived directly from the GATT. As a founding 
member of the GATT South Africa was classified as a developed country. This classification 
means that the country is treated in the same manner as any other developed northern 
economy. Since the inception of the GATT in 1947 South Africa's developmental status has 
declined, and in terms of the current standards of development, South Africa should fit in 
somewhere in the middle income category. A formal re-classification of South Africa's status 
is unlikely to occur, however, and the country will just have to work within this allocation. 
More importantly, the WTO establishes strict guidelines for the establishment of Free Trade 
Areas (FT A) and acts as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations. These guidelines govern 
what a FT A should entail, and the amount of trade it should cover. It also stipulates that 
8 
FT A's have to be reciprocal in nature, and are not allowed to cause trade discrimination against 
other country's with similar economies. If a trade agreement between South Africa and the EU 
. is classified as a FT A it will have to conform· to t~e~e guidelines, and South Africa will not be 
able to receive any of the special treatment that the WTO allows for developing countries. At 
most, South Africa would be able to apply for an asymmetrical approach to a FT A with regard 
to timing only. This would not be that great an achievement as the rules of the WTO (as stated 
in Article XXIV) state that the maximum period of implementation for a FTA is 12 years. 
An area of bargaining power that South Africa would have is UNCT AD, an organisation set 
up to promote global trade that enhances and supports development. At the time of the EU-
SA negotiations South Africa held the chair of this organisation. One purpose of UNCT AD is 
to unite the South in a way in which they could stand together and be strong, this being the 
only means of influencing the policies of international organisations that were controlled 
largely by the North. 
Internal economic problems and a recession within the EU also need to be mentioned. - The 
post-Maastricht European Union was aiming at increased integration in Europe, and the 
implementation of a single currency, the "euro", by 1999 at the latest. This aspiration required 
strict fiscal discipline by EU member states to bring their economies and currencies up to the 
standard required for their inclusion in the single currency. This further prevented much 
altruism when it came to helping the development of third parties. 
Another of the ED's concerns was the issue of expansion. The post-Cold War Europe has seen 
many of the Central and Eastern European countries applying to be included in the EU. 
Already the organisation had grown to 15 members, and the waiting list is growing constantly. 
The most likely candidates for inclusion in the EU are Poland and the Czech Republic, both of 
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which have largely agriculturally based economies that would be a tremendous burden on the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the ED. For this reason any added competition from 
South African agricultural produce would have compounded this problem. The expansion of 
the EU also carried other costs that may have prevented the EU from acting In a very 
charitable fashion with regard to a trade agreement with SA. 
1.1.2. Historical Analysis 
Any historical analysis involving South Africa is necessarily dominated by the policy of 
apartheid; the policy of institutionalised racism of the National Party that lasted for 40 years in 
South Africa finally ending with the democratic elections in April 1994. Apartheid left a deep 
scar in South Africa, a scar that was looking increasingly difficult for the new African National 
Congress (ANC) dominated government of national unity to hide. Apartheid had acquired 
Pariah status for South Africa, causing the United Nations General Assembly to call for 
comprehensive sanctions from the 1950s. International opinion was strongly divided on the 
issue of South Africa, and this fact was extenuated by the Cold War, in which South .Africa 
formed a strategic alliance with the West. The country used this geo-political playing card to 
its best advantage, and managed to avoid comprehensive United Nations Security Council 
sanctions. However, the Security Council did institute a mandatory arms embargo against the 
country in November 1977. 
The most significant impact of South Africa's historical background was the nature of the 
economy that had developed under the auspices of apartheid. With the threat of 
comprehensive international sanctions constantly looming the Nationalist government adopted 
an inward looking policy for the country. The idea was to make South Africa into a self-
sufficient entity. Heavy protectionist barriers were set up to develop South African industries, 
10 
including a number of large, expensive state sponsored experiments. Trade barriers were set 
up to protect already established industries, and to promote their products within the country . 
. Control boards set the prices and quotas of production for all agricultural produce, as well as 
in some manufacturing industries. The value of the currency was also protected, and the Rand 
carried a highly inflated value. 
This has resulted in an extremely inefficient productive sector in South Mrica today, with a 
number of large, unviable, parastatal industries that are too expensive to run, but also too big 
to close down without having a massive negative impact on employment. The manufacturing 
sector in general is inefficient and generally unable to compete effectively on the global market. 
Along with this, the South Mrican economy never developed much beyond its colonial origins. 
The majority of South Africa's exports were raw minerals, gold being the primary ~:cport 
earner. Today the value of the Rand has dropped dramatically since the new government has 
come into power and certain controls, that previously boosted the currency's value, have been 
relaxed. 
Historically, the EU and South Mrica have never had formal trading relations. Under the 
GATT, the EU and SA both had to extend most favoured nation status (MFN)6 to the other. 
This principle no longer applied to trade between the two parties during the apartheid period, 
when the EU's policy of condemning apartheid prompted it to impose economic sanctions on 
SA. Yet the EU never reached consensus on the issue of sanctions against South Mrica, for 
apartheid had managed to divide even the European Community. Thus, it was not until 1986 
that the European Community adopted a moderate package of sanctions against South Africa. 
This package included sanctions of four types: economic, military, cultural and diplomatic. At 
6 Under the MFN clause of GAIT members are bound to grant to the products of other members treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to the products of any other (Europa Yearbook 1996: 230). 
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the 1990 Council of Ministers Meeting in Dublin EPC suffered a potential collapse. Britain 
decided to unilaterally revoke some of its sanctions against South Africa, days after the release 
. of Nets on Mandela. They acted without consultation with the European Community, and this 
action, according to Holland, 
... constituted the most serious breech in the principle of consensus in the hIstory of 
- political co-operation and questioned the legal authority of the single European Act, 
leading the Irish Presidency of the Community to talk of the 'destruction' of EPC. 
(Holland 1991: 1) 
The EU's anti-apartheid stance had a dual nature. Besides the imposition of sanctions, the EU 
also provided support to the Southern Mrican region in their struggle to reduce their economic 
dependence upon, and political and military domination from, apartheid SA. This support was 
.. ' 
initially aimed at the Front-line States (FLS)7, and later at the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).8 The European Community often cited its own regional 
ideology as a reason to promote regional co-operation and independence in Southern Mrica. 
This support came primarily in the form of development assistance in the regional 
transportation and power infrastructures. Problems that were encountered by SADCC-EC co-
operation were often linked to an incompatibility with the Lome Convention, as Mozambique 
and Angola were not admitted to Lome until 1984 and 1985 respectively. The community's 
support came overwhelmingly in the form of rhetoric, and ironically the stumbling blocs in this 
co-operation relationship were contained in the very mechanisms and institutions intended to 
assist development. 
7 The Front-line states were a group states geographically linked to South Africa, who were being adversely 
affected by the apartheid regime. These states formed an alliance to stand together against South Africa. The 
FLS consisted of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Angola and Tanzania. 
8 The first SADCC meeting was held at Arusha in 1979 and was linked to the FLS, but was a more regional 
organisation in the sub-continent whose aim was to bring about a Southern Africa that could exist 
independently of South Africa. 
12 
1.1.3. Mechanisms of Domination 
. The third point in the Globalist's guidelines refers tp .mechanisms of domination that prevented 
the South from developing, and contributed to world wide uneven development. As 
mentioned, this paper briefly examines the institutions that existed to govern North-South 
relations, including those of the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions, in as far as they 
impact on the case study. More important to this study is the Lome convention as a 
mechanism of domination. The question posed is whether this arrangement, which was 
intended to overcome dependency and uneven development, was by its very nature 
propagating these factors. The concept of trade liberalisation as. a mechanism of domination 
is also examined. While the benefits of trade liberalisation have been sufficiently demonstrated 
and described by economic historians and analysts with regard to trade between devel,oped 
countries, this has not been sufficiently demonstrated when it comes to developing economies 
(The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1991: XIX). 
The concept of trade liberalisation is, in essence a healthy one. It is rather the how of trade 
liberalisation that needs to be considered when trying to implement it in an undeveloped 
economy. Trade liberalisation as encouraged by the structures governing global trade did not 
appear to be assisting the plight of the South. The issue at stake here was whether South 
Africa could get around this obstacle, and manage to liberalise its economy at the same time as 
protecting the domestic economy. This was especially problematic given South Africa's 
ambiguous classification in terms of developed/developing, North/South, First World/Third 
World categories. 
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1.1.4. Economic Factors are Dominant 
The fourth and final point in the Globalist guideline is the assumption that economic factors are 
the critical factor in the relegation of developing states to subordinate positions. This study, 
therefore, focuses primarily on economic factors; developmental issues and ather areas ofEU-
SA involvement will be discussed only when relevant to the economic situation. Economics 
did clearly dominate the relationship, and the primary concern of the EU was how SA could 
impact on and effect its domestic economy. The case study tends to revolve around a question 
of development versus economics in the EU-SA relationship. South Mrica's aim was to 
develop a relationship with the EU that in some way assisted its development. Rhetorically, 
the EU supported this, and promoted it. However, in reality the potential impact of SA's 
economy on the EU appears to have overridden the rhetoric. 
1.2 The Analysis 
The analysis begins in Chapter 2 with an examination of the Lome Convention in order to 
create the framework within which the EU-SA trade negotiations were being conducted. In 
1994, South Mrica's then Trade and Industry Minister, Mr. Trevor Manuel, requested that 
South Mrica be admitted, as a full member, to the Lome Convention. South Mrica's accession 
to the Lome Convention had also been spotlighted as a policy option for EU-SA relations as 
early as 1991, when the British Foreign Ministry commissioned the Overseas Development 
Institute to conduct research into policy options for EU trade relations with a post-apartheid 
South Mrica. Another reason for beginning with the Lome Convention is that it enables an 
examination of why South Africa would have wanted to be included in an agreement that had, 
by all accounts, largely failed in its objectives. The EU's objections to SA's inclusion in Lome 
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also provide some useful insight into the apprehension that existed in certain EU sectors about 
an increase in preferential trade access for South Africa. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the EU and South Africa and exammes the build-up to trade 
negotiations, beginning shortly before South Africa's first democratic elections ip 1994. This 
sectio~ traces the sequence of events from the first offer of trade and development relations by 
the EU, to what eventually became the mandate given to the European Commission by the 
Council of Ministers on 25 March 1996. It examines the trade agreement primarily from the 
European Union point of view, looking at the procedures that were involved in reaching a 
mandate. It also looks at the applications and the progress made by South Africa over this 
period. 
The effect that an FT A, of the type suggested by the EU, would have on South AfrIca is the 
focus of chapter 4. It discusses the South African economy and the trade that South Africa is 
currently conducting, and how this could be effected by the EU FT A. 
Chapter five concentrates on South Africa's links with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Both of these 
organisations would have faced serious consequences had South Africa entered into a bilateral 
Free Trade Area with the ED. The relationship between this region and the EU is discussed, 
following the development of the relationship over roughly the same period of time as that of 
the previous section. This begins with the EU-SADC Council of Ministers Meeting held in 
Berlin in 1994, following through to the second Council of Ministers Meeting held in 
Windhoek in 1996. The focus is on the level of rhetorical support of the EU, its failure to act 
on that rhetoric and, in some cases, its acting in contradiction to it. This divide between 
rhetoric and action had strong implications for the EU-SA negotiations, as South Africa could 
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not afford to base its negotiating position on proffilses made by the EU. It also had 
implications for the nature of North-South trade, and the South's ability to break: out of its 
. mould~< . 
The fourth part of the analysis, chapter six, examines South Africa's move ~0Il! a free trade 
agreement to a trade and development agreement (TDA). The concept of a TDA was first 
presented by Faizel Ismail of the Department of Trade and Industry at a workshop on the EU-
SA trade relations which was held in Johannesburg in October 1996. The TDA represents the 
South African view of what a trade agreement between the two parties should entail. 
Contained in this concept is the optimistic expectation, expressed by South African Member of 
Parliament Dr. Rob Davies and others, that in creating the TDA, South Africa can create a new 
concept in the North-South trade paradigm, and include this alongside the regulatioIl,s on 
FTA's in the WTO. 
1.3. Research Methods and Activities 
The research was conducted in three ways: 
1) through an examination of the available literature and policy documents, 
2) the conducting of interviews in Europe and in South Africa, and 
3) attending the Foundation for Global Development workshop on Trade and Development 
relations with the European Union, in Johannesburg in October 1996. 
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The literature on the topic is, largely, limited to journal and newspaper articles analysing the 
relations, and providing input on policy options. The work of Martin Holland, covering South 
. African - EU relations fr-om 1983 to 1995, was particularly useful in providing a solid analysis 
and study of the historical relations between the parties. Holland also provides a good 
examination of the ED's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and ~ow South Mrica 
has i~pacted on this. 
The interviews conducted with vanous individuals involved in the negotiations were 
particularly useful. These interviews were conducted between April 1996 and November 1996 
and include interviews with the South African Mission to t~e European Union in Brussels and 
with the Departments of Trade and Industry and Foreign Affairs in Pretoria. Unfortunately, 
the European Commission and their Directorate General VIII (the Directorate General for 
Development) were unable to accommodate an interview. However, a fair amount of insight 
into the workings of the Commission and of the European policy formulation has been 
acquired through studying Commission documents. This has been supplemented with 
. - - . 
discussion with various interested European Parties, and through monitoring the discussions on 
South Africa in the European Parliament. 
The Workshop held in Johannesburg (hosted by the Foundation for Global Development and 
the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung) provided insight into the thinking prevalent in South Mrica as to 
what a trade agreement with the European Union should entail. Of particular value was the 
presence of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM); an 
independent research institute studying the relations between the ACP and the EU, and helping 
to formulate policy options for the future of this relationship. The ECDPM has also taken an 
interest in the SA-EU trade relations and has been involved in some of the impact assessments 
for the Southern African region. The presentation of the Department of Trade and Industry'S 
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concept for a Trade and Development Agreement (TDA) to govern relations with both 
Southern Africa and the EU was also made at this workshop. 
-'it • 
Documentation obtained from the European Commission and the vanous South African 
negotiating parties provided most of the information on the process of the negotiations. 
Included in these are the negotiation directives and the mandate presented by the European 
Union to South Africa, as well as the various responses to this mandate. Other official 
European Commission documents, directives and memos have contributed to this 
understanding. 
Data on the Lome Convention were largely provided by The Courier, the official journal of 
ACP-EU relations, published in Brussels by the European Commission. Critical perspectives 
of this relationship were numerous. The ECDPM (1996) provided a particularly usefuf report 
on the future of ACP-EU relations, and policy options for agreements to follow Lome IV's 
expiration in 2000. Information on the WTO was obtained via the World Trade Organisations 
information pages on the internet. Analyses of Article XXIV of the Uruguay Round Were 
provided by the SA Department of Trade and Industry. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ED AND LOME 
The relationship between the member states of the EC and their associated overseas territories 
~- ~ 
is examined in its capacity as the most developed relationship structure that the ED has with 
the developing world. This relationship is currently governed under the auspices of the Lome 
Convention, a partnership agreement between the ED and 70 countries in the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. South Africa sees membership of this structure as the 
most beneficial scenario for its development. It is appearing increasingly likely that this round 
of the Lome Convention (Lome IV) is the final one, as the Lome Convention has been said to 
have failed ACP trade (Cosgrove 1994: 223). In order to avoid similar pitfalls in SA's 
negotiations with the ED, it is important to examine the Lome Convention and what has 
caused it to fail. Looking beyond Lome IV, a trade and development agreement between the 
ED and South Africa could set a precedent for the future of ACP-ED relations. 
The Lome Convention has now been through four terms, and is two decades old. The most 
recent Convention, Lome IV, was launched in 1989, and was the longest term of the 
agreement signed to date. When the Lome members signed the Lome IV agreement it was 
agreed that there would be a mid-term review (mtr) ofthe Convention. This review took place 
in Mauritius in 1995, and the resultant agreement will be referred to as the Lome IV mtr. This 
Chapter presents the Lome Convention and its various mechanisms, and examines the 
interaction between the ACP and the ED. ED mechanisms that impact on the Lome 
Convention are also be examined. The aim here is to assess why the Lome Convention has 
failed, and what lessons South Africa can learn from this failure. 
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2.1. History of Lome 
. In the. original European Economic Community (EEC) Treaties, the French protected the 
-t; • 
interests of their colonies and territories in a Part IV that was added to the EEC Treaty. This 
provided for favours to 'Overseas Countries and Territories', which were mainly French and 
mainly in Africa (Pinder 1995: 198). Part IV provided that no tariffs would be imposed on 
imports from these associates into the whole of the Community. Exports to them from the 
Community would, at the same time, enjoy 'reverse preferences'. That is to say any 
preferences that were already granted to such exports from France, Belgium, Italy, or the 
Netherlands would be extended to exports from all the CoITlmunity countries. Along with this, 
France negotiated the creation of the European Development Fund (EDF), allowing for aid to 
the associates in the first five years, to be renewed for subsequent periods (ibid.). 
With the independence of the French colonies in 1960, Part IV was partially renewed in the 
form of the Yaounde Convention for successive periods. One of the implications of Britain's 
accession to the European Community in 1973 was that it brought its Commonwealth ties with 
it. It was felt that the Part IV clause and Yaounde could not be extended to any more 
countries as it was insufficient to deal with the increased scope of coverage. This resulted in 
the formulation of the Lome convention, a treaty linking Europe to a group of countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Lome Convention was first signed in 1975, between 
the 46 member ACP group and nine EC members, initially for a five year period. The aim of 
the Lome Convention was to create a partnership between the EC and its members' associated 
territories to promote healthy trade relations. It was negotiated in a spirit of optimism for what 
seemed like a bold new partnership. This partnership was particularly remarkable because of 
the disparate levels of economic development and diverse range of political systems to be 
20 
found on each side of the relationship. The member states of the ACP placed a lot of hope in 
the Lome Convention, believing it would assist them in their development. 
At the time of its signing the Convention was greeted with considerable enthusiasm from those 
who thought that it would lead to a more just North-South relationship (Parfitt 1996: 53). This 
relationship remained unique in its fourth incarnation, but was now important to far more 
countries. The ACP group, originally 46 members, was now made up of 70 countries, 
including all the countries in sub-Saharan Mrica, with the exception of South Mrica. This 
grouping of countries also contained the world's least developed countries (LDCs), although 
not all members of the ACP were LDCs. The Lome Convention encompassed non-reciprocal 
free trade access to the ACP. That is, ACP exports gained free access to the EC market, while 
being permitted to maintain a certain level of trade barriers and tariffs on EC products. The 
reverse preferences, which most of the ACP countries regarded as a relic of the imperial order 
that caused them to buy more expensive goods from the Community rather than cheaper goods 
elsewhere, were removed (Pinder 1995: 199). Under the terms of the Lome relationship, the 
. -
EU guaranteed the ACP states substantial amounts of aid from the EDF, mostly on generous 
terms. This was accompanied by free access to the EU market for 99% of their products 
(Parfitt 1996: 53). 
The EDF existed alongside the Lome Convention, and was an institution that had been given 
an increased role in the post Maastricht ED. It was one of the few mechanisms that had been 
carried across from the early days of EC-South relations. The EDF was not included in the 
Community budget, but was financed separately by member states. It provided grants and 
loans to help finance development projects in ACP countries. 
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2.2. Lome: Success or Failure? 
. With the Lome Conven~ion' s 21 st year in 1996, much of the enthusiasm surrounding it at its 
-,z ~ 
inception had disappeared. The facts seem to paint a very dismal picture. In the 21 years of 
Lome, the share of ACP trade in the ED had dropped dramatically. The extent of this decrease 
in market share is even more evident in the face of the increases and/or maintenance of levels 
of trade evident in other developing countries and regions. While overall developing country 
trade has dropped, the drop in ACP trade is by far the most substantial (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Developing countries' share of EU imports, 1976-1994 (%) 
1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
ACP 6,7 7,2 6,7 4,7 3,7 2,8 
Asia 4,2 5,9 6,5 11 13,6 13,1 
Latin America 5,3 5,1 6,5 4,6 5,1 5,4 
Mediterranean 6,1 6,1 8,1 6,5 6,2 6,1 
All Developing Countries 44,8 42,4 34,7 31,2 29,2 34,2 
Source: Eurostat (cited in ECDPM 1996: 21) 
In addition, most ACP countries failed to diversify their exports into non-traditional products. 
Most did not manage to become more competitive in the world market (ECDPM 1996: 21). 
ACP exports were dominated by a small group of primary commodities: crude petroleum, 
uncut diamonds, cocoa beans, wood, coffee beans, copper and fruit (especially bananas). 
These seven commodity groups accounted for 54% of ACP exports in 1992. In recent years a 
decline in the market price of these products has further depressed ACP export performance 
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(Cosgrove 1994: 228). The World Bank also noted that whereas the demand for primary 
products in industrialised countries grows at approximately the same rate as incomes, that for 
. imported manufactured· goods grows apprbxiIIl4tyly twice as fast (World Bank cited in 
Ravenhill 1985: 151). This meant that the ACP was marginalised exponentially as levels of 
industrialisation increased in the North and stagnated in the South. 
Criticism of the Lome convention began shortly after its inception, coming initially from the 
ACP, but later also from European and international academics, development workers and 
other interested parties. 10han Galtung saw the Lome Convention as 
.... representing two aspects of structural imperialism: a vertical link, which serves to 
create an international regional division of labour forcing the ACP states to export 
primary commodities and agricultural products to European markets; and, beyond this, 
a kind of feudal, or paternalistic, link which in effect controls the external relations of . .. 
these countries and works against regional integration efforts with other developing 
countries or with other economic centres in the world. 
(cited in Boardman et. al. 1985: 3-4) 
The criticism suggests that, instead of aiding the development of the ACP group, the Lome 
Convention either did not achieve this purpose, or served to inhibit the development of these 
countries. In the approach to the expiration if Lome IV in February 2000, there is a lot of 
concern and consideration about this possibility. The alternatives for future relations between 
the ED and the ACP are being closely examined, in the light of the possibility that Lome trade 
has failed ACP states. 
One observation about the nature of Lome was that, on closer examination, the relative effect 
of the agreement was not as significant as had been assumed. In 1993 the EC Commission 
23 
calculated that in the absence of the Lome Convention 63,4% of imports from ACP states 
would have entered the European Community duty-free, under the :N1FN and the GSP. Duty 
. free aecess under Lome, therefore, applied to les§ ~han one-third of ACP exports (Cosgrove 
1994: 224-255). 
Where the duty free access under Lome did make a significant difference was in ACP exports 
that would otherwise face non-tariff barriers (NTBs), common external tariff duties or 
common agricultural policy (CAP) levies. This one third of products represented a potential 
trade access advantage (ibid.: 225). One of the problems of the failure of the negative impact 
of Lome was in this area. The preferential access to the ED market existed across varying 
degrees. Some products obtained more preferential access than others, depending on the 
degree of protectionism required by the EC. Given the general structure of the ED's common 
external tariff, the more processed the product, the higher the tariff. This provided substantial 
incentives for ACP states to focus on their primary commodities, thereby increasing their 
preference margin in ED markets. 
The existence of non-tariff barriers remained a formidable barrier to ACP trade entering the 
European market. These NTBs existed in the form of standards controls within the ED, and in 
the form of the CAP, which contained substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers. Standards 
controls had improved in the post-Maastricht ED, where a common standards mechanism had 
been introduced. However, it remained very expensive for ACP exporters to comply with the 
ED standards requirements, as they had to pay a substantial amount to get their products 
passed. Further, these NTBs often perpetuated the dominant character of the North. One 
example of this is the ED's banning of the use of certain pesticides in the growing of 
agricultural produce entering the ED, although certain expensive ED pesticides were 
permitted. This type of regulation secured a market for the ED product in the ACP, and 
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cajoled the ACP into buying the more expensive EU products. These decisions did not often 
appear to be made on health grounds. 
2.3. The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
The existence of the CAP is an important factor to consider when examining any trade between 
the EU and other countries. The CAP was one of the most controversial components of the 
EU, as well as being the area of co-operation that was most highly organised within the ED. 
The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, stated 
that the CAP would have as its objectives: 
a) the increase of agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors of production, particularly labour; 
b) the ensurance thereby of a fair standard of living for the agricultural population; 
c) the stabilization of markets; 
d) regular supplies; 
e) reasonable prices in supplies to consumers. 
(Europa Yearbook 1996: 147) 
The markets for agricultural products were progressively organised following three basic 
principles: 
i) unity of the market (products must be able to circulate freely within the Community 
and markets must be organized according to common rules); 
ii) Community preference (products must be protected from low-cost imports and from 
fluctuations on the world market); 
iii) common financial responsibility: the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) finances, through its Guarantee Section, all public expenditure 
intervention, storage costs, marketing subsidies and export rebates. 
-(; . 
(ibid.: 155) 
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The CAP fixed prices each year at a common level for the community as a whole. This took 
into account the rate of inflation and the need to discourage surplus production of certain 
commodities. Export subsidies were paid to enable farmers to sell produce at the lower world 
market prices without experiencing a loss. These subsidies accounted for approximately 50% 
of EU agricultural spending. When prices for certain cereals,. sugar, some fruits and 
vegetables, dairy produce and meat fell below a designated level, the Community intervened, 
and bought a certain quantity which was then stored until prices recovered. This protectionist 
policy was extremely expensive to maintain and, as a result, the CAP accounted for the largest 
share of the Community's budget. It accounted for around two-thirds of annual expenditure. 
The EAGGF's Guarantee section alone accounted for ECU 38 422,5m, or 51,2% of the total 
budget in 1995 (ibid.). 
In 1990 the CAP came under attack in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The US, in 
particular, demanded massive reductions in the EC's agricultural and export subsidies, on the 
grounds that they disrupted world markets. This resulted in some tension between the US and 
the EU, with the US threatening the imposition of tariffs against EU imports if a rapid system 
of reform was not embarked upon. This led to the imposition of various land limits within the 
EU, removing some land from cultivation. Further, the EU had to reduce its subsidised 
productive volume by 21% and its value by 36% over a six year period. These agreements 
faced strong opposition from the French on the grounds that they were detrimental to French 
farmers. Despite these objections, the reforms were accepted, and formed the basis of the 
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GATT agricultural accord which was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round trade 
agreement (Pinder 1995: 104-105). 
Recent problems have threatened the future of the CAP, particularly the battle between the UK 
and the EU over efforts to prevent the spread of the disease bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(mad cow disease), and the possibility of expanding the EU. The problems between the EU 
and the UK are indicative of the unsustainable nature of the CAP. The expansion of the EU to 
the East would mean the inclusion of countries who have heavily agriculturally based 
economies. The addition of one or more large agricultural countries would have a dramatic 
effect on the entire EU system, should the CAP be extended to these countries as it is currently 
constituted. The Commission has rejected the dismantling of the CAP, along with proposals 
for further radical change. It has asserted that a continuation of the existing reforms would 
have sufficient impact on EU expenditure on agriculture. In September 1995 the Corilrillssion 
adopted proposals to reform the fruit and vegetable sector. In a report on the CAP published 
in December 1995, the Commission envisaged further extensive reductions in the support 
prices for farmers, with compensatory payments being directed towards the role of farmers in 
improving the environment and managing natural resources (Europa Yearbook 1996: 155-
156). 
Any country wanting to export agricultural produce to the EU had to go up against the CAP. 
The preferences that were provided for the ACP in the Lome Convention therefore carried a 
lot of weight when it came to the agricultural relations between the ACP and the ED. The cost 
to the EU was also potentially high, especially with the prospect of EU expansion. The 
probable inclusion of Poland and the Czech Republic at roughly the same time as the expiry of 
Lome had to be given serious consideration. The extension of CAP to Poland and the Czech 
Republic was very likely to stand in the way of renewing the agricultural preferences enjoyed 
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by the ACP. The costs of extending the CAP and renewing the ACP's preferential status 
would not be supportable by the EU in parallel. 
-;t 
A further knock to the EU came in the form of the results on the Tropical Products Round of 
the GATT talks in Uruguay. Under the Tropical Products conditions, all tariffs on these 
commodities would have to be reduced substantially and eventually removed. This outcome 
allowed for very little manoeuvring on the part of the ED. 
It is important to note that while the ACP received certain preferences in terms of the CAP, it 
did not gain free and open access to the agricultural market in Europe. This was the only area 
of ACP-EU trade that faced EU tariffs. The preferences given to ACP states were provided in 
relative terms to other agricultural producers. The ACP group applied for the reduction of 
tariffs on 36% of farm products covered by the CAP at the Lome IV mtr. The EU diclprovide 
some concessions, but was way off the figure called for by the ACP, granting 16% in tariff 
reductions. Quotas were also relaxed or increased for a variety of products such as canned 
tuna, fresh figs and strawberries (Parfitt 1996: 63). 
2.4. Lome: Structure and Characteristics 
One of the main features of the Lome Convention was the principle of non-reciprocity. This 
clause allowed the ACP to treat EU imports as they would those of any other MFNcountry, 
while at the same time gaining preferential access to the EU market. This resulted in a 
deliberate imbalance between the obligations undertaken by the EU and those undertaken by 
the ACP group. It was also one of the primary criticisms of the WTO, as this type of 
relationship was seen to be unsustainable. Any future agreement between the ACP and the EU 
would have to be reciprocal in nature, in light of the WTO ruling that after the expiry of Lome 
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IV in 2000, this relationship would no longer be condoned. Until then, the WTO had issued 
Lome IV a waiver with respect to the reciprocity of trade agreements rule. This factor had 
. strong- implications for a trade agreement between< t~e EU and SA, as any hopes that SA may 
have had of being included in a non-reciprocal trade agreement with the EU were effectively 
neutralised. 
The Lome Convention's regulations with respect to origin of product and cumulation were 
designed to protect against non ACP members using the Lome Convention to gain preferential 
trade access by re-directing their products through ACP countries. The rules of origin stated 
that a product shall be considered to be originating in the ACP States if it has been either 
wholly obtained or sufficiently worked or processed in the ACP States (Lome IV mtr 1995: 
Protocol 1, Title 1, Article 1). This required that the ACP country perform at least 50% of 
the processing. Cumulation stated that, for the purpose of implementing the origin of product 
rules, the ACP, EU and OCT (Overseas Countries or Territories) 9would be treated as one 
area. This allowed that if products wholly obtained in the Community or in the OCT undergo 
working or processing in the ACP States, they shall [then} be considered as having-oeen 
wholly obtained in the ACP States (Lome IV mtr 1995: Protocol 1, Title 1, Article 6.2). The 
rules surrounding the origin of products, and the procedures governing them, were complex 
and required detailed declarations. In order to prevent illegal free access to their market, this 
strict watch over the origin of products was seen as vitally important by the EU. The 
regulations on cumulation were supposed to promote trade and co-operation within the ACP-
EU-OCT region. The Lome IV mtr added a point 5 to its rules on cumulation, stating: At the 
request of the ACP States, products originating in a neighbouring developing country, other 
than an ACP State, belonging to a coherent geographical entity, shall be considered as 
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originating in the ACP State where they undergo further working or processing ... (ibid.: 
Article 6.5). A list of provisions following this stated thatthe majority of the processing had to 
. be carried out by theACP State, and that there 'Y~s to be adequate ACP-EU administrative 
procedures with these other countries to ensure correct implementation of this paragraph. 
The rules of origin carried some disincentives to ACP trade development. The origin of 
primary products was relatively easy to prove, and the declaration of these products was a 
simple process. Once a product had been processed in some way, it remained the task of the 
ACP State to prove its origin. This was particularly problematic when it came to fisheries, and 
fisheries by-products that were processed on factory ships. The regulations of origin of 
product required that processing be carried out on a ship with at least 50% ACP-EU-OCT 
ownership, registered in an ACP State, and of which at least 50% of the crew, officers and 
masters included, were nationals of States party to the Convention, or of an OCT. The ability 
of ACP states to process products was limited and they lost a lot of trade potential through this 
limitation. Further, the lack of willingness on the part of the EU to recognise countries that 
were eligible for Article 6.5 of Protocol 1 was impeding ACP trade development. This dtseis 
particularly relevant to a EU-SA case study, as origin of product and cumulation are two of the 
Lome benefits that SA has applied for. To date these requests have been turned down. 
According to Cosgrove (1994: 231), these rules determined the conditions under which a 
country could benefit from preferential treatment in the trade of export goods; that is, to meet 
the requirements of sufficient processing in a particular country or cumulatively in the ACP 
group. In the Lome IV mtr the ACP States requested that these rules of origin be reviewed. 
The European Community was not very co-operative on this. Opposition was made initially on 
9 The OCT states are those countries included in Part IV of the Treaty on the European Union, and consists of 
countries and territories historically linked to member states of the EU. They are considered EU member states 
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technical grounds, stating that the issue was too complicated to get into. The ACP group 
pushed the EU on this issue, and the result was the addition of Article 6.5. The ACP States 
. felt that the right balance of promoting industrial qeyelopment, and the constraints imposed by 
their currently low level of industrialisation, was not being struck. In the words of the 
European Commission's Information Memo after the signing of Lome IV mt:: t~e Community 
believed that the rules did strike a good balance, which was why it had not wanted to open 
negotiations on the subject (European Commission Information Memo: Signing in Mauritius 
of the Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lome, 4 November 1995: 
11 ). 
2.5. STABEX and SYSMIN 
According to AB. Beye, a former President of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, STABEX 
(the stabilisation of export earnings) was the "main pillar" of the Lome Convention (cited in 
Ravenhill 1985: 99). The aims and provisions of STABEX were contained in Article 186 of 
the Lome Convention: 
1. With the aim of remedying the harmful effects of the instability of export earnings 
and to help the ACP States overcome one of the main obstacles to the stability, 
profitability and sustainable growth of their economies, to support their development 
efforts and to enable them in this way to ensure economic and social progress for 
their peoples by helping to safeguard their purchasing power, a system shall be 
operated to guarantee the stabilization of export earning derived from the ACP 
States' exports to the Community or other destinations as defined in Article 189, of 
products on which their economies are dependent and which are affected by 
fluctuations in the price or quantity or both these factors. 
by virtue of this close historical relation. These include Greenland, the Falkland Islands and French Polynesia. 
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2. In order to attain these objectives, transfers shall be devoted, in accordance with a 
framework of mutual obligations to be agreed between the ACP State concerned 
and the Commission in each case, either to the sector, interpreted in the widest 
-It ~ 
possible sense, that recorded the loss of export earning and be used there for the 
benefit of economic operators adversely affected by this loss, or, where appropriate, 
to diversification, either for use in other appropriate productive sectors inJ)ril1ciple 
agricultural, or for the processing of agricultural products. 
(Lome IV mtr 1995, Article 186) 
SYSMIN provided for a similar mechanism when it came to minerals. SYSMIN was aimed at 
those ACP States whose economies were largely mineral based. SYSMIN aimed to contribute 
towards establishing a more solid, and wider, basis for the development of the ACP States 
(Lome IV mtr 1995: Article 214,2). SYSMIN was primarily a financing facility to boost the 
income of countries who had suffered adversely under a dramatic change in metals and 
minerals prices. 
What was immediately evident in looking at ST ABEX and SYSMIN were the complicated 
ways in which they were presented. This level of complication extended to the various 
conditionalities, rules and procedures attached to the system. This was one of the primary 
complaints levelled by the ACP against ST ABEX; the system was seen to be rendered largely 
ineffective through being hampered by conditionalities which delayed access to their resources 
for long periods (Ambassador Cumberbatch, ECDPM 1996: 70). SYSMIN also proved to be 
painfully slow in disbursing its aid (Parfitt 1996: 54). 
Despite these drawbacks, the systems of S T ABEX and SYSMIN were seen by the ACP as two 
of the more beneficial aspects of the Lome Convention as they were dealing directly with 
countering the imbalance in development between the ACP and the ED. The ACP had also 
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called for the continuation of ST ABEX and SYSMIN in any future agreements between the 
ACP and the ED. However, they had made a request that the mechanisms of ST ABEX and 
. SYSMIN be made more user friendly. The Lom¢ IV mtr did not alter the structures of 
ST ABEX and SYSMIN at all, but a few small proposals by the EC were accepted without 
opposition by the ACP. 
Proponents of liberal trade would argue that the existence of artificial mechanisms to support 
ineffective and inefficient productive sectors is unsustainable and does not lead to a healthy 
long term outlook. This is a problem being faced by the ACP, as the future of Lome looks 
increasingly unclear. Member States of the Convention that had economies relying on single 
products, whether agricultural or mineral, had been protected and supported by the ST ABEX 
and SYSMIN mechanisms. The presence of these mechanisms had kept their productive 
sectors running, and had, in some cases, provided incentives not to diversify their economies. 
If the EU decided not to renew the ST ABEX and SYSMIN mechanism in the trade and 
development agreement likely to follow Lome IV, then these countries would find themselves 
. "'" - . 
in a very difficult situation. Their industries would have to face the global market head on 
without having been exposed to the natural fluctuations in the prices of their exports. It is 
unlikely that these industries would be able to survive without the support of the EU. 
2.6. Lome IV and the mid-term review 
Lome IV was signed in Lome on 15 December 1989 and came into force on 1 March 1990 
(Vernier 1996: 8). It was different from its predecessors in that it was given a 10 year life 
span, as opposed to the shorter terms given to the previous Conventions. This 10 year period 
allowed for a mid-term review of the Convention and divided the financial protocol into two 
parts, the second part to be negotiated after five years. The focus of Lome IV was to "provide 
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a firm and solid foundation for trade co-operation between the ACP States and the 
Community", with the aim of "promoting and diversifying ACP exports" (Cosgrove 1994: 
. 224).-The aim of LomtUV was to try to increaseJh.e effectiveness of the Lome Convention in 
making preferential trade work for the ACP. The result was a ground breaking commitment 
from the EC to assist ACP States in [deriving) the maximum benefit from the provisions of 
_. . 
this Convention in the fields of trade, agricultural and industrial co-operation. .. under the 
most favourable conditions in the Community, domestic, sub-regional, regional and 
international markets by diversifying the range and increasing the value and the volume of 
ACP States' trade in goods and services (cited in Cosgrove 1994: 236). Title X of Lome IV, 
Articles 135 to 138, focused on trade development, committing the contracting parties to the 
development of trade "at all stages up to final distribution of the product". These provisions 
were meant to harness a wide range of activities to support the development of trad~ and 
diversification of ACP exports. 
The mid-term review took place in 1995, begining in Mbabane, Swaziland, and finally being 
signed in Moka, Mauritius. This meeting of the Lome Convention was particularly important 
to South Africa as it was granted a special observer status at this meeting, in the expectation 
that the country would some how be accommodated in the future of the Lome Club. The mid-
term review shifted the focus away from preferential access (previously seen as the main way 
of ensuring trade flows from ACP States) for the first time since Lome I. The talks became 
wider in range, emphasising the analysis of factors behind commercial success and the means to 
be applied to ensure such success, through a sectoral, integrated approach. This approach was 
reflected in the addition of two new articles in the Lome IV mtr (6a and 15a) as well as in 
amendments to a number of existing provisions (Articles 50, 51, 136 and 220). Article 15a, in 
particular, deserves closer attention: 
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Trade development shall be aimed at developing, diversifying and increasing the ACP 
States' trade and improving their competitiveness in their domestic markets, the 
regional and intra-ACP market, and in the Community and international markets. The 
Contracting Parties undertake to use all the means available under this Convention, 
including trade co-operation and those on financial and technical co-operation, for the 
achievement of this objective. They also agree to implement the provisions_offvis 
Convention in a coherent and co-ordinated manner. 
(Lome IV mtr, Article 15a) 
The subject was also specifically highlighted in a joint declaration on trade development issued 
by the representatives of the ACP Countries, the Community, and its Member States at the 
time the revised text was signed (Vernier: 1996: 10). 
With regard to ACP products, preferential access for ACP goods in the EC market under the 
Lome IV mtr was based on a horizontal approach, rather than a product-by-product one. 
Time constraints and quantitative restrictions were also lowered. The results meant that, in 
practice, ACP countries would benefit from preferential trade applying to almost all products 
through the year. 
The addition to the rules of origin clause are presented above, and are contained in Article 6, 
Paragraph 5 of Protocol 1. This addition was widely welcomed, despite its restrictions, as a 
major step towards regional co-operation between ACP States and other developing countries. 
2.7. Lome: What has gone wrong 
Although the Lome Convention had been widely criticised by proponents of trade 
liberalisation, the Bretton Woods institutions, the development community and from certain 
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sectors within both the ACP and the ED, there is no evidence to show that the situation would 
have been any better had the Lome Convention never existed. It is futile to look at what 
. would- have been had the Lome Convention either<b~en different, or if it had not been there at 
all. What has to be examined instead are reasons for its failure to bring about a growth in ACP 
trade, and the failure of ACP trade development and diversification. T~s is particularly 
important when it comes to South Africa, as it could provide clues for what to avoid, and what 
to aim for in a new trade and development co-operation agreement. 
In 1989 the EC commissioned a study to determine to what extent ACP tariff preferences were 
being eroded by EC concessions under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). An 
analysis of EC import statistics by volume and value from 1976 to 1986 for all developing 
countries, GSP beneficiaries and the ACP States, indicated that alterations in preference levels 
failed to change trade flows substantially. It was suggested that the reason for this' was the 
volatile nature of the world economy, and the fact that these economies were based mainly on 
primary commodities. The study further showed that the Lome Tariff benefit played a very 
minor role in determining changes in the value of ACP exports. The ACP States felt that -the 
principle constraints to their exports to the European Community were the CAP and Lome 
rules of origin. 
With regard to preference erosIOn, the study could find no evidence in support of this 
phenomena. Instead, what the report discovered was that the principle benefactors of GSP 
were the Asian NICs, whose export profiles bore little resemblance to those of the ACP, and 
therefore should have had very little or no impact on the ACP's preferences. The study found 
that the countries that benefited most from GSP preferences were those with the most dynamic 
economies and the most advanced capacity to expand exports competitively (EEC Trade 
Preferences and ACP Exports: Report to the European Commission, 1989, CTA, Reading, 
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cited in Cosgrove 1994: 231-232). What the report was suggesting, in essence, was that the 
nature of the ACP economies was the reason that they were not able to benefit from the trade 
. preferences, and were U1)able to compete in the intrf!1ational arena. 
The ECDPM report (1996) also examined some of the reasons for the apparent failure of the 
Lome Convention. One of the primary factors indicated by the ECDPM was the disparate 
nature of the ACP as a group. The ECDPM questioned the very existence of the ACP group 
as an homogenous entity, examining its future legitimacy. Some of the problems identified in 
this report are that: 
... it is increasingly difficult to see what "common interests" tie the 70 ACP countries 
together. This tends to weaken their negotiating position towards the EU, while 
reducing the overall effectiveness of the ACP institutions. It may also help to explain 
the limited political leverage of the ACP in other international fora (such as the WTO, ' . 
and the Bretton Woods institutions). Representatives from ACP countries with a good 
"track record" often express their frustration at the EU lumping them together with a 
group of "bad performers". 
(ECDPM report 1996: 13). 
This geographical question extended to the ED group. With the enlargement of the ED the 
newer member states were objecting to the Lome idea, which they saw as a "post-colonial 
relic" and "discriminatory" (ECDPM 1996: 13-14). Further, with the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
ED set out its policy on development co-operation. Both the Lome Convention and the EDF 
stood outside this framework. There was increasing pressure to integrate the Lome 
Convention into the overall policy framework and to "budgetise" the EDF, incorporating it in 
the overall ED budget and procedures (ibid.). 
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Critics of the Lome Convention had been accusing the Convention of being part of the problem 
rather than the solution. These arguments focused on the type of trade relationship that 
existed between the EU and the ACP, saying tb~t Lome was institutionalising a'state of 
dependency. The relationship that was originally supposed to be a partnership had evolved 
into a situation that was displaying paternalism and clientelism as the Community took the lead 
~- -:": 
in bot~ decision-making and implementation. The ACP members did not seem to have the 
expertise or the capacity to become involved in decision making and, where they were 
involved, the EC tended to take a very sceptical approach to projects motivated from within 
the ACP (ECDPM 1996: 5). The result was that the ACP was allowing the EC to take 
command of the situation, and to dictate and dominate. Any proposals on their initiative were, 
more often than not, rejected. Part of this problem was that in the past ED officials had 
encountered a lack of interest in Lome in the ACP countries, and consequently, did not e~pect 
new ideas to come from this source. 
Part of this problem was a lack of information in the ACP states on what the Lome Convention 
had to offer. Real understanding seemed to be confined to a few officials in each country -~ho 
were responsible for the day to day management of resources provided through Lome. The 
reasons for this lack of knowledge could be partly attributed to a lack of openness in 
governments, to the complex nature of the Convention, and to inadequate information 
disseminated from the ED and its delegations. There was a concerted effort being made to 
distribute information on Lome beyond the National Authorising Officers in each ACP State. 
Information was being targeted at line ministries, and many private and non-governmental 
organisations. The reason for this was that research had shown that there was a large reservoir 
of enthusiasm and interest in this sector that was waiting to be tapped (ECDPM 1996: 4-5). 
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The post-Maastricht abolition of EC national non-tariff barriers had very little effect on the 
ACP export market. The ED had implemented a strict ED imposed quality control, specifying 
. quality requirements at a regional level. This allo.w.ed it to control and enforce the standards 
requirements, with no products being allowed to enter the ED market without first being 
cleared. The cost of getting the required stamp of approval by the ED was o~en yrohibitive to 
ACP ~ountries, and many regulations appear to be designed to act purely as barriers to trade. 
To pass a manufactured product through the quality control required the manufacturer to have 
the entire manufacturing process checked by a European quality control company, at a 
formidable cost to the manufacturer. Regulations on the import of agricultural products, 
especially fruit and vegetables, were multifarious, especially when it came to the use of 
fertilisers and pesticides. This in combination with the CAP provided a formidable barrier to 
ACP agricultural trade. 
2.8. Lome: The future 
However one looks at it, the Lome Convention as it has existed for the past 20 years is about 
to end. Pressure from the WTO, from within the ED, and evidence of its failure will mean that 
the post 2000 ED-ACP relations will be dramatically different. Negotiations for the post 2000 
agreement are due to begin in 1998 and both sides are beginning to prepare their negotiating 
positions. There is some concern about the negotiating position of the ACP never developing, 
in view of the aforementioned lack of knowledge and lack of interest in the Convention outside 
of specific government circles. For this reason, the ECDPM has embarked on a massive 
campaign to assist the ACP in developing a negotiating framework. Part of this is getting 
NGOs, private industries and organisations and civil society involved and informed in what 
Lome has to offer. In this way the ECDPM hopes to bring more scope to the discussion. 
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One of the key areas being looked at in the future of the relations is the legitimacy of the ACP 
countries as an homogenous entity. As mentioned above, the region is becoming increasingly 
- divides, and the gap between African issues and<t~ose in the Pacific and the Caribbean are 
difficult to reconcile. The ACP is also divided on this issue, as some countries were benefiting 
more from the arrangement than others. The ACP group was also accorded very little 
r- -
legitimacy by the other international institutions such as the WTO and the Bretton Woods 
institutions. This question will have to be seriously considered as a non-functioning group can 
not be beneficial to any future relations. The ACP as a group has tremendous potential to 
unite and use their combined voice to create a formidable negotiating entity. This, however, 
appears to be an unlikely scenario. 
What is inevitable is the termination of the non-reciprocal side to the trade relations. This has 
to alter as the WTO and other international institutions will no longer tolerate it. 'The ED 
member states are also no longer willing to support this type of relationship. The question is, 
how to introduce reciprocity without the ACP suffering serious adverse effects. The 
European Research Office in Brussels presented the scenario in Table 2 as a starting point" for 
considering future ED trade policy. The ERO presented two possible options for ending the 
non-reciprocal relations, and examined a few possible implications of these options. However, 
as indicated by the ERa table (Table 2), the impact on individual countries is difficult to 
assess, as the differentiation between countries is so great (ERO table and information cited in 
Lome 2000 no. I, 1996: 2). 
Table 2: Future EU Trade Policy - A Scenario (Source: ERO cited in Lome 2000 no.1, 1996: 2). 
EU position? Non reciprocal trade preferences must end 
How can non End trade Introduce 
reciprocity end? preferences reciprocity 
Implications of 
• end special • revenue 
each option protocols (sugar, implications 
rum, bananas) • impact of increased 
• end agricultural competition on 
market access domestic industry 
under annex XL • impact on trade 
• end ACP type policy towards 
access for other other OECD 
sensitive products countries 
(e.g. fisheries • trade diverting or 
products) trade creating? 
• end general trade • macro-economIC 
preferences policy 
Impact on ? ? individual country 
The example of EU-South African 
negotiations 
1. non-reciprocal preferences not 
possible 
2. only option for reciprocal 
preferences which is WTO 
compatible is a FT A 
3. Such an FT A must: 
• cover at least 90% of trade 
• introduce full reciprocity within 
10 years (exceptionally 12 years) 
• involve moves towards 
reciprocity beginning year 1 
Question: 
does the E U intend to use the same 
WTO compatible approach towards 
ACP regions? 
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The ECDPM outlined four possible scenarios for future Lome preferences. A summary of 
these options are briefly presented: 
1. Preserve the status quo (with marginal changes). This option makes a clear 
choice for continuity. Its proponents argue that the ACP group functions relatively 
well. It makes little sense to break up this structure in the absence of alfernative 
arrangements that offer similar political and institutional benefits to its members. It 
allows for a limited number of new members to join the ACP group (including South 
Africa and Cuba), in order to promote regional coherence. EU demands for 
flexibility and differentiation could be accommodated within the existing framework, 
either through a diversified use of the instruments for financial and technical co-
operation, or through a refinement of phased programming. From a strategic point 
of view, it is quite understandable that many ACP people defend this option. 
However, a status quo proposal is not likely to generate much support at EU level, 
nor will it offer solid guarantees against further marginalisation of the ACP group. 
2. Extend the benefits of Lome. The idea here is to abandon the geographical 
approach in favour of equal treatment for countries with comparable levels of 
development. This proposal is supported by several EU Member States. For equity __ 
reasons, they want to extend the benefits provided by a future co-operation 
agreement to other poor (least-developed) countries. This would be consistent with 
the overall poverty alleviation focus, contained in the Treaty of Maastricht 
development co-operation objectives. Proponents of this option also argued that 
the trade agreement for the ACP as a group was partly challenged in the WTO 
because it discriminates against countries with comparable levels of development. 
However, this option also carries risks. The "newcomers" would probably include 
highly populated countries in south-east Asia (Bangladesh) and, depending on the 
criteria used, perhaps also countries such as India or China. Such an extension 
would lead to a major redistribution and dilution of available financial resources -
mainly at the expense of Africa. It would also jeopardise EC attempts to obtain 
greater political leverage by concentrating its development co-operation efforts. 
3. Vary the geometry. This option proposes a Lome "umbrella agreement" as the 
basic framework, objectives and principles of co-operation. The more detailed 
aspects of co-operation would be covered by sub-agreements to which certain 
groups of countries would be eligible. The main benefit of this option would be to 
reconcile, to a large extent, the concerns of the defenders of the status quo and 
those who would like to see a greater differentiation. The ECDPM proposes four 
~ - " 
options for geographic breakdown: 
i) Geographically break the ACP down into three separate groups: Caribbean, sub-
Saharan African and Pacific. This would have different effects on the different 
groups and these are discussed in more detail in the report. 
ii) Development indicators could also be used as a unit to break down. In this option, 
countries with similar levels of development are grouped together. The purpose 
here is to treat countries like Mozambique, who are very poor, differently to 
relatively high income countries like Barbados. 
iii) Content of a la carte. This option divides the ACP down into smaller regional 
groupings, offering different Lome sub-agreements according to the nature and 
content of the co-operation relationship. A menu of options would be available to 
the ACP countries and caters more for their specific needs. 
iv) Performance. This is the policy option of a number of European policy-makers. It 
offers the introduction of differentiated treatment on the basis of "performance 
criteria". This proposal is consistent with the "new politics of aid" which emphasises 
the need for credible partners in development co-operation, with good governance 
and accountability. Under this scenario, countries are classified according to a 
political scale, e.g.: "deep political and social turmoil"; "reforming economies"; "early 
stages of economic reform". Proponents argue that such categories could help to 
identify the most appropriate support packages. 
4. Dismantle the ACP. This is the most radical approach. It begins with the premise 
that there will no longer be an "umbrella Lome agreement". In this scenario, the EU 
would probably negotiate a new set of separate agreements with each of the three 
regions of the ACP group. Another possibility is to associate some ACP countries to 
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existing arrangements (the Caribbean might have a jOint agreement with Central 
America). The most radical scenario would be one where the EU incorporated all 
the ACP states within its broader developmen.tal concept, and negotiated separate 
agreements with each country individually: . 
(summary of ECDPM options: ECDPM Report 1996: 16-19) 
43 
With the future of Lome looking so uncertain, and its past looking so unsuccessful, it IS 
imperative that South Mrica not rush into a trade agreement with the European Union, but 
examine all the options carefully. South Mrican Parliamentarian, Dr. Rob Davies, noted that 
South Mrica and the ACP group had a unique opportunity to influence each other's future 
relations with the EU (Statements at FGD Conference, J()hannesburg, October 1996). This 
potentially influential relationship is examined in more detail later. For now it is important to 
note that, while South Mrica had no official trade links with the ACP group within the Lome 
Convention, the ACP and the post-apartheid South Africa have been mutually supportive. 
It is primarily in the fourth option presented by the ECDPM that South Africa could have an 
influence on the ACP. A trade agreement negotiated between South Africa and the ED CQuid 
set a precedent for future agreements signed between the ACP and the ED. The potential to 
break out of the mould of current North-South relations is also contained within this 
agreement. The following chapter examines the relations between South Mrica and the EU, 
with particular focus on the establishment of trade and development relations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOUTH AFRICA AND TUlt EUROPEAN UNION 
3.1.1. Pre-elections: From Sanctions to Co-operation 
The release of Nelson Mandela from prison on 13 February 1990, and the announcement by 
then President F.W. de Klerk of a programme for reform in South Africa, prompted the British 
government to unilaterally drop certain EC sanctions against South Africa. While this decision 
was a contravention of the Single European Act, and was also seen as a premature decision by 
many anti-apartheid groups, it none the less represented a major turning point in EC relations 
with South Africa. The EC was compelled to consider the implications of a post-apartheid 
South Africa and what this would mean to SA-EC relations. A fact finding Troika was sent to 
South Africa in April 1990 to report back to the Twelve on prospects for "promoting the 
launching of a national dialogue" amongst all political parties in South Africa (cited in Holland 
1995 b: 59). The Troika was encouraged by the prospects for substantive talks especially after 
the success of the first official ANC-Govemment meeting in May 1990 (Holland 1995 b: 59). 
The acceleration of this change led to the unbanning of all political organisations and the 
relaxation of the State of Emergency (except in Natal). The government of SA had also 
committed itself to bringing about a non-racial democracy and to commencing negotiations on 
a future South Africa with all representative groups. The Community issued a statement that 
their objectives with regard to South Africa were to bring about: 
the complete dismantlement of the apartheid system, by peaceful means and without 
delay, and its replacement by a united, non-racial and democratic State in which all 
people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and where respect for universally 
recognized human rights is guaranteed ... 
- It is the intention of the European Community C!n? its Member States to encourage by 
every means available to them the early opening of negotiations leading to the creation 
of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. 
(cited in Holland 1995 b: 60) 
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The eagerness displayed by Britain for the relaxation of sanctions against South Africa and the 
normalisation of the relationship was being countered by opposition from Denmark and 
Ireland, both historically strong, anti-apartheid countries. The EC had to reconcile these 
differing perceptions and the result, according to Holland; was an EPC statement reflecting 
flexibility and accommodation for these opposing viewpoints. The pressure of measures to 
promote the profound and irreversible changes that had been adopted in Strasbourg in,J 989 
were maintained, but were coupled with a new willingness to consider a gradual relaxation of 
this pressure when there is further clear evidence that the process of change already initiated 
continues in the direction calledfor Strasbourg (cited ibid.: 60). 
While these responses were all relevant and necessary to the development of change, they were 
merely responding to change in SA, and not looking towards a future of co-operation. The 
concern was to bring about an end to apartheid, and provide support for this change. In this 
way, the EU provided invaluable support for South Africa's transition. While the rest of the 
EU largely sidelined the South Mrican issue while negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, the 
British government took the initiative to investigate future EU-SA relations. The UK 
Government's Overseas Development Administration commissioned the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) to consider the effects of different trade arrangements befl,veen 
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the EC and South Africa in a post-apartheid world (Stevens and Kennan 1991: Annex 1: 
Terms of Reference/Scope of Work). The mandate givento the study was to examine: 
-;t • 
the present structure of South African exports by destination and commodity, 
desegregating the latter to a degree sufficient to reflect EC trade regulations; 
the export structure which is likely to emerge under a majority government hTthe 1990s, 
_ taking due account of the developments in both external factors (eg an end to 
sanctions, the GATT Uruguay Round, changing trade patterns etc) and internal factors 
(eg changes in government policy on support to agriculture and industry, land reform, 
industry ownership and organisation etc), on the assumption that South Africa's trade 
arrangements with the EC undergo no significant change beyond an end to sanctions; 
the effects of various options for more preferential EC-South African trade 
arrangements to include a) GSP, b) Lome membership, c) a Co-operation agreement 
on the Asia/Latin America or Mediterranean models and d) an "appropriate" hybrid of 
these. 
(Stevens and Kennan 1991: Annex 1: Terms of Reference/Scope of Work) 
The study was also charged with examining these factors and their effects, not only on South 
Mrica and the EC, but also on third party countries, particularly South Mrica's neighbouring 
states, taking account of all salient factors. 
Stevens and Kennan identified six options for future possible trade relations between South 
Africa and the EC. The six options identified, in order of preference to South Mrica were: 
• full signatory membership of the Lome Convention; 
• 'associate' Lome Convention status; 
• a non-reciprocal association agreement; 
• a reciprocal association agreement; 
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• the Generalised System of Preferences; 
• standard most favoured nation status. 
(Stevens and Kennan 1991: 1) 
-< 
One of the problems outlined by the Stevens and Kennan study was the lack of accurate 
statistics on South Africa. The reasons for this were numerous and included deliberate 
manipulation of trade figures by the South African government and the diversion of trade as a 
result of sanctions. The problem of inaccuracy of South African trade statistics exists to date, 
with the Department of Trade and Industry lacking a statistical analysing capability and relying 
on often inadequate Customs and ExciseTecords to get their information. 
The ODI report identified minerals as South Africa's largest concentration of exports to the 
EC. This sector could not benefit any more from preferential trade agreements, IlOI'" from 
increased revenues. Neither (except in the case of coal) would it have presented the EC or any 
of its developing country trading partners with a competitive challenge. Coal should not have 
posed a problem as the EC could protect its domestic interests under any of the prefer_eptial 
options (ibid.: 2-3). 
Apart from minerals, there were a number of commodities, mainly deciduous fruits, among 
South Africa's top twenty-five exports to the EC, for which trade preferences were seen to be 
beneficial. These commodities, although not the most important sources of export revenue for 
South Africa, were identified as labour intensive, and therefore important to South Africa's 
labour market. The report identified the only countries to potentially suffer from increased 
competition to be Chile and Argentina, and this effect would only have been marginal. The 
principal adverse effect for the EC would have been a loss of customs revenue. However. the 
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area of agricultural trade proved to be the most contentious in later developments of a trade 
agreement between the EU and SA. 
The primary concern identified by the ODI report in 1991 was that of future exports. The 
desirable scenario for South Afuca would have been trade diversification into new, and 
preferably labour intensive, export commodities. Such new exports were seen as likely to be 
associated either with a change to past trade/industrial policy or to a number of major mineral 
beneficiation projects that had been started. Other possible new exports that could have 
provided some concern for developing countries were textiles and clothing. This concern was 
especially appropriate to the EU in 1991 as their Multifibre Arrangement had recently expired 
(Stevens and Kennan 1991: 3). 
The tentative conclusion drawn by the report indicated that a liberal trade regime could offer 
significant benefits to South Africa, even with its current export mix. Further, it was apparent 
that there would not be as many contrary effects for developing countries, or to the EC, as had 
been expected. Existing exports certainly did not present serious problems and any ~'new 
exports" were seen as unlikely to reach substantial proportions much before the end of the next 
decade, at best. 
The report identified the Lome Convention as the option offering South Afuca the greatest 
benefits, as well as being the least disruptive to Southern African intra-regional trade. The 
report suggested that, should a future South Afucan government seek Lome membership, the 
EC should give the request serious consideration. It recognised that South Afuca's economy, 
while sharing many of the characteristics, was not typical of an ACP state. The nature of 
Lome IV was seen to preclude carte blanche entry to most of the sensitive products of current 
interest to South Afuca. The value of Lome to SA would therefore depend very much on a 
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product-by-product negotiation, for such items as pears and grapes, to increase and extend 
provisions that were negotiated for the existing ACP states. The result was that full 
. memoership of Lome would have provided the EC, and other interested parties, with just as 
many opportunities to tailor preferences on sensitive items as would any of the other options. 
If full Lome membership was precluded on non-trade grounds, the most adv~antageous option 
for SQuth African would then be an associate Lome Convention status. 
This interim report provided the groundwork for a more comprehensive ODT report presented 
by Sheila Page and Christopher Stevens in 1992. By this stage, most sanctions on trade and 
investment against South Africa had been lifted. This had.proved to be just about as difficult 
as instituting them had been. The Danish Government had failed to win parliamentary support 
for the removal of Community sanctions and, under the EPC, the decision to lift sanctions had 
to be unanimous. The sanctions were finally lifted during the first half of 1992, when the 
Danish government withdrew its reservations (Holland 1995 b: 62). The ODI report, entitled 
Trading with South Africa: The policy options for the EC, presented itself as look[ing] at the 
-
role of the trade regimes which EC countries could offer to [South Africa] in the context of its 
new needs and objectives (Page and Stevens 1992: vii). This refined report probed South 
Africa's trade composition more closely, making use of detailed import data from South 
Africa's major trading partners, the EC countries, the US, Japan, Zimbabwe and Taiwan. 
These, together with the available South Africa data, provided the material to build a picture of 
South African exports with which the EC could work. The existence of some representative 
trade figures for South Africa were essential to any agreement between the country and any 
other in the world. The competitive nature of global trade did not allow for a country to enter 
into a trade agreement with another country without first assessing the full extent of the impact 
that such an agreement could have on the domestic economy. The efforts of the ODI in this 
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research were thus a fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of any trading regime that 
South Mrica could enter into. 
-~ 
A more serious concern outlined by the report was that the comparative advantage of South 
Mrica's industry could not be accurately assessed due to the substantial and sustained 
distortion to the South African economy over past decades. The complex set of import taxes 
and tariff duties on manufactured goods, plus the subsidisation of local industries, made it 
virtually impossible to identify accurately the items that the country might be able to export 
competitively in the future (cmd hence the degree to which other developing countries might 
face competition) (ibid.: 3). This issue was of particular concern to South Africa as these 
industries, many of them large and state owned, provided for many jobs in the depressed 
economy. 
The other area of uncertainty identified by the report was the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
negotiations. The Uruguay Round had not yet been completed, and it was unclear how far it 
would take generalised liberalisation on any of the products of interest to South Africa. ~ This 
meant that the potential value of trade preferences to South Africa was very unclear. For this 
reason, the report advised that it was not sensible to attempt a detailed quantification of the 
potential benefits for South Africa at that stage. 
The significance of these two ODI reports is that they identified the positions that South Mrica 
could assume when embarking on formulating trade relations with the EC. The factors 
identified by the reports were largely proved to be accurate well into the post-elections period, 
and remained the basic foundation on which any negotiations would be built. The report also 
identified the dilemma faced by South Mrica with regard to its classification within the 
WTO/GATT as a developed country, when it displays an overwhelming number of 
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characteristics of a developing country. This classification is not just pragmatism, but carries 
substantial consequences for the country. The regulations of the GATT and later the WTO 
. made- special provisions for developing countries that were not extended to developed 
countries. Further, and more importantly, the EU had special relationship structures for 
developing countries, the most easily accessible being the GSP. Of the six r~gime options 
identLfied by the ODI report, all but one of them required South Africa to have developing 
country status. 
The EC position on South Africa had become far more accommodating during this period. 
The lowering ofEC sanctions was coupled with diplomatiestatements in support of the change 
in South Africa, with particular support being given to CODESA (Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa) and the return of refugees. At the same time, the EC was critical of 
,-
the continued detention of political prisoners and the alleged involvement of the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) in instigating violence. The Danish government proposed that the EC 
adopt initiatives to reduce tension and violence in South Africa, such as supervision of the 
-
security forces, police training and monitoring of the electoral processes. Increasing violence 
in South Africa, and the ANC's boycott of the CODESA process, prompted further strong 
criticism from the EC. The EC's position was subdued as domestic problems surrounding the 
signing of the Maastricht treaty were preventing any concerted foreign policy actions (Holland 
1995 b: 62-63). 
An EC Troika visit to South Africa in September 1992 resulted in an EC observer team being 
sent to South Africa under UN Resolution 772. This team, which was known as ECOMSA 
(the EC Observer Mission to South Africa), arrived in South Africa in late October 1992. The 
team, consisting of policemen, lawyers and economists, was given the task to seek, [through J 
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their presence in situations of potential conflict, to prevent violence, defuse tensions and 
promote peace (Foreign Ministers 1992, cited in Holland 1995 b: 63). 
-,: . 
The period that followed proved extremely difficult for South Africa, and fears of a breakdown 
in the peace process ran high. Throughout this period the EC provided support in the form of 
funding development projects, and providing support for the democracy education process. 
The EC budget for South Africa had been increased to 90m ECU, representing the EC's 
largest contribution to any country in Mrica. 
The major breakthrough in South African-EC relations came with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union, which came into effect on 1 November 1993 1°. Under this treaty 
the Union was divided into three pillars: The first (Titles II, III and IV) amended the EEC, 
ECSC and Euratom treatiesll (as revised most recently by the Single Act), formallY naming 
them the European Community. The second pillar (Title V) concerned foreign and security 
policy and was built upon the existing intergovernmental procedures of European Political Co-
operation. The third (Title VI) covered justice and home affairs. The first and last sections of 
the Treaty (Titles I and VII) comprised a Preamble and Final Provision and sought to bind the 
three pillars together into the European Union (Duff et al 1994: 19). The member states of the 
Union set up institutions to govern the Communities. This novel system of government 
created significant federal-type elements represented by the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice. These coexist alongside the European Council and the 
Council of ministers, which represent the member governments in which ultimate power is still 
firmly vested. Collectively these institutions, together with associated consultative bodies, 
provide a series of arenas where the concerted collective effort required in the building of the 
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EC is continued. The process now extends far beyond governmental and business circles and 
engages many hundreds of thousands of people in almost every walk of life (ibid.: 8). 
Under the Treaty European Political Co-operation (EPC) was replaced by a more effective 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). South Africa was adopted as one of the first 
topics for "joint action" under the auspices of the EU and the CFSP. South Africa took its 
place amongst four other initial foreign actions, these being the promotion of peace and 
security in Europe, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia and the elections in Russia. On the 
7 December 1993 it was decided that, under the CFSP, the transition towards a democratic 
and non~racia1 South Africa would be supported through: 
a co-ordinated programme of assistance in preparing for and monitoring of the elections 
of April 1994, and through 
the creation of an appropriate co-operation framework to consolidate the economic and 
social foundations of this transition. 
(EC MEM0/95/61: 49) 
This resulted in the active participation of the EU in the build up to the South African 
elections, providing voter education and monitoring of the electoral process. On 15 December 
1993 the Community dropped the last of its sanctions against South Africa (the ban on nuclear 
collaboration and cessation of exports of sensitive equipment to the police and security forces). 
Diplomatic relations were normalised on 14 December with the signing of a diplomatic accord 
which facilitated the formal opening of the Commission Delegation in Pretoria (Holland 1995 
b: 70). 
10 It was at this point that the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU). 
II The EEC, ECSC, and Euratom Treaties were the three treaties that, starting with the ECSC in 1950. which 
led to European Union. 
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3.2 The New South Africa: From Apartheid to Democracy 
. By the time of the ele~tions in South Africa, the European Union had firmly established a 
-i{ ~ 
policy of support for change in South Africa, as well as the diplomatic structures to support 
their policy. The European Commission sent an exploratory mission to South Mrica in early 
1994 to assess what support the country should be given to help it emerge successfully through 
its transition. The result of this mission was the proposal of a package of immediate measures 
to be given to South Mrica on the occasion of the inauguration of the new President. The 
package was intended to: 
.. . send a strong political Signal to the incoming government and to the South African 
population, thus proving [the EU'sJ firm determination to support the transition towards 
democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development 
of South Africa after the elections. 
(Article 1, European Council 6294/94: 5) 
It was suggested that these immediate measures 
[BeJ aimed at addressing the immediate needs and aspirations of SA, without prejudice 
as to the form of the future more global arrangement between the two parties (EUlSA), 
should be autonomous in nature and should help create the foundation upon which a 
long-term relationship could be built. 
[BeJ Included as part of the initial package of measures should be the announcement of 
the EU's intention to work for the earliest possible lifting of remaining UN sanctions and 
concurrently to withdraw related EU measures. 
should also include an offer to conclude the agreement quickly, 
should have a simplified structure and contain measures that can be quickly put into 
effect. The practical purpose of this agreement would be to provide the legal basis for 
the development of future co-operation with the new SA government and the allocation, 
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as appropriate, of the corresponding funds from the Community budget. It should have 
only a few articles including: 
a strong human rights clause, making the respect of democracy and human rights 
an essential element of the new relationship between the EU and South Africa; 
a comprehensive co-operation clause, which could be drafted flexibly to include 
~ -
future development, covering all areas of co-operation which are within the limits of 
the respective powers of the Parties; 
provisions wherever necessary to enable the EU (or SA, as may be the case) to 
engage in specific co-operation activities or the further development of certain 
policies. 
- [Furthermore] provision should be laid down, in parallel,-in order to provide access to 
the appropriate budget lines for the funding of activities under this Agreement and 
an offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should 
the new govemment so request. 
(Article 2, ibid.: 5-6) 
These proposals were adopted at the Council of Ministers Meeting in Luxembourg on 19 _~pril 
1994. The conjecture was that this would be followed by a more comprehensive agreement 
that would be negotiated between the new South African government and the ED. 
The package that was presented to South Africa by the European Union on 10 May 1994 
consisted of 
Improved market access, through granting the benefits of GSP to South Africa, taking 
into account - inter alia - the specific characteristics of South Africa and the interests of 
other countries in the region; 
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An offer to provide South Africa with technical assistance in order to facilitate the 
opening-up of the South African market and the gradual integration of South Africa in 
the world economy; 
-~ 
Encouragement of and technical support to the process of regional economic co-
operation; 
Promotion of EU investments in small and medium-sized enterprises in SA~ through the 
_ instruments of ECIP (European Community Investment Partners) and BC-Net 
(Business Co-operation Network), and through the encouragement of bilateral 
investment protection agreements between EU Member States and South Africa; 
Preparation of co-operation in areas like industry, commerce, telecommunication, 
science and technology, education and training; 
Continuation of the Special Programme for SA at a substantial level of expenditure; 
Introduction of a political dialogue between the EU and the new government of SA. 
(European Commission MEMO/95/61: 50). 
Following a second exploratory mission of the Commission in July 1994, the simplified co-
operation agreement between the EU and SA was formulated. This was signed in October and 
approved by the Council in December 1994. The agreement was described by the Commission 
as an elementary text which basically contains a mutual undertaking to co-operate in all 
areas of respective competencies (ibid.). Other than the political implications and the 
rhetorical support contained in the interim agreement, the significance for South Mrica was 
minor. The most significant part of the agreement was South Mrica's inclusion under the 
European Union's General System of Preferences (GSP). 
The end of 1994 saw three important meetings for South Africa's relations with the EU: 
Firstly the EU-Southern Africa Council of Ministers meeting in Berlin12; secondly, an ACP 
12 This meeting is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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Council of Ministers meeting; and lastly, a Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting. In 
November, at the ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting, South Africa's Minister of Trade and 
. Industry, Mr Trevor Manuel, formally applied for; t:Ull membership of the Lome Convention. 
This application was made in response to the offer from the European Union to negotiate a 
comprehensive long-term relationship with South Mrica. Applying for L.?m~ membership 
appeared to be the best option open to South Africa, as it not only offered the country the best 
trade preferences possible, but also accommodated the regional aspect of Southern Mrican 
trade. South Africa was the only one of the 11 SADC countries that was not a member of 
Lome. Mr Manuel recognised that Pretoria's accession to Lome would have to occur in a 
manner minimising the negative consequences for existing ACP signatories. In particular, Mr 
Manuel emphasised South Mrica's desire not to divert development assistance resources away 
from existing beneficiaries, accepting that EU aid to South Mrica should continue to.?ome 
from the EU's annual budget rather than the European Development Fund (Kibble et al. 1995: 
52). In this light, South Africa's application for Lome membership was warmly accepted by 
the ACP group, with the Ivorian minister for raw materials publicly declaring his support for its 
full membership (SouthScan, vol 9, no 45, 2 December 1994: 1). The ACP group saw South 
Africa's membership as having the potential to strengthen its hand in negotiations with the ED. 
This attitude reflected the fact that the ACP viewed little or no direct competition from South 
African trade resulting from SA's accession to Lome. 
The ACP Council meeting agreed to set up a joint working group with South Africa to report 
back to the Council on the impact of the latter's accession on existing ACP signatories, before 
the joint meeting with the ACP-EU in February 1995. Pretoria also expressed the desire to 
establish a joint ACP-EU working group on its application before that meeting. However, this 
does not appear to have taken place (Kibble et al. 1995: 54). South Africa was granted 
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observer status at the Lome IV mid-term review where Article 364, governing the procedure 
should South Africa be granted access, was added to the Lome Convention. 
-~ . 
Following a visit to South Africa by Directorate General VIII Commissioner, Prof. Joao de 
Deus Pinheiro, the European Commission said that it had become clearer to both parties that 
South Mrica would not get what is was seeking, both in terms of aid and trade (SouthScan, 26 
May 1995). The EU informed South Africa in June 1995 that full access to the Lome 
Convention was not a possibility (IRC News vol. 1, no. 1 1996: 2). The reason for the EU's 
objection to South Mrica's accession to Lome was based primarily on the incompatibility of 
South Africa's economy and level of development with the rest of the ACP. Article 363 of the 
Lome Convention stated that applications submitted by a State whose economic structure and 
production are comparable with those of the ACP States would be considered by the Council 
of Ministers. South Mrica's economy was clearly far more developed than those of the other 
ACP countries, being more comparable to middle income countries like Brazil and Venezuela. 
However, in terms of other indicators like the Human Development Index, South Africa was 
far more comparable with the ACP. In terms oflife expectancy, literacy and adult educatIon, it 
was on a par with most ACP countries (Page and Stevens 1992: 7). 
Despite being excluded from full Lome membership, South Mrica could still have obtained 
partial Lome membership, which would have entitled the country to participate in everything 
but the trade and development aspects of Lome. Exclusion from the developmental aspects of 
Lome were of little importance to South Mrica, as the country was already receiving 
development assistance of a far greater value than it would have through Lome (Jenkins and 
Naude 1995: 43). While full Lome membership was now impossible, the offer of qualified 
Lome membership was still open. Under qualified membership, South Africa would be 
excluded from all forms of trade, the ST ABEX and SYSMIN stabilisation funds, and a number 
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of other Lome financial funds. Qualified membership would have allowed South Africa access 
to certain political advantages, a possibility to be included in the terms of the rules of origin, 
. the possibility of tendering for Lome funded EPF projects and participation ill' regional 
development programmes. This membership would have had to be negotiated in parallel with 
a more comprehensive co-operation agreement (IRC News vol 1 issue 1 19~6: 7). The Lome 
IV m!r was due to be ratified in January 1997, giving South Africa and the EU until this date 
to formulate an agreement. If this did not occur it would mean that each of the member states 
of the Lome Convention would have to ratify South Africa's accession individually. This 
would be a long and arduous process. The result was that both the first and second trade 
regime options identified by Page and Stevens (1992) in the aDI report, i.e. full Lome 
membership and the associate Lome membership that they had envisioned, were not available 
to South Africa. This associate membership would have included South Africa in the trad,~ and 
development aspects of Lome, whereas qualified membership excluded both these areas of the 
Convention. 
With full Lome membership an unrealistic option for South Africa, other options for a trade 
and development co-operation agreement between the EU and South Africa had to be 
examined. The third regime on the list of options in the ODI report was a non-reciprocal 
association agreement. This option was also annulled in the wake of the development of the 
World Trade Organisation. Article 24 of the GATT regulated customs unions and free trade 
areas and provided for a common understanding of the obligation of [WTOj members (GATT 
Article XXIV: preamble). This article required free trade areas, or customs unions, to be 
reciprocal in nature and specified that substantially all tariffs between signatories to an 
agreement had to be dropped within a reasonable length of time. Besides this ruling by the 
WTO, non-reciprocal trade agreements were increasingly being viewed as unsustainable. Even 
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from within the ACP the non-reciprocal nature of the Lome Convention was being criticised. 
A Caribbean researcher and business representative at the ECDPM Conference on the future of 
. Lomewas quoted as saying that non-reciprocal pr.eferences have reached their outer limits or 
are "past their sell-by-date" and could no longer be instrumental in improving [developing 
countries'] trade performance (ECDPM 1996: 24). The possibility of a non-reciprocal trade 
...- - ~, 
and c?-operation agreement between South Africa and the EU was therefore not only seen as 
undesirable, but also illegal in terms of the WTO regulations. 
It was the fourth ODI option that the EU eventually offered South Africa in June of 1995. On 
19 June the EU Council of Ministers approved directives for the European Commission to 
negotiate a framework for the longer term relationship between the European Community and 
the Republic of South Africa. The directives proposed that this relationship be built on two 
elements: 
1) a Protocol to the Lome Convention covering the terms and conditions of South 
Africa's accession to the Convention, and 
2) a bilateral Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the European Community 
and South Africa. 
With respect to market access, the Council decided that South Africa will be invited to initiate 
a process leading to progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of trade with a view to 
establishing a Free Trade Area (EC 1996 b: 3) . 
The Council further stated that, if the South African Government was ready to negotiate such 
an agreement, the Community should respond favourably on the principle of a Free Trade 
Area, corresponding to the Community's economic and commercial interests. This aim 
should reconcile compliance with the rules of the WTO and consideration for certain interests 
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and products that are sensitive with the Community. The Agreement would also cover the 
right of establishment, provision on services and the free movement of capital, and on the free 
. settlement of current transactions in convertible currencies (ibid.). 
On 30 June 1995 the negotiations between the Community and South Mrica were formally 
~. -
open~d (ibid.: 3). The Commission had delegated the negotiation of the trade and 
development agreement to its Directorate General VIII (DG8), the Directorate responsible for 
development. South African relations had formerly been dealt with in both DG8 and 
Directorate General I (DG 1), the Directorate for external relations. DG8 had historically been 
more sympathetic to South Africa's needs for an agreement that incorporated developmental 
aspects than DG 1 had been (IRC News: 2). Commissioner Pinheiro of DG8 invited the South 
African Government, on behalf of the European Community, to explore the option to s!art a 
process leading to progressive and reciprocal trade liberalisation with a view to establishing 
a Free Trade Area (EC 1996 b: 3-4). In response to this Trevor Manuel stated that 
progressive and reciprocal trade liberalisation with a view to establishing a Free Trade Area 
would be acceptable as a long term objective. In the short and medium term, South Mrica's 
objective was to negotiate a comprehensive trade and co-operation agreement with the EU 
for the duration of the next 15 years at least. During the first 10 years the agreement should, 
in the South Mrican view, contain features which are as close as possible to the Lome 
Convention to support the current transition underway in South Africa and Southern Africa as 
a whole (Statement of Minister Manuel 30 June 1995). Minister Manuel also presented the 
delegates at this meeting with a list of four reasons why the EU should negotiate this type of 
agreement with South Africa. The four reasons (and Minister Manuel's reasoning) were that: 
1. The New South Africa had inherited trade discrimination from its Apartheid history. This 
discrimination needed to be removed and rectified. 
2. Trade liberalisation and South Africa's re-integration into the global economy was a painful 
process and the country needed all the help it could obtain in this process. Attention was 
called to the promises of support made by the EU in the April 1994 Luxembourg 
Declaration. 
3. The EU had expressed its objective to contribute to the reconstruction and development of 
Southern Africa as a whole, South Africa's development was intrinsic to this. ~ . 
4. I"here were long term benefits in establishing strong links with South Africa, and with 
Southern Africa. 
(Extracted from the address by Minister Manuel at the first EU-SA round of negotiations on 30 
June 1995) 
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In addition to these four motivating points, Minister Manuel added seven additional principles 
that South Africa felt should guide negotiators in the process of the negotiations: 
1. Fair trade: The removal of the effects of discrimination resulting from Apartheid South 
Africa's isolation. 
2. No prejudice to the rights and interests of all parties concerned, especially those of SACU, 
SADC and the ACP member states. 
3. The advancement and non-impediment of the current process of restructuring and 
democratisation of the Customs Union that had existed in Southern Africa for close to a 
hundred years. The agreement would also have to take cognisance of the development of 
a protocol for trade and industrial integration being developed in Southern Africa. 
4. The negotiations should lead to the fastest possible implementation of what was agreed 
upon. 
5. The negotiations would have to be based on trust and continuous consultation with all 
parties concerned, especially the ACP countries. 
6. The negotiators would have to strive to achieve as their principle objective an agreement 
that increased the number of sustainable jobs and raised the standard of living in South 
Africa and Southem Africa. 
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7. Deliberation would have to begin with the reality and needs of SA and the Southern 
African region, informed by detailed impact studies. Part of this reality was reflected in 
fact that SA was part of a Customs Union with some similarities to the European Union 
- . 
-'it • 
itself and thus any framework. agreement could not include any commitments that 
infringed on the rights, interests and preferences enjoyed by the partners in the Southern 
African Customs Union. 
(ibid.) 
Minister Manuel's request that the future agreement be as close as possible to the Lome 
Convention showed South Africa's determination not to give up easily on a Lome type 
agreement. This fact was not favourably received by the EU, who made a point of noting that 
the objectives, as stated by Minister Manuel, would be difficult to reconcile with the mutually 
binding WTOIGA TT rules, would not be consistent with the parties' mutual general interests, 
and would fall short of the political ambitions of the Community, as laid down in -the June 
19th directives (ibid.: 4). This statement, made at the first round of technical discussions 
between the EU and SA in Brussels, was seen as a great disappointment to South Africa. SA 
saw Lome trade options as the best option with regard to access to the EU market in order to 
rectifY past Apartheid inherited discrimination (Dr. R. Davies' address to the ACP-EU Joint 
Assembly, 25-29 September 1995). 
At the second round of talks, which took place in Pretoria in September 1995, South Africa 
accepted the invitation by the European Union to start a process leading to progressive and 
reciprocal trade liberalisation with a view to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA). This 
decision was taken on condition that nothing [was] agreed until everything [was] agreed (EC 
1996 b: 4). This clause included the acceptance of the partial membership of the Lome 
Convention. South Africa included this condition in order to prevent being railroaded into an 
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imperfect agreement somewhere along the way. The idea was that the agreement in its entirety 
had to be healthy for South Africa. 
At this point in the trade negotiations, South Africa requested the European Union to put 
forward a detailed description of what their FT A entailed. This meant that the European 
'Commission, the ED's administrative branch, had to develop a comprehensive mandate for 
negotiations, a process that would prove to be a slow and involved one. The Commission 
needed to develop the mandate, conducting research into all aspects of the potential effect of a 
FT A with South Africa. This then would have to be given to the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives13 (Coreper) who would assess the propose,d mandate and make suggestions or 
point out problems. Coreper would then send the proposal back to the Commission for repair, 
and once Coreper has accepted it, the proposal would be sent to another committee known as 
,-
the 113 Committee. The 113 Committee consisted of experts in international law and the 
workings of the international trade organisations. This committee would examine the proposal 
for compatibility with WTO regulations (Texeira interview, 24 January 1997). Once the 113 
Committee and Coreper had accepted the proposal it would finally be sent to the Council of 
Ministers for ratification (Bosman interview, 25 October 1996). 
On 23 October 1995 the Commission approved a recommendation for a Council decision on 
complementary negotiation directives for the planned Trade and Co-operation Agreement with 
South Africa. Shortly thereafter the proposal was submitted to Council for consideration and 
conclusion. The Commission's proposal was that the FT A with South Africa should cover at 
the end of a 10 year period of transition, at least 90% oj all trade between the Parties, with a 
possible element of differentiation between the two parties. This included asymmetry in 
13 Coreper meets weekly and is an organ designed to take some of the pressure off the Council. Coreper acts as 
the first check of the Commission, attempting to iron out any problems before an issue is sent to Council. 
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implementation, meaning that the EU would have had to liberalise its economy to South Africa 
quicker than SA would have had to for the EU (Davies address, 1995). The FTA would 
include both the industrial and the agricultural sector. The proposal was to aim at a· coverage 
of 97% of EU imports in the non-agricultural sector, and 55% in the agricultural sector. In 
turn South Africa would be asked to apply, at the end of the transitional period, a zero tariff 
for 88.% of its non-agricultural imports from the EU and 95% of its agricultural imports. The 
proposal was supplemented by a list of products to be excluded from the agreement, issued by 
various Member States of the ED. These products, so called sensitive products, were 
identified by the Member States as being potentially threatened by. trade with South Africa. 
France and Germany in particular had firm positions on items being excluded (MRB vol 5/2 
1996). 
In the meantime the European private sector had met at the Investment and Trade in Southern 
Africa conference at the Club de Bruxelles between October 19 and 20. This conference was 
extremely well attended, and European business expressed keen interest in both South and 
Southern Africa. What was clearly expressed was a lack of knowledge and great deal of 
confusion over what the region had to offer. This meeting also allowed· the Director General 
of Development at DG8 to clarify how far the negotiation between the European Union and 
South Africa had progressed. There was a strong call by pro-Southern African lobbyists at the 
conference for an immediate review of the rules of origin applying to Southern Africa. The 
lobbyists were calling for the SADC region, including South Africa, to be treated as a single 
entity with regard to the rules of origin. British Labour MEP, Glenys Kinnock, attacked the 
present system, saying that it, spells delays and uncertainty, which are unlikely to stimulate 
trading opportunities (cited in Misser 1995: 21). The issues addressed at the conference, and 
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the level of interest in the regIOn, were encouraging to South Africa's future investment 
opportunities, and reiterated the importance of a good outcome for the agreement. 
In October and November 1995 two more rounds of discussion between the Commission and 
South Africa took place. All discussions focused on non-trade matters, where good progress 
was made (EC 1996 b: 4). In December 1995 South Africa effectively froze any further 
discussions with the European Union, until such time as the Commission had received a 
complementary negotiating mandate from the Council. 
3.3. Obtaining an ED :Mandate 
In late January 1996 the process of preparing a mandate for the Commission hit a snag. On 22 
June 1995, three days after the approval of the first set of negotiating directives for South 
Africa, the Council and the Commission concluded that in future, before taking steps towards 
establishing a free trade area, the Commission should: 
• assess the compatibility of the planned agreement with WTO rules; 
• assess the implication of such an agreement for the Union's common policies and 
for its relations with its main trading partners. 
At the time of this conclusion it was unclear whether this should apply to South Africa, as the 
principle decision to invite South Africa to enter into an FT A with the EU had already been 
taken. On 27 October 1995 the 113 Committee expressed the view that the complementary 
negotiating directives which the Commission had presented to Council should indeed be 
assessed in the light of the conclusion of June 22nd . While this had been decided, the issue of 
when these studies should now be conducted had not been resolved. The obstacle encountered 
in late January was that some of the Member States argued that the studies should be 
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conducted in parallel with negotiations, and others argued for the completion of studies before 
issuing a negotiating directive. After the Coreper meeting of 23 January it became clear that 
. several Member States required a written assessment of the impact of a trade agreement with 
South Africa before a negotiating mandate could be ratified (EC 1996 b: 3-7). 
The impact studies were commissioned at the General Affairs Council on the 29 January 1996. 
Prof Pinheiro announced that detailed impact studies would be conducted into the full effect 
of a trade and development agreement with South Mrica. This would involve a lengthy and 
comprehensive study in each Member State and in all South Mrica's trading sectors, including 
products for which no trade had as yet been recorded. This would also include an assessment 
of the requirements laid down by the WTO and other international trade bodies. For this 
reason, any further decisions on the FT A were postponed until the reports had been submitted. 
South Africa had not been expecting this delay in the process of establishing the agreement. In 
a demarche issued on 12 February by the South Mrican government to the EU, Pretoria 
expressed regret at the inability of the EU to reach an agreement and the consequent de1ay in 
negotiations (Press Release from the South Mrican High Commission, London, 12 March 
1996). What had started out as a display of goodwill and support for the new government, 
was rapidly turning into a competitive battle for who would gain the most from an agreement. 
From the South African viewpoint, the South Mrican market would have little or no impact on 
the European one. An already cautious South Mrican team became increasingly sceptical of 
the agreement from this point on, realising that any concessions that the country might gain 
from the agreement would have to be hard fought for. This was accompanied by a 
simultaneous, rapid closing of the so called "window of opportunity" that had been opened in 
the immediate post-apartheid era. South Mrica was having to compete in a global 
environment that was becoming steadily less sympathetic to her political and social transition. 
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The brief period in which South Africa was riding on the wave of post-apartheid goodwill was 
over. South Africa realised that it was a country with an inefficient industrial sector, and a 
. collapsed economy, coupled with massive social problems, making it an unwieldy naVigator in 
the global market. With tl>is realisation, a good trade deal with Europe was becoming more 
imperative and looking increasingly unlikely at the same time. Fear of losjng.more ground 
caused Pretoria to launch a sharp attack on the delays (.MRB vol512 1996: 1-3). 
Indications from the European Union were that they wanted an agreement signed before the 
Union's summer break to allow sufficient time for ratification of the agreement which could 
then have been enforced from early 1997. Tl>is desire was coupled '"'lith the desire of the 
Italian Presidency of the EU to present President Mandela with an agreement at the European 
SUII1Init in Florence in June. This push by the Italians was hoped to overcome some ~f the 
reluctance of the French, German and Spapish to rush the agreement along (ibid.). The 
political dimension of the agreement in Europe \-vas having a surprising effect. South A.frica's 
effect on the EC during the apartheid years had been one of dividing the Commupity into 
parties that were to varying degrees pro and anti sanctions. As mentioned previously, this had 
led to a near breakdown of EPC and the Single European Act. In the post-apartheid era a 
division, of lesser intensity, was once again being witnessed. The Scandinavian countries that 
had been very strong in the anti-apartheid struggle were now pushing strongly for a healthy 
trade and development agreement. France, Germany and Spain were finding themselves 
heavily under the influence of their farming lobbies, who felt seriously threatened by South 
Africa's agricultural sector. Britain, which had traditional economic links with its former 
colony and had always been anti-sanctions and pro-SA investment and development, was also 
pushing for a post-apartheid trade and development agreement. 
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In the meantime, the South Mrican negotiating team expressed dismay at the delays incurred 
by the slow process of formulating the trade mandate. At a special meeting held in London on 
. 10 aria 11 March 1996; the South African Head$ .of ~1ission in ED Member States met to 
discuss trade relations. The meeting was aimed at sharing ideas and information. The result of 
the meeting was that the South Mrican governlnent expressed its dismay at~ th~ delays in the 
negotiations, saying that valuable opportunities were being lost for South Mrican exporters at 
a time when they were critically important for social upliftment inside the country, and for the 
bolstering of the Southern A..ffican region. T}lis was seen as being contrary to previous ED 
commitment to both South Africa and the region (Press release issued by the South .A.frican 
High Commission, London, 12 March 1996). 
3.4 The Impact Studies 
The first impact studies were completed by mid-Februaf'j and covered 4 main areas: 
1, Compatibility of the planned agreement with WTO rules 
2. The economic and commercial interests of the EU in South Africa 
3. Implications of an FTA for EU Common Policies 
4. Implications on the relations with the EU's main trading partners 
Research had been conducted into all conceivable impacts of the proposed FT A. The 
economic and product impacts had been assessed in terms of South .A.frica's overall economic 
structure, and through a sector by sector and product by product analysis. 
The member states ofthe ED had been requested to submit lists of products for exclusion from 
the agreement. These lists were the cause of considerable problems for the ED's development 
of a mandate, as the list was far too large to be accommodated by the WTO. In late February 
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this list amounted to around 46% of all agricultural trade. The ED were working at whittling 
this list down to a more manageable and realistic figure. 
The results of the impact study and the reduction of the exclusions list allowed the Commission 
to prepare its final negotiating mandate, which was presented to Council in March 1996. On 
25 March the Council of Ministers authorised the European Commission to start negotiations 
with the government of the Republic of South Africa on the trade part of the planned Trade an 
Co-operation Agreement. 
3.5 The EU Mandate 
On 29 March 1996 the Director General of DG8, Steffen Smidt, presented South Africa with 
the planned bilateral agreement's trade proposal. The ED's new mandated proposal added 
three new political and commercial decisions to the June 1995 directives: 
the Community's support and encouragement of the process of trade liberalisation that 
was underway in South Africa; 
the parties' commitment to ensuring that their mutual arrangements did not impede the 
process of restructuring the Southern African Customs Union, which linked South Africa 
to four ACP States (the BLNS states); 
the commitment of both parties to encouraging regional economic co-operation and 
integration between the countries of Southern Africa, and the liberalisation of trade 
between those countries. 
With regard to the second and last point, the Community invited South Africa to provide 
improved market access opportunities to its partners in the ACP group, alongside the 
liberalisation process to be effected in relation to the ED. 
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The duration of the transition period to establish the FT 1\ and fulfil the trade liberalisation that 
would be required, was set at a maximum of 10 years, starting from the entry into force of the 
. agreement. This was done in accordance with the rules of the WTO as contained in Article 
.. 
XXIV. In exceptional circumstances, for specific products, the length of the transitionary 
period could be extended to 12 years. At the end of this transitionary period, the FTA would 
r· -
cover the bulk of trade between the panies, with a possible element of differentiation between 
the two parties. The FT A would cover the free movement of goods in all sectors, the 
liberalisation of trade in services, and the free movement of capital. 
In order to ensure compliance with the WTO rules, the mandate did not commit itself to any 
percentage target for the trade coverage of the FT A Instead, it was proposed that a formula 
for coverage in the future agreement be introduced. The objective was to avoid the need to re-
negotiate the agreement, to ask for a waiver, to give erga omnes14 concessions or to be 
involved in compensation claims or acts of retaliation. The FT A was to cover substantially all 
trade. However, the exact coverage of the FT A was not published; the coverage is widely 
reckoned to be around 96% of current trade. This figure should have comfortably met -the 
WTO requirements. It was when the mandate was broken down into sectors that problems 
and disparities began to emerge. 
3.5.1. Non-Agricultural trade 
In the non-agricultural sector, the Community proposed to suppress duties and taxes having an 
equivalent effect in two stages. One group of products, including the products that were 
already covered by the GSP, could be liberalised immediately following the entry into force of 
14 ergo omnes: "and so all", meaning an agreement covering all (100%) trade. 
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the agreement. For a second group of products, duties and taxes would be eliminated during 
the first three years of the agreement. 
South Africa's obligations under this mandate would be to suppress customs duties and taxes 
having an equivalent effect in four stages: A first group of products was to be liberalised 
immediately following the entry into force of the agreement; a second group after the 
transitional period of three years; a third process of liberalisation would start four years after 
the entry into force of the agreement; and the last one would only start after six years. This 
staggered effect was intended to accommodate South Africa's developmental requirements and 
provide a buffer for the side effects of trade liberalisation. The definition of the different 
groups of products was to be a subject for negotiation. 
The mandate also covered the liberalisation of products for which little or no trade had been 
recorded. These products would be subject to one of the dismantling processes, or would be 
excluded, depending on their degree of sensitivity, which would be assessed on a case by case 
basis in parallel with the negotiations. 
For certain sensitive products, or for products where South Africa had proved strongly 
competitive on world markets, both parties would eliminate customs duties in parallel, 
notwithstanding the principle of asymmetrical dismantling. The identification of these products 
would again take place during the identification process. 
3.5.2. Agricultural trade 
The coverage of agricultural produce in the EU's trade mandate displayed a lot more 
protectionism on the part of the ED. The suppression of duties and taxes in the agricultural 
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sector were set to take place in four stages. Immediately at the entry into force of the 
agreement a first group of products would be liberalised. This group would include those 
. products already covered by the GSP. For a second. group of products, duties and taxes would 
be eliminated over a period of three years, starting from the entry into force of the agreement. 
For a third and fourth group, the Community would start eliminating duties no later than four 
..-- - ,~ 
and s~x years respectively after the agreement's entry into force. 
In return, the South African market would have to liberalise its agricultural imports from the 
EU in two stages, the first of which would begin immediately at the entering into force of the 
agreement. For a second group of products, South Africa was requested to eliminate custom 
duties and taxes over a ten year period starting from the entry into force of the agreement. 
The Mandate made specific reference to the Community's wish to ensure coherence'between 
the trade arrangements with South Mrica on the one hand, and the provisions of the 
agreements with other preferential partners of the Community on the other. This included the 
Union's common policies and broader economic interests. The EU made it clear thar the 
liberalisation process would have to comply with the principles of the CAP. This would mean 
that Community preferences would have to be maintained and the FT A was not to affect the 
mechanisms for the operation of the corresponding common market organisations (CMOs). A 
general clause was suggested to assure the integrity of the parties' agricultural policies. This 
clause was to guarantee that if, as a result of implementation of the parties' agricultural 
poliCies, specific rules [were} introduced, or if existing rules [were} modified, or if the 
provisions concerning the implementation of the parties' agricultural policies [were} modified 
or developed, both parties [could} adapt the arrangements laid down in the agreement in 
respect of the products concerned. 
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The mandate for the agreement specified that trade liberalisation in fisheries products would be 
discussed in a specific fisheries agreement to be negotiated in parallel with the trade agreement. 
Specific sensitivities of certain fisheries products would also be dealt with. 
F or certain sensitive products tariff dismantling was foreseen in the form of tariff quotas, 
whose levels and growth rates would be mutually agreed between the Parties. 
The list of agricultural products to be excluded from the agreement was contained in the 
mandate. This list of excluded products had been expected by South Africa. However the 
extent of the exclusions came as some surprise. The exclusion list that had been identified by 
the Commission contained the following products: cut flowers, lemons, fresh apples and apple 
juice, fresh and preserved pears, fresh oranges and frozen orange juice, preserved asparagus, 
preserved apricots, preserved peaches, grape juice, pineapple juice, some mixtures of preserved 
fruits and mixtures of juices, and wines. The total value of these lists equalled about 39% of 
the ED's agricultural imports from South Africa, only a little down on the previous 46%. 
Pretoria had been expecting exclusions in the region of 25% of agricultural produce. 
As with the non-agricultural products, the mandate specified the arrangements for dealing with 
products for which little or no trade had been recorded. These products would be subject to 
one of the dismantling processes, or would be excluded, depending on their degree of 
sensitivity, which would be assessed on a case-by-case basis in parallel with the negotiations. 
The mandate stated that 
... without prejudice to the results of this systematic examination and to the overall objective 
of the negotiations, the Community's position is that it does not envisage liberalisation of 
imports into the EU of maize, sugar, beef and veal and certain of their derivatives or 
substitutes, butter, milk powder, certain preserved citrus fruits, vermouth and preserved 
tomatoes . 
. 3.5.3:- General Provisions 
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The ED also defined its position on a series of general aspects of the pl~~d agreement. 
These general arrangements were drawn from the most recent generation of Trade and Co-
operation agreements that the ED had with third countries, and were proposed as follows: 
On competition it is recognised that practices which have the effect of distorting, 
restricting or preventing competition, abuses of dominant positions as well as State aids 
. which distort competition and hamper new investments can act 8S serious non-trade 
barriers. The agreement will therefore ensure that these practices be effectively 
outlawed. 
As regards the barrier of import quotas the Community suggests that the two parties' . 
retrospectively agree that no new import quotas nor measures having equivalent effect 
shall be introduced by either of the two parties after the beginning of the negotiations on 
30 June 1995. A roll back clause shall be introduced to ensure that this undertaking 
has effectively been implemented. Existing import quotas or measure having equivalent 
effect shall be eliminated on the entry into force of the agreement. The parties shall not 
apply export duties or taxes having equivalent effect, nor quotas or measures having 
equivalent effect. 
The Community proposes that the parties further agree that they will not discriminate 
between the products of the other party by way of fiscal measures or practices. 
The agreement will also contain a clause allowing the parties, in case of major 
difficulties resuUing from South Africa's or the EU's trade liberalisation towards each 
other, to temporarily suspend the liberalisation process for certain products, after 
consultation with the other party. 
Another clause would confirm that the agreement shall not preclude the maintenance of 
the Southem African Customs Union (SACU), or the establishment by either party of 
free trade areas or other trade arrangements that contribute to increased trade 
liberalisation and regional economic co-operation. 
_ Furthermore, the 90mmunity recalls, with due [~gard to Community legislation, that the 
specific interests of the Community's outermost regions, in particular of the local market 
of Reunion, must be taken into account. 
An anti-dumping clause will be necessary. If one of the parties finds that injurious 
- dumping or subsidization is taking place in trade by the other party within the provisions 
of the GA IT, it may take appropriate measures against this practice, in accordance 
with the GA TTIWTO rules and practices. 
There will also be a safeguard clause. Where any product is being imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to caLJse or threaten to cause serious 
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competing products, appropriate 
measures may be taken. The drafting of this clause will reflect current CCEE 
safeguards and may include, for highly sensitive products, statistical surveillance 
mechanisms. Safeguard measures already introduced and notified in accordance with 
GA TTIWTO rules will be maintained. Regional safeguard measures, consistent with 
WTO rules, may be adopted to take account of the economic situation in the EU's 
outermost regions, particularly in Reunion. 
It is evident that the agreement shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public security, health 
protection, the protection of national treasures etc. 
Finally, the Community proposes that the parties shall agree to review the progress 
being made in the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement, and in particular in the 
liberalisation process as regards the most sensitive products, within 5 years from the 
date of entry in force of the agreement. 
(statement by Steffen Smidt, 29 March 1996) 
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3.5.4. Rules of Origin 
The mandate also proposed that the agreement <irtclude a Protocol on the terms of South 
Mrica's inclusion in the Lome Convention's rules of origin. This protocol [would} be inspired 
by the ongoing harmonisation process of preferential rules of origin applicable to third 
countries and [would} be consistent with those of the Lome Convention (statement by Steffen 
Smidt, 29 March 1996). As in the other Community preferential agreements, products would 
be considered to be originating if they were wholly obtained or sufficiently processed in the 
territory of the contracting parties. The criteria for determining whether a product had been 
sufficieritly processed would refer to provisions set out in a·list annexed to the Protocol. 
With regard to the Lome Convention, the Protocol would include, in particular, a cumulation 
procedure with the objective of promoting closer economic co-operation between the Parties, 
and furthering regional economic integration. The cumulation procedure would involve 
procedures of three parties: the EU, SA and the ACP countries. To avoid deflection of trade, 
this procedure would take account of the specific nature of the arrangements to be negotiated 
with South Africa as compared to the Lome Convention arrangements, particularly where 
sensitive agricultural products were concerned. 
3.5.5. Trade in Services 
The Protocols covering trade in services included the right of establishment of companies of 
one party in the territory of the other, and the liberalisation of the supply of services by 
companies of one party to service consumers in the other. While this objective was covered in 
the Mandate, the Protocols established that these objectives would only materialise at a later 
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stage. The Protocol established that trade in services would be compatible with the terms and 
obligations laid out in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), annexed to the 
. treaty-establishing the WTO. In particular, the cPIpIIlitment was to accord each other MFN 
treatment in trade and services in sectors covered by these commitments. The parties would 
further be bound by Article 274 of the Lome Convention, governing qualification and 
treatment of business entities. 
It was suggested that, once the two parties had gained a certain level of experience in the 
implementation of the MFN and GATS treatment, recommendations would be formulated in 
order to extend the scope of the bilateral agreement to reciprocal liberalisation in the area of 
services. This would be subject to examination as soon as possible after the implementation of 
the agreement, and no later than five years after the entry into force of the agreement. 
The Mandate provided specific formulations for dealing with the subject of maritime transport. 
Both parties were to undertake to apply effectively the principle of unrestricted access to the 
international maritime market and traffic on a commercial basis. In applying this principle Doth 
parties were to permit the shipping companies of the other party to maintain a commercial 
presence in their territory, for the purpose of carrying out shipping agency activities. This was 
to be conducted under condition of establishment and operation no less favourable than those 
accorded to their own companies, or to subsidiaries or branches of companies of any third 
country. The ED further suggested that both parties agree on the importance of exchanging 
information on the inspection of ships by the State of the port and agree to take action to make 
this exchange as effective as possible. 
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3.5.6. Free Movement of Capital 
The provisions on the free movement of capital <required the parties to undertake to allow 
payments for current transactions to be made in freely convertible currency. Both parties 
would further have to ensure the freedom of repatriation of foreign direct investment and all 
profits stemming therefrom. Finally, both parties would have to agree that, in case of serious 
balance of payment difficulties, certain restriction on current transactions be allowed to be 
introduced. This was to be conducted in accordance with the rules set out in the GATTIWTO 
and IMF, with a limited duration, and not going beyond what was necessary to remedy the 
imbalance of payments situation. 
3.5.7. Other Trade Related Aspects 
In concluding the mandate, reference was made to the other trade related subjects that had 
already been included in the general negotiating directives of 19 June 1995, and which were 
also subject to negotiation between the parties. 
In these complementary directives, it was proposed that the parties should agree to adopt 
policies aimed at: 
• evolving and recommending trade promotion measures suitable for fostering the 
development of trade, in particular in favour of SMEs (Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises) as well as organising trade and investments visits and industry trade 
fairs; 
• supporting cross border initiatives facilitating regional trade, investment and 
payments in the interest of more economic cohesion of the Southern African region; 
• promoting and facilitating co-operation between the customs services of both parties 
in order to ensure that the provisions on trade were observed and to guarantee fair 
trading. The co-operation would give rise to, among other things, the exchange of 
information and to training schemes, as we'll as to provisions for mutual assistance; 
• achieving a level of protection of intellectual. industrial and commercial property 
which was equivalent to the highest international standards; South Africa would be 
asked to apply the multilateral convention on protection of intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property, without taking advantage of the exceptional transitional 
periods available to LDCs; 
• ensuring the greatest possible reciprocal liberalisation of public procurement, in 
accordance with the principles of the GATT. South Africa should undertake to 
become a contracting party to the GATT Government Procurement Code and to 
negotiate additional liberalisation on a bilateral basis; 
• encouraging convergence in respect of standardisation and certification by 
promoting the use of compatible systems of standards and certification, in 
perspective of the mutual recognition of norms; 
• instituting co-operation in the field of trade statistics. 
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The EU saw the issuing of this mandate as a signal that the negotiations would now begin in 
earnest. DG8 Commissioner, Prof 10ao de Deus Pinheiro, welcomed the directives. Prof 
Pinheiro said that the Commission felt the directives were a well balanced attempt to respond 
to the South African demand jor improved access to the Community market, and to encourage 
South Africa itself to open up to the global economy (Statement by Prof Pinheiro welcoming 
the mandate, 25 March 1996). The objective, presented by the mandate, and interpreted by the 
Commissioner, was to: 
... negotiate a genuine FTA, which will have to be consistent with the rules of the WTO. 
Under these rules, tariff dismantlement must apply to "substantially all trade" between the 
parties, which allows only limited scope for exclusions. We are bound to achieve this over a 
transition period often years, except for specific products where an extension to 12 years 
may be justified. The Free Trade objective will cover al/ sectors, agriculture included, which 
is an innovation when compared to other preferential agreements entered into by the 
Community. The free trade agreement will first apply to trade in goods, but its extension to 
trade in services is foreseen in the future. 
(ibid.) 
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The Commissioner warned that if the mandate proved to be incompatible with the WTO rules, 
or unacceptable to South Africa, it would be reverted to Council. 
Director General, Steffen Smidt, expressed that the Commission was now fully equipped to 
undertake the trade negotiations with the government of South Mrica. He expressed the 
desire that the negotiations begin immediately and be brought to a conclusion as soon as 
possible in 1996. The trade negotiations would be conducted in conjunction with tho,se of 
South Mrica's accession to the Lome Convention and in parallel with other planned 
agreements covering co-operation in non-trade and non-Lome areas. 
3.6. South Africa's Response to the EU Mandate 
South Mrica's trade diplomats reacted angrily to the news that the EU ambassadors had bowed 
to the pressures of the protectionist farmer's lobby. The South Mrican team expressed that, 
while they had been expecting a list of agricultural exclusions, they had not expected such a 
formidable one. This list, and the EU's support of protectionist policy, was in contradiction 
with earlier promises and commitments. Director for foreign trade at South Africa's 
Department of Trade and Industry, Mr Faizel Ismail, expressed his team's deep disappointment 
with the list. He said that until we are convinced that there is something negotiable on the 
table, we may have to rethink the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement. Our initial 
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impression was that there would be no exclusions (Business Day 25 March 1996). South 
African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, also criticised the EUs trade mandate 
while speaking in the pailiamentary foreign affairs debate. Mr Nzo further questioned the EUs 
commitment to their previous rhetoric, saying South Africa was concerned that the EU's 
mandate for the trade negotiations [had} been eroded since the strong commitrmmt in support 
of SA!s transition to democracy which had earlier been expressed. 
Mr Willem Bosman, Director for Regional Economic Organisations at the South Africa 
Department of Trade and Industry, criticised the EUs lack of sensitivity to South Africa's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). He said that the objectives set out by 
the EU in their trade mandate were the same as would apply to a developed country such as 
Australia. He said that South Mrica's repeated requests for free access to the EUs market, 
while at the same time keeping the EUs trade access to our market at an absolute minimum for 
at least 10 years, had been ignored. Mr Bosman expressed dismay at the EUs insensitive 
mandate, which was contradictory to their stated objectives both in the Luxembourg 
Declaration and in the original FT A proposal of June 1995 (Report by Mr Willem Bosman, 
later submitted to Finansies en Tegniek Weekliks, 28 August 1996). 
Another concern expressed by the South Mrican negotiating team was the issue of linking the 
various parts of the negotiations. The European Union's Mandate required the simultaneous 
conclusion of all the agreements. This meant that the trade agreement and the qualified 
membership of Lome had to be negotiated simultaneously. These had to be concluded in 
parallel with the bilateral agreement on sea fisheries, wine and spirits and, finally, that dealing 
with science and technology. According to Bosman, this was impossible to achieve and did 
not suit the SA negotiators, or tie in with the EUs stated wish of concluding the broad 
agreement as soon as possible (ibid.). 
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The nature of the ED mandate prompted South Africa to assess the full impact of a FT A with 
the ED. This impact assessment began in September 1995. However, without a mandate from 
. the ED, it had been difficult to assess just what the .FT A would have impacted on. The South 
African negotiating team announced that they would have to now prepare their own mandate 
in the light of the ED's mandate. This would have to be thoroughly researched, and the impact 
_. -
on n~t just South Africa, but also on the SACD and SADC, would have to be assessed. The 
extent of this assessment would mean that it would take some time to complete. Pretoria also 
indicated that its primary trade responsibility was to the Southern African region, and for this 
reason any agreement between the ED and SA would have to be acceptable to both SADC and 
SACD.. 
South Mrica also wanted to accommodate both the private sector and labour, much as the ED 
had accommodated their agricultural sector. For this reason, the South Mrican team decided 
to work in co-operation with the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(Nedlac). Nedlac's origins lie in the struggle against apartheid, against unilateral decision-
making, and in the calls from all sectors of society for decisions to be taken in a more inc1tisive 
and transparent manner. This had emerged out of the recognition of the importance of seeking 
consensus on major economic, social and developmental policies to ensure their success (What 
is Nedlac? http://www.nedlac.org.zafbackground.html). Nedlac's charter further stated that it 
shall be a representative and consensus-seeking body where the parties ... will seek to reach 
agreement through negotiation and discussion based on proper mandates. Requiring the 
agreement of Nedlac would mean that the more economically conservative labour movements 
in South Mrica would have to agree to the negotiation of a FT A. 
South Africa's investigation into the effects of a FT A, before granting a mandate for 
negotiation, meant that the preliminary discussions about the negotiations between SA and the 
84 
ED, that were due to start on June 20, could produce no fruit. This apparent lack of action on 
the part of South Africa prompted Director General Steffen Smidt to seriously criticise South 
. Mrica- at an investment conference held in Cannes in June 1996. He accused South'Africa of 
foot dragging and warned that the offer of a free trade agreement would not exist indefinitely. 
He also warned that the window of opportunity that had been opened to So~uJh.Africa would 
not r~main open for long. Director General Smidt also expressed his dismay at what he saw as 
South Africa's viewing of the FTA offer as unattractive, 
The comments from Director General Smidt came at a bad time for South Mrica, as it was 
trying to win foreign investor interests. The conference was attended by South Africa's Deputy 
President, Mr Thabo Mbeki, the Minister of Finance, Mr Trevor Manuel, and the Governor of 
the SA Reserve Bank, Mr Chris Stals. Mr Manuel's response to the accusations was to .point 
to the fact that the foot dragging was in fact an attempt by the South Mrican government to 
get consensus from all parties that would be potentially effected by the agreement, particularly 
that of the region (Business Day 19 June 1996), 
Mr Manuel's response indicated that South Mrica would not respond to the ED's offer of an 
FT A until all factors had been considered, The following chapter examines the South Mrican 
economy and the possible effects that a FT A, such as the one presented in the mandate, could 
have on the SA economy. While no comprehensive impact studies of the FTA have been 
released to date, numerous draft studies have been conducted, and the implications of a FT A 
for South Africa can therefore be speculated upon. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF A FT A< ON SOUTH AFRICA 
At the end of 1996, the South Mrican negotiating team made it clear that no agreement could 
be embarked upon before all factors had been considered, and all impacts assessed. This was a 
very difficult process for a number of reasons, some of which had been encountered by the 
European researchers in the early stages of formulating a proposal for a SA-EU agreement. 
South Mrica's import and export figures during the apartheid years were extensively 
manipulated in an attempt to circumvent internationally imposed sanctions. The figures had 
been further manipulated by the need to support South Mrica's protectionist policies under 
apartheid. Furthermore, because of the extensive sub-continental linkages, the impact upon 
. 
the entire region, especially upon the SACU countries, would have to be thoroughly assessed. 
The poor trade statistics extended to the entire region, and this would also have to be taken 
into consideration. 
By the end of 1996 no impact studies had been released by the South Mrican government. 
This study, therefore, makes use of data from the EU and draws extensively from the Global 
Economic Strategy Project's (GESP) draft document of September 1996. This document was 
prepared by Kate Kuper of the Department of Trade and Industry, and Rashad Cassim of the 
Trade Policy Monitoring Project at the University of Cape Town. Its aims were to: 
• Develop a policy tool which would act as a basis for determining the allocation of 
DTI foreign offices and domestic marketing resources. This would be done 
according to an assessment of the trade (and to some extent inward investment) 
potential for South Africa across a range of markets. 
• Create a framework which took into consideration some of the important but less 
tangible qualitative factors which played a role in prioritising countries with which 
South Africa should have fostered economic r:elations. This would require a broader 
political economy approach. 
• Begin a process whereby government and its social partners worked together to 
identify markets and sectors which held out the greatest potential for enAaneing 
South Africa's economic performance in the global economy. 
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This report was aimed at SA's relation to the entire global economy, not specifically at the 
European market. The report supplied good trade data, and policy proposals for South 
Africa's general foreign trade stance. 
The first thing to note, when assessing the effects that a FT A would have, is that the parties to 
the agreement were vastly different. The concept of an FT A, as defined by the GA'(TIWTO, 
was one designed to be implemented between parties that faced geographic proximity and 
similar levels of development. The EU-SA case was clearly neither geographically 
approximate, nor was it economically homogenous. The EU was a grouping of 15 Qighly 
developed economies representing the bulk of South Africa's foreign trade: absorbing more 
than 40% of SA's exports and supplying more than 33% of SA's imports (European 
Commission 1996: 13). On top of this, the EU contributed 52% of all foreign direct 
investment in the country (Fouere address at FGD conference, 21 October 1996). South 
Africa was a developing country facing massive social and economic change, that represented 
only 1,9% of the ED's imports, and 1,3% of exports (EU 1996 b: 13). The importance of the 
European trade for South Africa is evidenced in Table 3 
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Table 3: South Africa's most important trading partners 
-
1990 r!inking 1991 ranking 1992 ranking 1993 ranking 1994 ranking 19!J4 in 
.. 
million rand 
European Union 52082,5 
Gennany 1 1 2 2 2 16692,5 
United Kingdom 2 3 3 4 3 14900,2 
Italy 7 8 7 8 
~ -
6 4749,6 
Belgium 9 10 9 7 8 4344,7 
- Netherlands 6 7 8 9 9 4003,5 
France 10 9 10 10 10 3712,0 
Others 3680,0 
United States 4 2 1 1 1 16901,5 
Japan 3 4 4 3 4 12049,8 
Switzerland 5 5 5 5 5 8006,4 
ROC (Taiwan) 8 6 6 6 7 4421,3 
total all countries 134544,7 
(source: EU 1996 b: 13) 
Not only was the EU, as a group, South Africa's largest partner, but six of the 15 member 
states were in SA's top ten trading partners in their individual capacity. 
Despite the fact that South Africa's developmental level was of an inferior nature to that of the 
EU, South Africa had managed to maintain a trade surplus in the past. This surplus, however, 
was maintained only through the export of precious stones and metals, a sector that has rapidly 
declined in importance. Further, the EU maintained a large surplus on trade in industrial 
goods, and this had been growing as quickly as the decline of South Africa's precious stones 
and minerals. Figures for 1994 showed. that South Africa had lost this trade surplus, and the 
future prospects indicated that the EU's surplus would grow exponentially. For this reason, 
the maintenance of a positive trade balance in agriculture was important for SA as it was one 
of the only areas in which SA could compete with the ED. If gold was excluded from the 
assessment, the EU would be seen to have had a trade surplus much larger than that indicated 
in the table. Table 4 displays the EU's trade balance with SA from 1992 through to 1994. 
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Table 4 EU (15) trade balance with South Africa 
Amount in Millions ECU xlm ratio 
--
1992 1993 1994 (average) 
total -3781 -2855 +622 75% 
agricultural products (CN-code 1-24) -621 -476 -542 30% 
industrial products (CN-code 25-70. 72-98) +1757 +2311 +3414 177% 
I precious stones and metals (CN-code 71) -4917 -4690 -2250 2% 
(source: EU 1996 b: 14) 
Whe~ assessing the impact that a FT A could have on the two parties, it is first important to 
look at all aspects of the current trade relations. An area that demands particular attention is 
the degree of access that each party has to the other's market prior to an FT A. It is in this area 
that South Africa faces the most difficult transitions. The trade access, prior to any agreement, 
allows80% of South African exports to enter the ED market duty free. For ED products, 
however, the level of free trade access is low, with only 44% of goods entering the SA market 
duty free. These figures reflect South Africa's GSP treatment within the ED, with a higllJevel 
of free access. They also reflect the nature of South African trade, being primarily in products 
that are zero rated in terms of GATTIWTO and the GSP. This is especially true for trade in 
metals and minerals. In tum, South Africa's high level of protectionism reflects the effects of 
the apartheid government's protectionist policies. These figures, relating to quantity of exports 
in real terms, are also reflected in the level of tariffs imposed. The average level of tariff in the 
ED is more than three times lower than that of South Africa, where the average tariff is as high 
as 20% for industrial products and 38% for agricultural products (ED 1996 b: 14). 
These figures are manipulated further by requirements under the WTO. As a result of the 
WTO Marakesh agreement, the percentage of duty free access will be increased towards the 
year 2000 to 83% for access to the EU market, and 54% to the South African market. Given 
that negotiations towards a free trade agreement are unlikely to be completed before mid to 
late 1997, at the earliest, and following the slow progress to date, it is evident that the increase 
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in free access to the EU market, resulting from a FT A, is not going to be that substantial for 
South Africa. Conversely, the effects, faced by South Africa, of opening up an already 
. sensitive market at a rate quicker than that demapqed by the WTO will, in all likelihood, be 
extremely detrimental to South Africa's development and domestic industries. Under these 
terms, and taking the EU's mandate into account, the increase in free trade access to the EU 
..- - -"" 
mark~t will only be in the region of between 6% and 10% depending on the level of coverage 
of the agreement. In tum, South Africa will have to carry out a massive opening of its 
economy, facing all the increased competition that accompanies this. According to Paul 
Goodison, of the European Research Office, to achieve the elimination of 90% of tariffs on all 
current trade, the EU will have to eliminate 7% of its tariffs on SA imports, and SA will have 
to eliminate 36% of tariffs on goods imported from the EU (Goodison address at the FGD 
conference: 21 October 1996). These figures are not in keeping with the spirit of development 
that was proposed in the Luxembourg declaration. 
In addition to this, the EU's mandate required South Africa to use "applied" rather than 
"bound" rates when negotiating its tariff reduction commitments for the proposedFT A. 
Bound rates were the maximum rates that SA had already committed itself to in the WTO. In 
many cases, the country has reduced its tariffs below the bound rates in order to either simplifY 
its tariff structure or for the purpose of industrial or agricultural policy. These lower rates are 
the "applied" rates. South Africa reserved the right to raise the tariff up to its bound rates if 
industrial, agricultural or other policy decisions so demanded. The EU's insistence on the use 
of applied rates has effectively eroded South Mrica's use of legitimate (WTO compatible) trade 
policy instruments (Faizel Ismail in Business Day 18 July 1996). 
As mentioned above, South Africa's exports to the EU are mostly zero rated, due to the fact 
that they are primary products. This reflects the properties of South Africa's export profile, of 
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which close to two-thirds are commodities - primarily minerals and agriculture (the latter make 
up less than 10% of total exports). The contribution of minerals to South Africa's total exports 
. is clo~fe to 50% (Kuper and Cassim 1996: 21). This figure excludes limited processed mineral 
products such as ferro-alloys and steeL Of these minerals, the majority export earner is gold. 
The relative importance of gold, however, has been declining over the p,?-st _decade, from 
43.5~ in 1985 to 29.7% in 1994. In terms of value, South Africa's non-gold mineral exports 
have increased, although at a slower rate than total export growth. Gold, however, is pulling 
the entire mineral sector's growth rate down and, as indicated in Table 5, minerals as a 
percentage of all exports, have declined in importance from 66.7% in 1985 to 49% in 1994. 
Table 5 Minerals and Gold as a Percentage of Exports. 
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994. 
Minerals 66,7 66 60 57,5 57,1 54,2 53,2 49,1 48,7 49 
as % all .' 
Exports . 
Gold as 43,4 42,5 40,3 38 33,8 31,2 30 29 29,7 29 
% all 
Exports 
(Source: Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, cited in Kuper and Cassim 1996: 22) 
According to Kuper and Cassim (1996), South Africa has come to rely less on gold mining, 
both in terms of its contribution to GDP and export revenues in the post apartheid era, while 
the importance of other commodities has increased. What this means is that, despite some 
evidence of diversification, primary commodities collectively remain important to South Africa 
owing to diversification within the commodity sector (Kuper and Cassim 1996: 22). A FTA 
with the ED would have little effect on the future export of South Africa's minerals as these 
products face largely zero rated entry to the ED. 
On the agricultural issue, the South African party felt that the exclusion of 39% of agricultural 
produce was not only a contradiction of previous ED commitment to South Africa's 
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development, but was also unnecessary. The South African Department of Agriculture noted 
that South Africa's agriculture could have very little impact on the EU agricultural market, the 
. primary reason for this being the opposite. seasons. When Europe has its summer, South 
Africa is in the middle of winter. This means that the two regions could supply one another in 
alternating seasons. In addition, the cost of transporting fresh produce from South Africa to 
the EU adds tremendous costs to the products; costs that the European producers do not face. 
South Africa's erratic rainfall was also cited as a reason why the EU need not fear South 
Africa's agriculture. South Africa's agricultural production is subject to large fluctuations due 
to these annual changes in rainfall. These reasons, coupled with the competition that South 
Africa would face as a result of the CAP, means that South Africa's agricultural produce could 
have very little impact on the EU market. In addition, South Africa's agricultural exports 
account for only 10% of total exports to the ED. South Africa's agricultural sector, however, 
could benefit tremendously from better access to the ED. The sector is labour intensive, and 
any increase in agricultural exports would mean job creation. It is also one of the few sectors 
where South Africa could achieve some level of comparative advantage in Europe. These 
benefits could all be achieved at very little cost to the ED. 
South Africa's future success was firmly located in its ability to expand its manufacturing 
exports (Kuper and Cassim 1996: 23). This relies on the ability of South African industry to 
attain comparative advantage in the global manufacturing market. There was a general 
consensus in 1996 that South Africa's manufactured goods accounted for less than 25% of 
total exports, of which close to 40% were destined for a few countries in Southern Africa. 
The relative importance of manufactures as a percentage of total non-gold exports, increased 
from less than 25% in 1975 to an estimated 35% in 1993 (ibid.). While these figures for 
manufactured goods were showing increases within the South African economy, in terms of 
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global figures, South Africa has been slipping. South Africa's share in world manufactured 
products declined from 0,47% in the 1970s to 0,34% in the 1990s. The only area where South 
. Africa has maintained its share of the world market. is in iron and steel production (ibid.: 26). 
Iron and steel are both zero rated in the EU, and therefore would also not be affected by the 
FTA. 
The new South African government has inherited many inefficient and non-competitive 
industries from the Apartheid government's protectionist policies. The possibility of either 
making these industries competitive, privati sing them, or closing them down is, however, not 
achievable overnight. South Africa already faces high rates of unemployment, and market 
instability. The process of rapid closing down or privatisation of all inefficient, government 
owned, industry in the country would have a devastating effect on the already weak l~bour 
market. Also, many of these inefficient industries are located in areas where there is no 
alternative employment, and where the industry, no matter how inefficient, supports an entire 
community. A good example of this is SASOL, where the immediate deregulation of the 
industry and/or its complete privatisation, would most likely have resulted in its closure, 
leaving an entire community destitute. Instead, the government embarked on a slow 
transformation process, which included the phasing out of the oil, coal and chemical group's 
tariff protection over four years (Financial Mail 7 June 1996). The irresponsible closing down 
of these industries could have resulted in tremendous social repercussions. Furthermore, in the 
case of Moss gas, it was estimated that closure would cost the South African tax payer Rl,2bn 
(Financial Mail 16 February 1996). These industries were, however, not sustainable in the long 
run, with the Mossgas plant costing the South African government R365m per annum to 
subsidise (ibid.). A balance had to be struck between liberalising the economy, attaining 
comparative advantage and competitiveness, protecting social interests and the internal South 
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African economy in order to protect jobs and small industries and reforming state sponsored 
industries. As a result a policy of privatisation was embarked upon by the government . 
. However, this policy had to be implemented witp .care, one of the main reasons being the 
strong anti-privatisation drive from the country's trade unions. The labour movement was 
against the privatisation of industries as they would then, potentially, face the full effect of 
trade liberalisation, which in attempting to gain competitiveness, would cost jobs that were 
deemed to be inefficient (Financial Mail 15 December 1995). South Mrica's Deputy Minister 
of Environment and Tourism stated that privatisation would not be embarked upon as an 
ideological pursuit, but would rather be conducted in a manner in which the best outcome for 
the workers could be achieved (Financial Mail 12 January 1997). The reforms required by a 
SA-EU FT A would be insensitive to these particular problems being faced by South Africa in 
its transition. While international competitiveness, and South Africa's success in the global 
. 
economy, were essential to South Mrica's long term survival or success, these can not be 
attained at the expense of the South African labour market, or at the expense of the Southern 
African region. 
The preferential market access offered by the EU would be of great benefit to South Mrica. 
However, this access would be relatively small in comparison with the effect of allowing a 
regional grouping, comprising some the world's top countries, to have preferential access to an 
undeveloped and highly protected market. South Africa is undergoing transitions that are both 
numerous and diverse. In trying to rectify inherited political instability, structural defects, 
social inequalities, regional relations and an inefficient and undeveloped economy, South Africa 
has to develop its international economic policy with extreme care. There are too many factors 
that could be adversely effected by rushing into an agreement with the ED. Despite this 
precarious position, many interested parties, both South African and European, as well as some 
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third parties, are criticising South Africa's lack of action. The regional aspects of the FTA are 
of particular concern to South Africa. The following chapter examines the regional dynamics 
. that are involved, and the effect that the FT A ~o.uld have on the region. It assesses the 
regional implications through examining the two organisations whose members would be 
affected most by a FT A: The Southern African Development Community (S~C) and the 
Sout~ern African Customs Union (SACU). 
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CHAPTERS 
SADC. SACU "tN'll THE EU 
The end of apartheid, and the resultant progression into a new era, affected not only South 
Mrica, but the entire Southern African region. Much weight was placed on the success of the 
region. Colleen Lowe Morna wrote, in Mrica Report, that from a region wracked by war and 
despair, southem Africa has been miraculously transformed into Africa's brightest hope for 
peace and prosperity (Morna 1995:65). While this hope for the Southern African region 
existed, it was recognised that this bright future would only be achieved with hard work and 
co-operation amongst the regional members. The World Bank and the Development Bank of 
Southern Mrica prepared a report on the region's future, assessing the process that would have 
," 
to be embarked upon to achieve a successful outcome for the region. This success was 
identified as possible only through the combined effort of the entire region. 
Ten years ago the region was dominated by apartheid and civil war. It has now truly entered a 
new era, with all countries in Southern" Africa being self governed, and containing reasonably 
legitimate democratic governments. The wars in both Mozambique and Angola have wound 
down and, for the first time in the region's history, there is potential for co-operation for 
prosperity rather than liberation. This emancipation has also opened the way for regional 
organisations to take on a new role in assisting the region in its development. Some sort of 
forward movement is sorely needed in the region, where per capita income declined by 0,8% 
from 1980 to 1992, compared with the 2 and 6% per capita income growth on other low and 
middle income countries and East Asian countries respectively (Schweikert 1996: 48). 
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South Africa is by far the dominant power in the region; the South African average GNP per 
capita was almost 3,5 times that of the rest of the region in 1993 (Based on World. Bank data 
. published in the World Development Report; 199~).. South Africa is viewed as a benevolent, 
though domineering, relative - crucial to regional economic development, but feared for its 
dynamism (Hull 1996: 35). South Africa has, however, realised that its growth and 
~ - -"" 
deve19pment are intrinsically linked to that of the region. According to Alec Erwin, who 
replaced Trevor Manuel as Trade and Industry Minister in 1996, South Africa's growth can not 
be achieved unless it can integrate its economy with those of the region (Business Day 4 
November 1996). 
The regional organisations that are of primary importance to the region are the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
These two organisations have fundamentally different roots and are designed to serve opposing 
ideologies. However, in the post-apartheid era, they are both intrinsic to the survival and 
successful development of the region. The EU, in its dealings with South Africa, declared its 
support for the region and these two organisations, backing the drive to make Southern Africa 
a symbol of hope for the rest of Africa. This chapter examines these two organisations, and 
how they affect, and are affected by, the EU-SA trade agreement. The chapter also looks at 
the relationship between the EU and the region. 
5.1. From SADCC to SADC 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in 
Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980. The organisation was originally intended to unite the 
Southern African states against apartheid South Africa. The central aim of the organisation 
was to reduce the regional dependence on Pretoria. SADCC fought for 12 years against 
97 
apartheid and was effectively crippled by both South African destabilisation in the region, and 
the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. This was compounded by the policies of the 
individual member states, who were not prepared to forego the necessary sovereignty to make 
the regional organisation work. Despite achieving little in the way of concrete gains, the 
organisation managed to weather the apartheid years, and provide a semblance of regionalism 
in the.sub-continent. 
The change that was occurring in the region in the early 1990s prompted major reform in the 
organisation, as the original purpose of SADCC had changed somewhat. On 17 July 1992, at 
the Sllmmit of Heads of State, the Southern Mrican Development Community (SADC) 
replaced the Co-ordination Conference. This event took place in Windhoek, Namibia, the 
capital of SADC/SADCC's newest member, and also a symbol of the change taking place in 
the region. The new objectives given to SADC were to: 
• Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard 
and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration; 
• Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
• Promote and defend peace and security; 
• Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self reliance, and the 
interdependence of member states; 
• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; 
• Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the 
region; 
• Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment; 
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• Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities 
and links among aI/ people in the region. 
(Introduction to SADC: http://business.kent.edu/sabos/intro.htm) 
With the end of apartheid in April 1994 it was hoped that SADC could, with the help of South 
Africa, become an effective regional grouping. On 3 August 1994 the South- African Cabinet 
decided to accept an offer of SADC membership and, on the 29 August 1994, South Africa 
formally acceded to the SADC Treaty (South Africa and SADC: Http://www.southafrica. 
net/government/foreignlsasadc.html). The admission of South Africa to SADC, as its 11 th 
member would, at the very least, enlarge the regional market and bring new opportunities for 
co-operation, including possibilities for a regional minerals-based industrialisation strategy 
(Tsie et al. 1996: 11). 
However, the risks involved in integrating South Africa into Southern Africa were just about 
equal to the benefits. If all trade restrictions were lifted, other Southern African state's 
economies would be flooded by cheaper, aggressively marketed South African goods. This 
was accentuated by the fact that the Northern investors, where they showed any interest in the 
region, were interested only in South Africa. According to Dr. Balefi Tsie (1996: 12), without 
political commitment to balanced regional development, the logic of the market would 
intensify the existing acute disparities in economic activity. Furthermore, Southern Africa was 
seeing wide and worsening inequality in the distribution of incomes within, and between, 
countries, high inflation, unemployment, low levels of per capita income, low growth rates and 
very high indebtedness. 
The conclusions ofa report by Chipeta and Davies (cited Tsie et al. 1996: 12-13) on SADC's 
economic position and future were that: 
• the market for basic goods was limited; 
• close interaction between the countries of the region meant unemployment was 
easily interchaflged; 
• large debt ratios reduced the amount of foreign exchange available for imports, and 
hence, for production; 
• the secular long term decline in the terms of trade meant a gloomy outlook for 
primary produce exporting countries; 
• Lack of peace would worsen this situation for the countries affected 
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Another problem identified by the report was that local industries in Southern Africa would 
find it difficult to compete with increased imports from South Africa. By early 1996, some 
repercussions of South Africa's economic involvement in the SADC region were that: 
• some 50,000 SADC workers lost their jobs in the South African mining sector; 
• investment flows appeared to be polarised towards South Africa; 
• there was a brain drain towards South Africa from the region; 
• the gap in visible and invisible trade in favour of South Africa was growing. 
(Chipita and Davies op cit: 13) 
The risks that had been identified, and the problems that had already occurred, illustrated the 
importance of developing a constructive, sustainable development and trade strategy for the 
region. There was some concern about the rush of countries within the region seeking to form 
bilateral trade agreements with South Africa. Bilateral trade agreements were not favourably 
viewed by the WTO, which encourages a more regional approach. The reason given for this is 
that preferences granted to only a single country do not promote trade and competition in 
production. The European Union expressed its strong support for the Southern African 
region, offering its experience in regional groupings to be made available to Southern Africa. 
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The ED had supported the SADC region smce 1986 through its Special Programme of 
assistance to the victims of apartheid. This programme distributed funds exclusively through 
. NGOs, financing more than 700 projects for a tot~ ~mount of around 450 Million ECD, these 
funds going primarily to the Front-line States, all of which were members of SADCC. Further, 
all members of SADC, apart from South Africa, were also members of the Lome Convention. 
~ - ", 
In a display of support for the Southern African region, the ED hosted a landmark meeting in 
Berlin in September 1994. This meeting brought together the Foreign Ministers of all the 
SADC countries and the Foreign Ministers of all the ED countries. In his opening address, Mr 
Manuel Marin, the then Commissioner of DG8, noted that the political transition that had 
taken place in South Africa was part of a process in the region, paving the way to a better 
future for Southern Africa. He urged the Southern African region to establish, not only 
economic co-operation, but also mechanisms for securing peace and stability in the region in 
the long run. He also said that the ED supported South Africa's insistence that any future ED-
SA relations take full account of the regional aspects and lead to a closer integration in 
Southern Africa. 
Rhetorical support for the region was extremely high at the conference. The ED expressed its 
support for, and co-operation with, Southern Africa in nine areas: 
• Political Dialogue: there should be regular political dialogue between the EU and 
the SADC countries, consisting of regular exchanges of views on general matters of 
foreign policy, particularly with a view to promoting peace and long term stability in 
the Southern African region. 
• Regional Integration: the EU offered to share experience in the field of regional 
integration and in this respect to assist SADC inter alia, through exchange of 
personnel, training, assistance and advice on organisational matters. 
• Trade and Economic Co-operation: the parties undertook to promote regional trade 
in order to promote economic development within the region. This would be 
conducted within the parameters set by the WTO/GA IT and the Lome Convention. 
• Private Investment, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Promotion of the 
Private Sector: the parties recognised the key roles of domestic and foreign private 
investment, and the private sector, in the promotion of economic and social" 
development of the Southern African region. SpeCial emphasis was therefore 
placed on the development of small and medium sized enterprises. In order to 
promote an environment healthy to the development of the private sector. The 
parties undertook to promote the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the 
Member States of the EU and the SADC Member states. 
• Development Co-operation: the parties declared their intention to closely co-
ordinate the planning and implementation of regional development programmes and 
projects in the fields of transport and communications, energy, trade promotion, 
livestock protection, poverty alleviation, population and social development, food 
security, education, training and health. In this respect the parties recognised the 
importance of the co-ordinating role of the EU and the SADC secretariat. 
• Natural Resources and the Environment: the parties recognised the importance of 
the global environment and the conservation of natural resource. The EU undertook 
to support the Southern African region in four fields: 
- the fight against desertification and soil erosion 
- water resource management 
- sustainable agriculture 
- management of natural resources 
• Science and Technology: the parties agreed to intensify scientific and technological 
co-operation both with and within the SADC region. Possible areas of co-operation 
were identified as: 
- promotion of the utilisation of regional resources compatible with the environment 
- industrial research and development 
- ecological research 
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- agricultural research 
- energy technology, especially new and renewable resources 
- water processing technology 
- tropical medicine 
• Tourism: the parties underlined the major contribution which tourism could make to 
development. The remarkable opportunities for Southem African tourism were 
noted. The parties agreed to co-operate on bringing about conditions that were 
healthy to the development of tourism. 
• Cultural Co-operation: the parties agreed to foster contacts in the fields of culture, 
education and science, especially co-operation between institutions of higher 
learning, sports and socio-cultural organisations. 
• Co-operation in Combating International Crime: the parties undertook to co-operate 
closely in the fight against international crime, including in particular, arms 
smuggling, illicit cultivation, trafficking and consumption of drugs, money laundering .' 
and illegal dumping of toxic waste. 
• Other Areas: co-operation in other areas would be included upon mutual 
agreement. 
(Declaration by the EU/Southern Africa Ministerial Conference of 516 September 1994 
in Berlin) 
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The final item of the conference was a follow up clause, in which the parties agreed to 
continue their comprehensive dialogue and commit their respective competent institutions to 
making appropriate proposals to follow up the Conference (ibid.). 
One of the issues addressed at the conference was a push by some of the SADC members to 
set an agenda to address the day-to-day problems of co-operation, where the reality of ED 
support fell well short of the rhetoric. The EU's political support for this item, however, was 
not forthcoming. The final item on the conference's agenda, dealing with follow up to the 
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conference, failed from its outset. The EU member states set up a working group to discuss 
follow-up and, at their first meeting, this group ruled out the possibility of establishing any new 
mechanisms, or duplicating existing ones, in ord~r .to promote follow-up action. This meant 
that all the political dialogue that took place in Berlin had no real impact on the range of day-
to-day co-operation problems which arose in EU-Southern African relations. Further, no link 
was made with the need to ensure coherence between the trade and co-operation framework in 
existence for the ACP-SADC countries and the new trade and co-operation framework that 
was to be established between the EU and Southern Africa. As a result, a range of issues 
arising in EU-South African relations, which could have had serious implications for the 
neighbouring ACP-SADC countries, would potentially be ignored in the EU-SA bilateral 
negotiations (Tsie et al 1996: 16). 
The ED further claimed to be restricted in its actions with regard to Southern Africa as any 
special treatment to the Southern African region would prejudice the Lome Convention. As all 
but one of the SADC countries were members of the ACP, all developmental and trade 
relations had to be conducted within this framework. In terms of Lome, the EU could nof give 
Southern Africa special treatment. 
By early 1996, the SADC region had become a formidable force in Africa. The International 
Herald Tribune labelled the region the Economic Giant of Africa as the SADC countries 
accounted for 40% of Africa's total population, 81 % of the continent's total GNP, 81 % of 
Africa's total imports and 80% of its exports (Southern African Development Community 
http://business.kent.edulsaboslintor.htm). The region took a significant step forward at the 
SADC summit in Maseru in August 1996 when it signed a trade protocol which envisaged the 
elimination of import duties over a three year period (Business Day 26 August 1996). This 
agreement required ratification from the parliaments of all 12 SADC members, and would 
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come into effect once three-quarters of the members had given their consent. By aU accounts, 
the summit was extremely successful with all SADC member states, with the exception of 
. Angola, signing all the protocols presented .. The. s~mmit expressed the wish that the SADC 
region's Free Trade Agreement be the first to be signed since the formation of the WTO's 
existence. The agreement would also be remarkable due to the diversity in the scale of the 
various regional economies (ibid.). 
At the AWEPA (Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid) 
Conference on Reconstruction and Democratisation in Southern Africa, held in Cape Town on 
9 September 1996, Director General of DG8, Steffen Smidt, addressed the issue of the ED's 
support for regional co-operation and economic integration in Southern Africa. According to 
Smidt the .. ACP states are generally too small and too poor to base their growth only on 
their domestic market. ACP economies need regional co-operation and integration as a 
springboard for their own development and an entry point to the global economy (Director 
General Steffen Smidt addressing the AWEPA Conference, 9 September 1996, Cape Town). 
The Director General outlined the EU policy towards Southern Africa, which focuses on three 
complementary objectives: 
1) The Community gives its full backing to SADC political co-operation. This involves: 
- Willingness to assist the launching of specific initiatives in the area of Conflict 
Prevention and Peace Keeping; 
- Institutional support to Southern African political sector structures; 
- Promotion and facilitation of intra-regional parliamentary contracts; 
- Support for combating drug-trafficking. 
2) The Community fully supports regional economic integration through trade 
liberalisation. The challenge for the region is to develop an internal division of labour 
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that is equitable and sustainable, and that helps in reducing the divides which still 
characterise the region. 
3} A third priority of the EU policy is to further trade and economic co-operation 
between Southern Africa and the EU. This involves devising stable and open 
conditions for mutual trade, and supporting structural reforms that will enhance the 
region's competitiveness. 
_ (ibid.) 
Director General Smidt also expressed p,is support for the region and regional integration in a 
number of other areas, praising the development of the SADC "Organ" on politics; the Cross 
Border Ip,itiative which brought government and private sector interests together, a..'1d the 
S,A.DC trade protocol. He praised the objective of the development of a regional FTA, saying 
that if quickly ratified and properly implemented, the regional deal 'would help the new South 
Africa to open up to its neighbours in a transparent and predictable way. It would reduce the 
economic divide between SACU members and the other SADC states. It would also 
accelerate the growth of regional trade, which was seen as far too low. Director General 
He said that every effort was being made to design a FTA that took the region's best interests 
into account. He said, hnwever, that it was extremely difficult to assess the effects that a SA-
ED FTA could have on the region as the situation was so unique, and dynamic. He referred to 
the "bicycle syndrome": a bicycle only stands when it moves, and we cannot properly 
understand the interaction of an FTA lvhich would only exist 10 years from nml/ if we study its 
impact on the realities of yesterday. As the bicycle moves, the landscape is bound to ch.ange 
(ibid.). 
In October 1996, two years after the Berlin conference, a second SADC-EU Ministerial 
Conference took place in Windhoek, Namibia. At this Conference DG8 Commissioner, Prof 
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Pinheiro, spoke of the globalisation trend taking place in world trade. He referred to a 
threefold increase in world output matched by a sixfold increase in world trade, accompanied 
by the globalisation of ~apital and services in the. ~ake of a new industrial revolution. This, 
accompanied by the rapid developments in communications and transport, were opening 
markets and increasing ties between people, and having a profound impact on the economic 
~ - -
outlook at continental level. These factors required a change in thinking and behaviour. This 
interdependence called for a new co-operation effort at the world level. The Commissioner 
pointed out that the strongest argument and greatest scope for such co-operation existed at the 
regional level. In the light of this development the Commissioner expressed the EUs support 
for the development of this type of co-operation within the SADC region. He also expressed 
his strong support for the trade protocols that had already been signed between the countries 
of the region, expressing particular support for the SADC region's aim of establishipg a 
regional FT A. Finally, Prof Pinheiro commented that in his view regional integration should 
not stop at a FT A with a few financial transfers tacked on to it. He called for a common 
economic and social area, an organised space in which everyone pulled together. He also 
called for the establishment of priorities of action to maintain vital momentum towards a co-
operative strategy for growth and development (Professor Pinheiro's Introductory Statement 
on Regional Integration and Co-operation at the EU-SADC Ministerial Conference 15 October 
1996). 
Support for the SADC FT A also came from the various member states of the EU in their 
individual capacities. The British representative, Baroness Chalker, expressed particular 
support for the regional FT A initiative, and mentioned that her government was conducting 
research into ways in which they could offer practical help to the process. This would include 
a programme aimed at developing institutional capacities in the SADC countries to achieve the 
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ambitious goals set out in the Trade Protocols. Baroness Chalker said that one of the key 
challenges for SADC and its member states is to attract an increased level of private 
. investment (Statement by Baroness Chalker· at the, SADC-EU Ministerial Conference 14-15 
October 1996). 
5.2. SADC's Position 
The reaction of the SADC member states was, however, very different. The general feeling 
amongst the SADC members was that the EU's policy and rhetoric was contradictory in its 
SA-SADC approach. While the EU provided a lot of spoken support for the SADC region 
and regional integration, it undermined this process by negotiating a bilateral agreement with 
South Africa. The other SADC countries are extremely wary of South Africa's relative 
position of power within the region. They fear that a FT A between SA and the EU would 
accentuate this position, and further marginalise SADC regional interests. 
The SADC Secretariat addressed this issue in a paper entitled EU - RSA Free Trade Area: 
Some Critical Critical Aspects in September 1996. Here the SADC Secretariat put forward 
the argument that: 
... with a SADC FTA in place, a free trade arrangement between the EU and SA would 
represent, de facto, a FTA between the EU and SADC. Therefore, why EU - RSA 
negotiations, when, in the medium run, the subject of negotiations concems and affects 
all SADC member States? Therefore, not only South Africa's concems, but all SADC 
countries' concems should be considered in the negotiations of the FTA with the EU. 
Failing to do so, after the SADC Trade Protocol has been signed in Maseru/Lesotho, in 
August 1996, means questioning the collective political will of SADC member States to 
go for integration and their commitment to implement what has been Signed by SADC 
Heads of State. 
(SADC, September 1996) 
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On the issue of the EU's contradictory stance, the SADC Secretariat felt that the EU's political 
commitment to the SADC region, as begun in the Berlin Initiative, was being completely 
. undermined by the ED s~ngling out SA. SA had b~~n a full member of SADC since 1994, and 
singling it out from SADC was tantamount to driving a wedge between SA and her neighbours 
and partners in SADC. This approach was seen as counterproductive to SADC's integration 
efforts. 
The SADC Secretariat felt that the EU's focus on South Africa was understandable from a 
purely economic perspective. SA represented a much more important market for the ED than 
the other Southern African States did. From a developmental point of view, however, SADC 
felt that the ED had expressed equal commitment to both the SADC states and SA. South 
Africa had also expressed commitment to the SADC region, and by negotiating a bilateral 
agreement with the ED, SA herself was acting against spoken and legal objectives. TneSADC 
secretariat felt that SA should focus on extending the FT A and not limit its scope to the ED. 
SA was seen to be unable to develop in isolation from the SADC region, and the SADC region 
was also seen to be dependent on SA for development. The resultant relationship was one that 
required mutual co-operation. 
With regard to the SADC Trade Protocol of August 1996, South Africa had certain legal 
obligations to the SADC region. These ruled that SA could not grant more preferential market 
access conditions to the ED than to her SADC partners. This established an upper limit to the 
speed at which a possible ED-SA FT A could be put in place. This was seen as one positive 
factor for an ED-SA FTA for the SADC region, as it would effectively force SA to open its 
regional market quicker than would otherwise have been required. 
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The SADC paper also examined the viability of a SADC-EU FT A. SADC had only just signed 
a FT A arrangement for the region, the result being a regional trade liberalisation process, 
. accompanied by a need. to restructure the econo~es of all the member states. This would 
involve rationalisation and a significant modification of the individual member state's 
comparative advantages. SADC felt that the region would be unable and ill-equipped to deal 
with the added and profound adjustments that would be required to establish a FT A with the 
EU at the same time. With the regional integration process already having a strenuous impact 
on SADC producers, they could not be exposed to additional competitive pressures from 
European producers who had had ample time to rationalise and modernise in the context of 
European integration. It was felt that such new challenges for SADC's regional producers 
should not be embarked upon before, or, at the same time, as they took the first step of 
rationalisation and acquiring competitiveness in the regional context 
In summarising their stance, the SADC secretariat said that 
... the idea of a SADC-EU FTA should be kept under active consideration. However, 
SADC is not ripe for it now. For SADC, the priority is the creation of a unified regional 
market over a period of eight years in the context of the Trade Protocol as the 
framework. 
(SADC, September 1996) 
Furthermore, the SADC secretariat heavily criticised the EUs stance on SA's Lome 
membership. The EUs treatment of SA as a "middle income country" was considered 
detrimental to the majority of South Mricans. SADC noted that the international institutions, 
like the WTO, had not yet taken a decision on South Mrica's developmental status, as the issue 
was so complicated. SADC felt that South Africa's "middle income" status could only be 
attributed to a tiny minority of its population, located in small enclaves of an aflluent society in 
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a few urban areas. For the rest, SADC identified a developing country just like the rest of the 
SADC region. They felt that the country as a whole could not be denied specific preferences 
. undeUhe Lome Convention because of a tiny. elite. 
~ .;t 
South Africa's exclusion from Lome was seen as a further wedge between SADC and SA, as 
all the SADC members were signatories of the Lome Convention. Denying South Africa 
access to the Lome Convention had the equivalent effect of discriminating against the SADC 
region, as regional co-operation under the terms of Lome could not take place. From the point 
of view of poverty, the SADC secretariat felt that South Africa's people suffered an equal 
affliction as those of the rest of Southern Africa. The offer of a FT A as compensation for 
denying Lome access was viewed as a poor policy decision by the ED. 
With regard to the future prospects for an EU-SADC FT A, SADC expressed further concern, 
especially in the area of agricultural produce and about the effect that the CAP would have on 
SADC-EU trade under a FT A. The SADC secretariat felt that they should not expose the 
region to the artificial competitiveness of European agricultural products created thnmgh 
subsidies. In general, however, it was felt that a FTA between the EU and SADC would be a 
positive development for the future. 
A future FT A would have to be carefully considered, and there would have to be appropriate 
periods of adjustment for the parties. This is especially true for SADC, as they would have to 
adjust to an inefficient and often inactive market to be able to interact with the competitively 
aggressive European market. The issue of a FTA linked to a development policy, like the one 
offered to South Africa, would have to be extended to the entire SADC region. The SADC 
secretariat noted that the entire region was facing a need for development and, that the entire 
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region had been destabilised and had suffered under apartheid acts of aggression. This was 
another reason put forward for SADC's inclusion in the FT A. 
SADC harshly criticised the EU's exclusion of 39% of agricultural produce. According to the 
secretariat: This represents a matter of serious concern to South Africa and, in fact, Southern 
Africa at large. The products included in that list seem to cover virtually the whole array of 
agricultural commodities for which South Africa - and, in deed, SADC, has, or could possibly 
attain a comparative advantage vis-a-vis the EU (SADC, September 1996) 
In concluding the paper, the SADC secretariat expressed its concerns, raising the following 
questions: 
Does the EU propose a free-trade arrangement or a trade limitation arrangement? 
Does the EU intend to support development of RSA/SADC through such an 
arrangement, or does it intend to artificially support the EU countries' agricultural 
producers through an agreement by which any possible inflow of competing imports 
from the SADC region is suppressed? Does the EU favour growth through competition 
and development through trade creation - or does it want trade regulation and a 
penalisation of EU consumers and SADC producers at the expense of the latter's 
development? ... The modalities presented, in March 1996, by the EU, for the 
establishment of a FTA with RSA could not be accepted by SADC as a sound basis for 
an eventual FTA with EU at a future stage. 
(SADC Secretariat, 27 September 1996, Gabarone) 
The position of the SADC countries with regard to a FT A between SA and the ED is therefore 
clear. Any attempt by South Africa to include SADC in the FT A decision making process 
would undoubtedly produce an opposition stance from the SADC states. This would possibly 
extend to the formation of a SADC - ED FT A at the current stage. Despite its initial objective 
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to reduce dependence, the SADC states were linked to South Africa both geographically and 
ideologically. This dependence extended to a certain degree of economic dependence on 
. South- Mrica as the regional powerhouse, mainly, in the supply of transport, and the use of 
., . 
labour. The SADC states were not, however, integrally linked to South Mrica's domestic 
economy. A small number of the SADC states, however, namely the member states of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), were firmly linked to South Mrica's economy. 
South Mrica's consideration of a FTA with the EU would consequently have to be far more 
sensitive to the needs of, and consequences for, the SACU states than for the rest of the SADC 
members. 
5.3. SACU 
SACU is the oldest customs union in the world, established in 1910 between South Africa and 
the old High Commission territories: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Namibia joined 
SACU on its independence, having formerly been a de facto part of SACU due to its 
administration by South Africa (Tsie et al 1996: 8). This group became known as the BENS 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) states. The customs union had no internal tariffs 
or trade barriers, and applied a common external tariff and barrier to imports from outside of 
the union. In conjunction with the Common Monetary ArealS (CMA), it provided monetary 
and commercial integration through easy currency convertibility, preferential trade agreement, 
and an absence of trade tariffs (Hull 1996: 35). SACU was widely seen as a major contributor 
to the polarisation of accumulation within Southern Africa, owing to tough competition from 
South Mrica in BLNS domestic markets. The Union was also seen to have protected 
inefficient South African industries from cheaper goods outside, deepened the economic and 
15 The CMA consisted of South Africa. Lesotho. Swaziland and Namibia. all of which use the South African 
currency, the Rand. 
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political dependence of BLNS countries on their neighbour, and enabled Pretoria, in the 
apartheid era, to claim that some of its exported products originated from BLNS states. 
SACU's decision making and organisation of th~ .customs union were firmly entrenched in 
Pretoria's hands (Tsie et al 1996: 8). 
The future of SACU seemed uncertain in the post-apartheid era. Much of the international 
community viewed SACU as an instrument of apartheid that had no place in post-apartheid 
Southern Africa. This perception was quickly dismissed when it was realised that the 
dependent relationships that had developed as a result of SACU would be impossible to usurp 
in a hurry. The revenue sharing formula, that was intended to compensate for both the loss of 
sovereignty and economic and financial polarisation, dominated the incomes of two of the 
SACU members; both Swaziland and Lesotho relied heavily on the income received from the 
Customs Union. Lesotho, in particularly would be severely afflicted, as SACU receipts 
provided more than half of the government's revenue (European Commission Document DE 
78 1994: 25). Any reforms to the South African international trade policy would therefore 
have a massive effect on the economy of Lesotho and, to a slightly lesser extent, the economy 
of Swaziland. 
SACU had embarked on a process of change in the post-apartheid era. This had primarily 
taken the form of diversifYing the decision making from Pretoria to a more equitable power 
distribution located in all the SACU member states. All parties to the agreement would have a 
say in future tariff policy and related matters. This was likely be supplemented by a permanent 
secretariat staffed by citizens from member states, with its headquarters in either Lesotho or 
Swaziland. SACD's budget would be derived from contributions of member states deducted 
directly from their respective shares of the common revenue pool. 
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South Africa's accession to the WTO would necessarily result in a massive loss of revenue for 
BLNS as the Marakesh round's demands for reductions in tariff barriers are implemented. In 
. order - to accommodate. these future losses, SACtJ will re-evaluate the revenue sharing 
.~ ~ 
mechanisms and more of the revenue will be spent on industrial promotion and job creation in 
BLNS. 
As the ED is South Mrica's, and consequently SACU's, largest trading partner, any agreement 
between SA and the ED to reduce tariff barriers would have a much greater impact on BLNS 
than it would have on either South Africa or the ED. BLNS governments therefore 
commissioned the Imani Development· Consultants to conduct a Study on the Economic 
Impact of the Proposed EU-SA Free Trade Agreement on BLNS Countries. The Imani study 
assessed the impact of a trade agreement across five possible scenarios. All scenarios assume 
that the new SACD revenue formula is adopted. The findings of the study are presented in 
Table 6. 
The first two columns show the costs of entering an FT A. Column 1 estimates what revenue 
each government would lose if it entered a FT A with the ED and South Africa. The second 
column estimates what they would lose on the export side because the FT A would exclude 
some of the products on which they now have free access under Lome. The third and fourth 
columns are relevant if they remain outside the FT A. The cost of Borders measures the 
additional border controls. It includes the annual cost of staffing and running the posts and the 
capital costs of erecting additional border control points to calculate the collection tariff on ED 
imports through South Africa (amortised over 20 years, assuming an interest rate of 16%). 
Column four quantifies the value of Lome access to the ED (compared to the alternative, 
which would be GSP). The 1996 figures used current SACD tariffs, and the 2004 figures used 
the planned (lower) tariffs. 
115 
Table 6: Comparison of Scenarios (thousand rand) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
No FTA is signed The FT A is signed 
1996 Cost of Cost of Lome with Lome BLNS BLNS stay outside BLNS ignore it* 
Revenue FTA Borders Value Lome ends Jom with Lome with Lome , 
Loss excIus. r.t. asp Lome ends Lome ends , 
A B C D ~D -A-B -c -C-O -A -A-O 
1996 
Botswana 8191 6286 1800 69115 0 -69115 ~88205 -1800 -70915 -81919 -151034 
Lesotho 73323 15 5200 144 0 -144 -73338 -5200 -5344 -73323 ~73467 
Namibia 49362 6162 1800 44332 0 -44332 -55524 -1800 -46132 -49362 -93694 
Swaziland 78683 9931 3800 14212 0 -14212 -88614 -3800 -18012 -78683 -92895 
2004 ;, 
Botswana 61343 6286 1800 69115 0 -69115 -67629 -1800 -70915 -61343 -130458, 
Lesotho 54906 15 5200 144 0 -144 -54921 -5200 -5344 -54906 -55050
1 
Namibia 36963 6162 1800 44332 0 -44332 -43125 -1800 -46132 -36963 ~81295 
~waziland 58920 9931 3800 14212 0 -14212 -68851 -3800 -18012 -58920 -73132 
-(lmani 1996). 
,\ 
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Columns 5 - 11 combine these estimates, providing the calculations on which the five scenarios 
are based: 
• 1 (column 5): This could be considered the base of the present case for BLNS 
countries. There is currently no FT A, and they continue to have access to the EU 
equivalent to what they have under Lome. South Africa continues to collecf tariffs 
on EU goods, although the distribution to BLNS is on the new formula. The first 
conclusion must be that this case is superior to any of the others_ 
• 2 (column 6): This shows an alternative projection where Lome is not renewed. 
They return to the normal developing country access (they lose the advantage of 
lome access over GSP). South Africa does not sign the FTA. 
• 3 (column 7): If BLNS countries joined, they retain access better than GSP for the 
goods which are included in the FTA, but they lose access on those excluded, which 
have to be subtracted_ They lose their share of the total SACU tariff revenue lost on' 
EU imports. 
• 4 (column 8): Here it is assumed that BLNS does not join an EU-SA FTA, but that 
they keep the benefits of Lome access, with the cost of setting up borders assessed. 
• 5 (column 9): Presents the same scenario as 4, but assumes that the lome 
situation ended. 
• 6 and 7 (columns 10 and 11): Here BLNS decides that the costs of a FTA are too 
high. Not only the quantifiable costs, but also the impact on consumers and 
investors of setting up new barriers, damaging aU present methods of doing 
business among the SACU members. They accept the costs of loss of EU revenue, 
but do not have the costs of border controls. This loss is clearly much higher. It is 
also assuming that the EU allows the lack of border controls in a FTA. This may not 
be allowed due to the potential for South African goods to be re-routed through the 
other SACU countries, making use of the Lome Convention's preferences. 
(Jmani 1996: 46-48)_ 
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The results of this study show that whichever of the five scenarios are followed, BLNS would 
face fairly substantial revenue losses. The choice of whether to join an ED-SA FT A will be 
. largely determined by the future of Lome. If LoQ1~ is expected to continue, BLNS' countries 
would lose by joining the FT A, whether they put up borders or accept the loss of revenue. 
They have nothing to gain on access, and some products to lose. They would lose tariff 
1-" - ",., 
reven~e, and the cost of putting up borders is less than what they would lose. 
If Lome does not continue, the benefits of free trade access relative to GSP, for Botswana and 
Namibia, are sufficiently important that they should join. For Lesotho and Swaziland the 
benefits are less and the revenue costs greater, so that if it were possible to put up border 
controls, they would have a financial advantage in staying out. If this is not feasible, so that 
the only real option is to allow ED goods to enter duty free, then obviously it would be better 
to join. If this were the choice For Botswana and Namibia, it would strengthen the case for 
JOlmng. 
In summary, the FTA would be worse than Lome, but better than GSP for BLNS countries. 
The deciding factor would be the relative costs of putting up borders (and effectively killing 
the customs union) and losing tariff revenue (Imani 1996: 48). 
There were many factors that were not calculated into the Imani study, all of which have a 
potentially large negative impact on the future of BLNS. These include the erosion of Lome 
preferences that BLNS countries enjoy, although this would only be minimal. For Namibia and 
Botswana, the added competition of the EUs subsidised meat producers would have a large 
impact on their share of the South African meat market. One of the biggest impacts would be 
on products where the ED and SA compete directly in the ED. Many BLNS exporters survive 
only because of the tariff barriers faced by South Africa. An example of this is Namibian 
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exports of Hake, Namibian fish enter the EU duty free, and the South African fish face a 15% 
duty (Imani 1996: 49). The Namibian fish exporters would suffer tremendous losses if these 
. tariffs.were dropped. 
5.4. Options 
As call be seen from the Imani study, and the brief examination of other incalculable factors, 
the BLNS and SACU situation is extremely sensitive. BLNS countries (with the possible 
exception of Botswana) are in an already precarious economic position. The additional weight 
of losses of SACU revenue, and the other impacts of an EU-SA FTA, would be extremely 
difficult for these countries to bear. It is imperative that South Africa include these countries, 
and SACU as an instrument, in the calculations of the costs of a FT A with the ED. The SADC 
region, while important for the future of South Africa, will not be subject to such an immediate 
and large impact as the SACU region will be. Ideally, and in the post SADC Trade Protocol 
era, legally, the South African government is obliged to include the SADC region in any 
negotiations it has for potential trade agreements with any external parties. This obligation is 
even more necessary in the case of theSACU region, where BLNS survival is linked to the 
outcome of the FTA. Compensating BLNS for losses incurred in the short-term is no solution 
for the potential longer term loses experienced by those countries. South Africa's obligations 
to those countries lies not only within the framework of SACU, but could also be motivated 
from her own viewpoint. If South Africa excluded BLNS it would mean a potential 
breakdown of political diplomacy in the sub-continent. South Africa can not afford to alienate 
itself from its immediate neighbours; it has too many links to those countries, a notable case 
being the water supply coming from Lesotho. Further, a breakdown in the economies of 
BLNS could impact heavily on South Africa's local political economy. 
119 
The following chapter examines the South African standpoint in the second half of 1996. 
South Mrica adopted a far more regional, and South, stance during this period and also opened 
. up . th~ decision making process to a greater n~~ber of people from various and diverse 
backgrounds. This reflects the South African negotiating stance in late 1996. 
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CHAPTER 6 
- FROM FTA TO TDA: SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATING POSITION 
Speaking at the end of a two day conference of senior diplomats, academics and foreign policy 
analysts in September 1996, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azis Pahad, said that the 
consultative process on SA's future should continue with workshops to refine the diplomatic 
approach to specific issues. Minister Pahad said that government and civil society should 
jointly organise discussions aimed at better defining a range of issues, including SA's national 
interest, its response to economic globalisation, and conflict prevention. With the changes in 
the global concept of national sovereignty brought about by international moves towards trade 
liberalisation, the task of foreign affairs and the military in defending national independence 
required new definition. States were no longer able, and were often not inclined, to protect 
their citizens from the effects of globalisation, and this task was increasingly falling on civil 
society (Business Day: 11 September 1996). It was in this vein that the Foundation for Global 
Dialogue (FGD) in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) hosted a 
conference/workshop on the European Union and South African trade and development 
relations. This took place in Johannesburg on 21 and 22 October 1996, and was presented in 
two sessions. The first session was open to both South African and European (or any other 
nationals) participants, and was designed to provide a background on the issues being 
discussed. Various experts from academia, the four South African Ministries involved in the 
negotiation process, the European Commission and European Union, and independent 
European and South African researchers were involved in the process. The second session 
was initially reserved for South African participants, and was intended to be a workshop to 
promote dialogue and participation in the process of negotiating a trade mandate for South 
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Africa. Although reserved for South African participants, the second day of the conference 
also included a small number of interested European parties, but excluded the European Union 
. and the Commission. 
The opening day of the conference set the groundwork for the discussions on the second day, 
and comprised an overview of the EUs trade and development policy, the ED's approach to 
trade and development with South and Southern Africa and three presentations on South 
African trade policy by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The presentations by the 
DTI were of particular interest as they presented South Africa's planned approach to an EU-
SA agreement for the first time. Up tb this point, the South African team had adopted a 
position of responding to the ED's proposals, and never actually formulating their own concept 
of what a comprehensive agreement should entail. 
The lead-up to the conference saw a debate developing in the Business Day newspaper on the 
pro's and con's of a FT A. The first article, which appeared on 18 July 1996, came from Mr 
Faizel Ismail, Chief Director of Foreign Trade Relations at the DTI. His article questioned 
whether the ED's offer of a FT A was a threat to or an opportunity for South Africa. Mr Ismail 
expressed his concern about the nature of Free Trade Areas and the fact that comparative 
international experience had illustrated that they yielded mixed results. He probed the issues, 
which have been presented in chapters three and four, in which the benefits of greater market 
access to the EU, increased investment flows and the possible resultant growth, had to be 
measured against the negative impact on industry, agriculture and employment. Ismail's article 
severely criticised the ED's handling of the trade agreement. He said that what had started out 
as a promise by the EU to support SA's transition to democracy by providing better access for 
South Africa's exporters in the EU market had become an attempt to secure and gain 
privileged access to SA's markets for EU companies. In the light of the EUs exclusion of39% 
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of agricultural trade, he questioned the ability of the EU to deliver a "free" trade agreement to 
SA (Faizel Ismail in Business Day, 18 July 1996). 
The second article relevant to this debate was by Simon Barber, the Business Day's political 
foreign correspondent in the United States. Barber presented a position on the EU-SA FTA 
that expressed the view of the proponents of trade liberalisation, primarily that of the IMF. 
From- this perspective, the FT A between South Africa and the EU was seen to be a very 
positive move, as it would add discipline to SA's trade reforms. Trade reforms were seen as 
necessary for South African industry to become competitive on the international market, which 
was seen as essential in dealing with the unemployment problem in the country. The article 
referred to a report by the IMF in which the organisation expressed concern about South 
Africa's trade liberalisation process. It supported the SA tariff reduction under the WTO and 
the elimination of import surcharges, the winding down of export subsidies 'and the 
deregulation of agricultural marketing. Despite these positive acknowledgements, the IMF 
was uneasy about the tariff cuts resulting in a high degree of escalation, a term which means 
that the more a particular product is processed the higher the tariff rate to protect it from 
imports. Another criticism against South Africa's tariff reform was one that had been used by 
South Africa as a reason not to accept the ED's FTA; that being the issue of applied versus 
bound rates. The IMF expressed concern over the fact that South Africa reserved the right to 
increase tariffs that were currently below those required by the WTO. The IMF report 
concluded that lack of tariff reform would prevent the creation of employment in the country 
(Simon Barber in Business Day 16 August 1996). 
The final article came from South African Member of Parliament, Dr Rob Davies. In this 
article he examined the IMF's criticisms of South Africa's trade liberalisation process. Davies 
criticised the IMF's statements that the FTA was positive because it would add discipline to 
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SA's tariff reform programme. He felt that South Africa had to be careful not to allow 
negative factors to be recast as positive ones, thereby imbalancing the distribution of costs and 
. benefits. Furthermore he contended that any coruiection between current negotiations and 
~ > { • 
expressions of desire to assist SA in its efforts to promote democracy, reconstruction and 
development was purely coincidental. According to Davies, unilateral trade reform had been 
a recipe peddled by the IMF throughout the developing world. Whether any form of tariff 
reduction under any circumstances was an optimum policy for promoting growth and 
development in developing countries was, however, quite another matter. He referred to a 
paper presented at the North-South Round Table held in Johannesburg in October 1995. In 
this paper, Frances Stewart argued that whereas protectionist policies emphasised capacity 
development at the expense of efficiency, adjustment policies adopted in much of Mrica in the 
1980s, focused almost exclusively on efficiency, (paying) no attention to capability bui!c!ing, 
thus effectively killing the goose that could lay the golden egg of effiCient African 
industrialisation. Davies advocated a path forward that navigated a deliberate course between 
these two extremes (Rob Davies, Business Day: 21 August 1996). 
The South African Parliament had also been looking into the issue of the FT A between the ED 
and SA. On 12 August 1996 the Portfolio Committees on Agriculture, Water Affairs and 
Forestry, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry held a joint meeting with officials from the 
Departments of Trade and Industry and Foreign Affairs. This meeting was convened to 
discuss the preparation of a mandate to guide the South African team negotiating the 
agreement with the ED. Any agreement reached between the parties would have to be ratified 
by the South Mrican parliament before it could be implemented. The Parliament felt that an 
agreement that they would ratify should result in: 
• The removal of the discriminatory treatment which currently applied to South 
African exports when compared to those of comparable countries; 
• The securing of significantly improveg access· for South African exporters to the EU 
market in both currently traded and future tradable goods and service that could 
contribute to a narrowing of the current imbalance in trade with the EU; 
• Meaningful economic benefits from qualified membership of the Lome ConVention, 
particularly access to provisions for cumulation under the rules of origin of the Lome 
Convention that did not require elaborate bureaucratic procedures to be followed; 
• A distribution of costs and benefits between South Africa and the EU which took 
account of the different sizes of the economies of the two negotiating partners, their 
different levels of development, the relative importance of mutual trade as a 
proportion of total trade, the trade imbalance, the adjustment costs required by any 
agreement, the developmental needs of South and Southern Africa and which 
therefore gave effect to the repeated expressions of desire on the part of the 
European Union to reach an agreement that would assist in the promotion of 
economic growth, development and democracy in South and Southern Africa; 
• An agreement that reinforced, rather than undermined, efforts to promote regional 
co-operation and integration in Southern Africa, and in a context where the EU was -
reviewing its future relations with the ACP after the expiry of Lome IV, that created 
positive precedents for ACP countries. 
(Portfolio Committees on Agriculture; Water Affairs and Forestry; Foreign Affairs; 
Trade Industry: 12 August 1996). 
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The Parliamentary Committees went on to say that in order to achieve this, the South African 
negotiating team should focus on its own proposals, and not simply react to the mandate 
approved by the European Council. In so doing, the Parliament proposed sending a message 
to the ED negotiators that the negotiations would take place between two parties, each with 
constituencies to whom they were accountable, and in which no one mandate should have 
precedence over the other. Further, the needs of SADC and SACD were once again raised. 
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The Parliament felt that mutually agreed mechanisms needed to be put in place for a continuing 
exchange of views, and assessment of the impact of proposals emerging during the 
negotiations. It was also felt that due to the pos?i?le precedent that a FT A between SA and 
the ED could set for the future of the Lome convention, the ACP should also be regularly 
consulted. 
The Parliamentary portfolios presented four suggestions with regard to general principles and 
broad strategic positions: 
1. Reciprocity: The Portfolio Committees proposed that reciprocity only kick in after a 
period of non-reciprocal concessions. An agreement should therefore provide for 
non-reciprocal concessions by the EU immediately, with some understanding or 
agreement at a later stage. This was the basis for a number of association 
agreements that the EU had or was negotiating - the most notable being the 
negotiations with the Russian Federation. 
2. Nature of Free Trade Areas: The WTO rules on FTA's were drawn up having in 
mind regional integration programmes between group of countries in geographically 
defined areas. They were not intended to apply to cross-continental reciprocal 
agreements between developed and developing countries. The EU's proposal that 
better than MFN access be accorded to certain developing countries in return for 
reciprocal concessions by these developing countries was seen as a new departure 
in international trade arrangements. Further, the issue of substantially all trade was 
questioned. What had been discovered in the course of negotiations between South 
Africa and the EU was that there was no rule or established convention specifying 
that a WTO-compatible FTA should cover any fixed percentage of the total trade. 
Nor was there any ruling that the percentage be the same for both sides. The 
Portfolio Committees said that they believed an agreement compatible with the 
principles that both sides claimed to support should have resulted in the EU market 
opening up to a significantly higher percentage of duty free exports from SA than 
SA be required to open up to the EU. 
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3. CAP: In the light of the CAP, and the EU's inability to remove CAP subsidies, the 
EU had to accept SA's right to impose countervailing duties. 
4. Linking agreements: Finally concern was expressed about the EU's attempts to link 
a trade agreement to its demands in many other areas. Not only were many of 
these proposed linked agreements not directly "trade related", and not only did they 
amount to a major challenge to the integrity of domestic policy making, but making 
a trade agreement conditional on reaching agreement in all these areas could only 
result in inordinate and unnecessary delays. 
(ibid.) 
Recognising the limited role that they could play in the actual negotiation process, the 
Parliament nevertheless proposed to assume an active and engaged stance through: 
• requesting a briefing, and holding hearings with interested parties, on the 
negotiating mandate that emerged from the processes underway; 
• actively accompanying the negotiations in a manner to be determined; 
• requesting regular report-backs on progress and problems being encountered; 
• establishing and maintaining contact with colleagues in the European parliament 
and in the parliaments of SACU,SADC and ACP countries; 
• holding hearings on any agreement that was eventually submitted to parliament for 
ratification. 
(ibid.) 
What is evident in these developments leading up to the FGDIFES workshop is a shift in the 
South African approach. The South African team was going to have to develop its own 
negotiating stance, and not merely respond that of the EU's. The message from Parliament, 
and from observers, was that the concept of an FT A with the ED was skewed against South 
Africa from the very definition of an FTA by the WTO. South Africa was going to have to 
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look beyond the traditional framework for an international trade agreement and develop its 
own paradigm. 
A new framework for a bilateral agreement between the EU and South Africa would have to 
exist within a number of constraints so as not to impose on existing programmes of reform and 
development. These included policies already in existence within South Africa, as well as 
those in the Southern Mrican region. 
6.1. The GEAR Strategy 
The first of these domestic considerations was the government's GEAR (Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution) strategy. The GEAR strategy is a macroeconomic policy approach 
designed to bring about certain developments in South Africa as it moves towards .the next 
century. The GEAR seeks to bring about: 
• a competitive fast growing economy which creates sufficient jobs for all work 
seekers; 
• a redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor; 
• a society in which sound health, education and other services are available to all; 
and 
• an environment in which homes are secure and places of work productive 
(GEAR 1996: 1.1) 
In order to bring about this optimistic scenario, the GEAR strategy plans to implement a 
number of economic reforms alongside existing programmes such as the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). It believes that, in the context of an integrated economic 
strategy, it can successfully confront the related challenges of meeting basic needs, developing 
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human resources, increasing participation in the democratic institutions of civil society and 
implementing the RDP in all its facets (ibid.). 
The GEAR strategy also notes that the growth trajectory of 3% per annum IS grossly 
insufficient to bring about job creation. Job creation is identified as the primary source of 
income redistribution. Furthermore the inadequate growth rate has: 
• failed to reverse the unemployment crisis in the labour market; 
• provided inadequate resources for the necessary expansion in social service 
delivery; and 
• yielded insufficient progress towards an equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
(ibid.: 1.2) 
In order to sustain growth on a higher plane, the GEAR strategy identifies the need for a 
transformation towards an outward oriented economy. With regard to this, the strategy sees 
recent exchange rate developments as a springboard for enhanced economic activity. If left 
uncontrolled, an uncoordinated and conflicting response to the rapid drop in the Rand could 
cause further crisis and contraction (ibid.). 
The GEAR strategy is to attain a growth rate of 6% per annum and job creation of 400 000 
per annum by the year 2000, concentrating capacity building on meeting the demands of 
international competitiveness. Severe inter-related developments are called for, including: 
• accelerated growth of non-gOld exports; 
• a brisk expansion in private sector capital formation; 
• an acceleration in public sector investment; 
• an improvement in the employment intensity of investment and output growth; and 
• an increase in infrastructural development and service delivery making intensive 
use of labour-based techniques. 
(ibid.: 1.3) 
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In order to bring about the substantial expansion that has been envisaged, it is recognised that a 
major transformation in the environment and behaviour of both the private and "public sectors 
would. have to occur. These would have to include: 
• a competitive platform for a powerful expansion by the tradable goods sector; 
• a stable environment for confidence and a profitable surge in private investment; 
• a restructured public sector to increase the efficiency of both capital expenditure 
and service delivery; 
• new sectoral and regional emphases in industrial and infrastructural development; 
• greater labour market flexibility; and 
• enhanced human resource development. 
(ibid.) 
The government of South Africa anticipates the macroecononuc strategy would work in 
conjunction with the other policy programmes, such as the National Crime Prevention 
Strategy. These policies would complement each other, and together form the government's 
approach to development and growth, building a bridge between a constrained environment 
and sustainable expansion within an increasingly competitive international context. The core 
elements of the integrated strategy are: 
• a renewed focus on budget reform to strengthen the redistributive thrust of 
expenditure; 
• a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme to contain debt service obligations, 
counter inflation and free resources for investment; 
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• an exchange rate policy to keep the real effective rate stable at a competitive level; 
• consistent monetary policy to prevent a resurgence of inflation; 
• a further step i~ the gradual relaxation of exctiange controls; 
• a reduction in tariffs to contain input prices and facilitate industrial restructuring, 
compensating partially for the exchange rate depreciation; 
• tax incentives to stimulate new investment in competitive and labour absorbing 
projects; 
• speeding up the restructuring, compensating partially for the exchange rate 
depreciation; 
• tax incentives to stimulate new investment in competitive and labour absorbing 
projects; 
• speeding up the restructuring of state assets to optimise investment resources; 
• an expansionary infrastructure programme to address service deficiencies and 
backlogs; 
• an appropriately structured flexibility within the collective bargaining system; 
• a strengthened levy system to fund training on a scale commensurate with needs; 
• an expansion of trade and investment flows in Southem Africa; and 
• a commitment to the implementation of stable and co-ordinated policies. 
(ibid.: 1 .4) 
In his presentation at the FGDIFES workshop (October 21 1996), Alan Hirsch, chief director 
of Industrial and Technology Strategy at the DTI, identified two make or break variables in 
achieving the 6% growth and the creation of 400 000 jobs. These are: 
• an increase in annual gross domestic foreign investment to 23% over a five year 
period; 
• an increase in annual exports by 10% per annum over five years. 
Achieving this trade policy presented by Hirsch involves: 
• reducing, rationalising and refining the protection of industries; 
• reducing and removing demand-side intervention; 
• introducing and expanding supply-side support: e.g. technology development, 
training, investment and input costs; 
• facilitating exports in new ways: 
• export marketing assistance programmes, 
• pre-shipment export finance guarantees for SME's, 
• facilitating access to export advice through a competitiveness fund and a 
sectoral partnership facility which resemble World Bank programmes and other 
SME programmes to improve access to export markets. 
(Address by Alan Hirsch, 21 October 1996). 
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According to Hirsch, the creation of a trade and development agreement between the EU and 
South Africa could support the GEAR strategy in a number of ways: 
• it could provide opportunities for development assistance to improve productivity in 
partnership with the EU; 
• it could create opportunities for increasing and diversifying mutual trade through the 
restructuring of the relationship that could be developed; 
• it could provide investment opportunities in an outward-oriented project. 
(ibid.) 
A positive trade and development agreement between South Africa and the EU could, 
therefore, work in unison with the existing development programmes. This would require that 
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South Africa take on a more proactive role in the development of the concept of the 
agreement. The path that South Africa could take is appearing to move away from the EU's 
. proPQsed FT A, towards .a new concept embodied in the terms trade and development . 
. . 
6.2. South Africa's Trade Policy on SADe and Africa 
Mfundu Nkuhlu (October 21 1996), director of Africa Bilateral Trade Relations at the DTI, 
presented South Africa's position with regard to the Southern African region. From the 
beginning of the negotiation process, South Africa had insisted on the interests of the Southern 
African region being taken into consideration in the process of developing a trade agreement. 
Nkuhlu referred to the trade imbalance that existed in the Southern African region: SA 
exported RIO,S billion to SADC, and imported RI,5 billion from SADC. Further, 30% of 
SA's exports to the region were manufactured goods, whereas SA imported principallypnmary 
product from the region. Nkuhlu pointed to different sizes in economies, different structures 
of production, incoherent policies and import substitution, industrialisation and the legacy of 
colonialism as the main reasons for these trade imbalances. This resulted in an imbalance in the 
regional economy, with the SADC countries being dependent on South Africa. The regional 
transport systems, labour migration and revenue transfers all functioned well. The vision for 
the region's economic development [was] to promote sustainable growth and development, 
economic co-operation and integration to achieve restructuring (address by Mfundo Nkuhlu, 
21 October 1996). In order to achieve this, the South African government would have to: 
a) engage in regional projects for Southem Africa's growth and development; 
b) break with existing relations of dependency: To do this, it must restructure relations 
towards an approach of co-ordinated development, either in clusters or spatially; 
assist in infrastructural development throughout the region; provide favourable 
market access for its LOC partners and co-ordinate macro-economic policies; 
develop integrated regional approaches for water, transport and energy; restructure 
SACU's revenue sharing formulas; 
. _ c) promote growth and stability; 
-.; 
d) view integration as a combination of co-operation, co-ordination and integration of 
policies. To achieve this political commitment, human and other capacity and 
equitable distribution of net gains, convergence of macro-economic poliCfes~ 
institutional capacity, political stability and social integration were imperative. 
(ibid.) 
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None of this integration or regional co-operation can take place when South Africa and the 
SADC region are facing radically different market access to their largest trading partner. With 
all the SADC countries, except for South Africa, being members of the Lome Convention, 
there is a rift between the region and South Mrica. This would only be accentuated by the 
development of a bilateral agreement between the EU and SA. An FT A would riot foster 
closer regional co-operation within SADC. 
6.3. FTA to TDA 
The concept of a trade and development agreement (TDA) had already been mentioned in the 
build up to the presentation by Faizel Ismail, chief director of foreign trade relations at the 
DTI. In his presentation, Ismail (October 21 1996) proposed the concept of a TDA; in this 
case a framework for a trade agreement with the EU that was integrated within a development 
strategy. This TDA was to be inextricably linked to the region's development and best 
interests. It would take account of the needs of the region's least developed countries (LDCs), 
namely Mozambique and Lesotho. Ismail said that the South African negotiating team would 
be responsible for ensuring that the best interests of the region as a whole were considered. 
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the development of the concept of a TDA is in its 
challenging quality. The TDA was designed to introduce a new paradigm into the established 
. structtlres set up by the GATTIWTO and other international trade organisations. As has been 
- 0-
mentioned before, the concept of an FT A was developed to be implemented between parties 
with geographic proximity and comparative levels of development. Within the WTO structure 
there was no alternative to a FT A agreement to govern preferential trade access between two 
parties. The TDA proposal of the DTI would introduce a structure in which a preferential 
trade agreement between two unequal parties, on opposite sides of the globe, could be 
developed in such a way as to ensure the weaker of the parties is not compromised by the 
agreement, but could instead prosper from it. The South African team was optimistic about its 
chances of success in getting an agreement of this type accepted by the WTO, as there was 
seen to be a gap that an agreement of this type could fill. Further, due to the fact that the 
WTO is still a new organisation, its rules and structures are not yet carved in stone. Ismail felt 
that a strong case could be made for a IDA type agreement within WTO structures as the 
current structures are insensitive to the needs of developing countries who are not party to the 
writing of the rules. There is a definite need for WTO rules that focus on development and the 
upliftment of developing countries. 
The general objective of a TDA is to obtain ED market access, incorporating various strategic 
objectives in attaining this market access. The consultative process that would form the 
mandate to negotiate a TDA would include the participation of, and consultation with, 
industry, agriculture, trade unions and finally the Southern African region. Ismail said that the 
mandate would follow an analysis of all possible scenarios. The mandate would then be further 
developed through analysing the development of negotiating positions, taking the negotiation 
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process into account. All the relevant stake holders would then need to be consulted on the 
mandate before it could be presented to the ED. 
-< 
Ismail pointed to the fact that South Africa had never requested an FT A from the ED. What 
South Africa had called for was: 
_. a bilateral agreement that was as close as possible to the Lome Convention, or 
qualified Lome membership; 
• an end to the discrimination that South Africa faced in the EU market, where South 
Africa's competitors faced better market access through various other agreements; 
• a move to try to balance the trade between the two J)arties, where South African 
exports to the EU consisted of primary products or primary processes; 
• to increase South Africa's share of the EU market, where it had been facing decline 
in recent years; 
• to attempt to balance the high trade deficit that SA had with the EU; 
• that an agreement support the South African move to restructure and adjust its 
economy; 
• that the agreement support the development and integration of the Southern African 
region. 
(address by Faizel Ismail, 21 October 1996) 
The TDA was to be based on principles that: 
• supported the RDP and GEAR 
• were mutually beneficial and balanced 
• removed discrimination 
• encouraged investment in Southem Africa 
• built regional integration 
• provided access to some Lome provisions such as cumulation, which supported 
regional integration 
-< 
(ibid.) 
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The TDA envisioned by Ismail would address the issues about which South Africa has 
conC&Ils. These are, primarily, that a trade agreement between the two parties should be 
asymmetrical in content in order to facilitate development and, that the WTO rules should be 
adapted so that they support development. The exclusion of 39% of agricultural exports from 
an agreement was seen as unfair in keeping with the spirit of development. This was 
aggravated by an uneven playing field with the presence of the ED's CAP agricultural 
subsidies. Is was felt that South Africa should be compensated for adjustment costs, and non-
traded goods should be added to this list. The issue of NTBs also needs to be addressed, as 
these pose massive barriers to South African trade. This issue was also brought up by Willem 
Bosman of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who felt that the ED is using NTBs and 
accusations of dumping to keep South African products out of the ED market (interview with 
Willem Bosman, 25 October 1996). Ismail's TDA included the conditions of cumulation of 
origin and development finance in the overall agreement. 
With regard to the region, the Southern African interests were put at the forefront. BLNS was 
to be compensated for revenue loss and trade diversion due to the agreement. Other Southern 
Mrican countries would also be compensated for trade diversioll. Most importantly, the 
SADC trade protocol would have to be fully implemented before any reciprocity could be 
granted to the ED. 
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On the Lome front, South Africa's TDA would take account of the ACP interests. South 
African exports would not be allowed to threaten the ACP's trade with the ED. Further, the 
. implicCitions of an agreement with the ED that created a new paradigm of thought on bilateral 
. .. 
trade agreements between unequal parties could have tremendous consequences for the ACP. 
With the expiry of Lome looming, this type of agreement could set a precedent for future 
ACP-ED relations. South Africa seeks qualified Lome membership which entails being 
included in the rules of origin and cumulation of product structures. Further, South Africa 
seeks access to tendering for the 7th and 8th European Development Fund (EDF). 
With regard to linking the agreements, the linkages included in the· FT A are seen as putting 
unacceptable pressure on South Africa to make bilateral commitments on multilateral issues. 
These conditions also expect South Africa to raise certain standards (environmental, health and 
.. -
safety) within a very short time frame, while at the same time trying to achieve a-level of 
competitiveness. These issues, while important, should not, in South Africa's opinion, be 
attached to the bilateral trade agreement. 
This TDA agreement is, however, still very much on the drawing board. The concept of the 
TDA would have to be developed and all parties consulted and, if the TDA is found to be 
acceptable then it would be presented to the ED some time in early 1997. The steps taken by 
South Africa in developing the concept of a TDA are significant. The South African 
negotiating team was taking the offer of a trade and co-operation agreement into its own hands 
and moulding it for its best interests. This represents a major move from the former stance of 
merely reacting to the ED's proposals. South Africa displayed tremendous self confidence in 
coming up with this proposal as it not only challenged the ED's proposed agreement, but 
challenged the international institutions governing international trade agreements. This move 
aligned South Africa firmly with the region, and with the UNCT AD group of countries that 
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fought for better international conditions to enhance development and favour developing 
countries. 
The TDA concept poses a challenge to the EU to take up its proposed rhetorical role of 
supporting South and Southern Africa's development. Pretoria views a TDA as supporting 
South and Southern Africa's growth, development and integration. According to Will em 
Bosmann of the DF A, Mr Angelos Pangratis of the European Union's delegation in Pretoria 
has responded positively to the concept of a TDA (interview with Willem Bosmann 25 
October 1996). The EU has always encouraged South Africa to present its own ideas on what 
a bilateral agreement should entail. 
Some concern was expressed as to why the EU should even consider an agreement of this 
type. The proposed TDA concept has a lot of benefits for South Africa, but the benefits for 
the EU are both distant and unclear. Despite the expressed desire to assist in South Africa's 
development the EU has its own constituency to consider. The EU could not enter into an 
agreement with South Africa until it is agreed to by its member states. Moreover the timing of 
South Africa's proposal is not very good. The EU is in the process of preparing itself for some 
dramatic structural changes within its own regional economy, all of which require extreme 
measures from all the member states. Entering into an agreement with South Africa that does 
not produce immediate results, and that allows South Africa to gain preferential access to the 
EU market in an asymmetrical agreement, is not likely to be widely welcomed. South Africa's 
proposed agreement is not only going to have to take the considerations of the region and the 
ACP into account, but also those of the ED. South Africa will have to somehow make their 
TDA attractive to an EU that is in the grips of an internal economic upheaval. It remains to be 
seen whether this can be accomplished. 
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South Africa presented a copy of their trade mandate to the EU in December 1996. The date 
of resumption for the negotiations was set for 24 January 1997. The presentation of the SA 
. trade_mandate to the ~U was shrouded in. secrecy. Many of South Africa's attempts to 
introduce transparency to their decision making process were effectively annulled by their 
actions with regard to the presentation of this mandate. The EU's failure to follow up on the 
rhetorical support for the regional involvement in the decision making process is particularly 
disappointing. While the EU received its copy of the SA mandate in mid December 1996, the 
SADC states did not receive a copy until the week before the negotiations were due to restart 
in January 1997, a month after it was sent to the EU (Financial Mail 24 January 1997). The 
mandate was also not made available to other interested parties, and therefore a copy was not 
available for scrutiny at the time of writing this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The global environment in which South Africa finds itself in the post apartheid era is not one 
that is particularly accommodating to the needs, aspirations and desires of a young democracy 
looking to break its historic mould and develop into a productive and successful state. This 
environment is characterised by the global capitalist system in which states compete fiercely 
with one another within the global trading markets. In this system power is based on economic 
might and wealth, and this has largely replaced the previous order which was based on security 
and military might. Within this system, states are grouping together to form regional trading 
blocs. These blocs have developed out of a need to consolidate power, as the individual state 
no longer has sufficient strength within itself to compete in the global economy. It 1S one of 
these regional trading blocs that South Africa is coming up against in its relations with the ED. 
The ED is the largest, and most advanced, trading bloc in the world, and represents South 
Africa's largest trading partner. As such, a high degree of co-operation with the ED is seen as 
extremely important to SA's growth and development. 
Attempts to develop a long term relationship structure between the ED and SA in the post 
apartheid era have so far been very unproductive. They have been plagued by incompatibilities 
between what is required from such a relationship by South Africa and the ED. Both parties 
have different, and often opposing, interests that are difficult to reconcile. What South Africa 
requires is a relationship in which it could gain preferential access to the ED's market, while at 
the same time being granted space in which to reform its domestic economy and level some of 
the social imbalances. The ED's rhetoric declared support for South Africa's needs, however 
the ED has a constituency to answer to. The ED forms part of the competitive global 
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environment, and this does not allow for displays of altruism. The ED's constituency wants 
much the same thing that South Africa seeks from an agreement. The ED is looking to expand 
. its ex]ort market in South Africa while at the. same time protecting certain sensitive areas of its 
. ~ 
own economy - in this case the agricultural sector. 
The ED's objectives as declared in the Luxembourg declaration of 1994, and presented to 
President Mandela at his inauguration on 10 May 1994, were intended to ... send a strong 
political signal to the incoming government and to the South African population, thus proving 
its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness to 
contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South Africa after the elections 
(Article 1, European Council 6294/94: 5). The ED trade mandate that was eventually 
presented to South Africa in March 1996 had the appearance of an agreement that would 
ensure the ED access to South Africa's market, while at the same time protecting-its own 
market from any South African products that had the slightest chance of competing with ED 
products. In two years the political rhetoric displaying strong support for South Africa's 
development and success has been replaced by an attitude reflecting the ED's stauiiChly 
competitive nature, providing far fewer concessions for South Africa than had initially been 
suggested. 
A similar situation was witnessed with regard to the ED's support for the Southern African 
region. The Berlin Council of Ministers meeting in 1994 promised strong ED support for 
Southern African integration. This support was either not followed up on, or was contradicted 
in practice. The ED had declared its support for the Southern African region and for regional 
integration as a symbol for co-operation in Africa. However, by offering South Africa a 
bilateral trade agreement the ED effectively undermined its own objective of supporting 
142 
Southern African integration by placing one of the region's members on a different platform to 
the others. 
The reasons for this rift between the declared objectives and the realities that eventually 
emerged can be found in the nature of the global system. This point is fundamental to the 
Globalist outline as presented in Chapter 1. In re-examining the Globalist's guidelines it can be 
seen that the overall structure of the global environment is one in which states compete with 
one another in a setting where wealth and economic might represent the units of power. In 
order for a state to be successful it has to compete with the other states within this system. 
The evolution of this system is such that it has developed into an environment in which there 
are three clearly identifiable groups. The EU falls into the first group which consists of the 
states that have high levels of industrialisation, economic wealth and high levels of 
development. As result, they have a lot of influence over the way in which states interact and 
have, historically, dominated the international system. The second group of countries has 
emerged fairly recently and is known as the newly industrialised countries: these countries 
have managed to break out of the quagmire and have embarked on successful programmes of 
industrialisation and development. This has largely been achieved at the cost of human rights, 
and through tightly state-controlled fiscal policies. The third group of countries suffers from 
extremely low levels of development, and cannot seem to break out of their lot in the global 
system. They are confined to supplying primary products to the developed countries and 
buying manufactured goods, or services, from those countries. This situation is extremely 
difficult for the developing countries to break out of, and to this effect the Globalists assume 
that there is a mechanism of domination that keeps the developing countries where they are. 
These mechanisms of domination can be see in the organisations and mechanisms of the North, 
such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and, as has been shown in Chapter 2, even the 
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Lome Convention. These organisations are fundamentally supposed to assist the South, 
however they are constructs of the North in which the South has very little say. The track 
. record of these organisations in dealing with the d.e,{elopmental problems of the North has not 
been very good. Finally, the Globalists recognise economic factors as fundamental. In this 
case the ED's support for both the regional integration of the Southern Afric~n r:egion and the 
support of South Africa's democracy have been overruled by its economic interests. Displays 
of support for South African development, and Southern African integration, would not benefit 
the ED in any way, and therefore the incentive is not there to follow up on the promises of 
support. 
When South Africa's position is examined, the scenario that presents itself is very dismal. 
South Africa's chances for success lie in its ability to diversify its exports, and to move from 
'" 
exports of raw materials, primarily metals and minerals, to exporting manufactured goods. The 
reason for this was identified by the World Bank in the study mentioned in Chapter 2, where 
the demand for primary products in industrialised countries was shown to grow at 
-
approximately the same rate as incomes, while that for imported manufactured goods grew 
approximately twice as fast (World Bank cited in Ravenhill 1985: 151). Further, the return on 
manufactured goods is far greater than that on primary products, so in order for South Africa 
to reach the necessary levels of growth identified by the GEAR document, it needs to focus its 
exports on manufactured products, which are the big earners. Manufacturing is also a large 
employer, which was another fundamental reason for the sector's development in a country 
that faces unemployment levels approaching 50%, and where the government is looking to 
create 400 000 jobs in four years. 
The reaction of the ED to South Africa's manufacturing exports indicates that the country does 
not pose a threat to the ED. For South Africa to become at all competitive in the international 
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manufacturing market, its industry will have to face massive reforms and development. The 
FT A agreement proposed by the ED would not assist this development in the manufacturing 
sectOF as the ED's manufactured goods would ept~r the South African market with greater 
ease. This would come at a time where reform programmes and historical legacies have left 
the South African domestic economy particularly vulnerable. It would incr~~s~ the levels of 
competition within South Africa, and in many cases, potentially destroy the domestic producer, 
causing job losses and undermining the government's programme for growth. While the 
proponents of trade liberalisation would argue that this is good as it forces South African 
industry to become efficient, the social situation in South Africa cannot absorb the impact of 
the effects of massive, rapid trade liberalisation. While this needs to take place, it needs to 
happen within a controlled environment that supports the other government programmes such 
as GEAR and the RDP. 
The one area in which South Africa could have competed effectively was agricultural trade. 
However, the problems that exist in this sector are both numerous and diverse. Firstly the 
agricultural sector, while important to South Africa's economy, is not going to bring about the 
necessary change and economic growth that the country requires. Agriculture is a sector that 
produces low returns and is subject to large fluctuations in production due to South Africa's 
erratic rainfall. In terms of trade with the ED, the South African agricultural sector would 
have to come up against the CAP, the ED's protectionist agricultural regime. The CAP not 
only heavily subsidises the ED's agricultural produce, but also effectively lobbied the exclusion 
of 3 9% of agricultural trade from the mandate for trade negotiations with South Africa. While 
this represented a large exclusion in terms of agricultural trade, agriculture constituted only 
10% of total trade, therefore the exclusion was only around 3,9% of total trade. This figure 
was, therefore, not that significant to the overall SA-ED trade agreement, even when 
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considering the fact that this was one of the few sectors in which South Africa had 
comparative advantage. South Africa, none the less, invested a lot of energy and time in this 
. issue,.when they could . have been focusing-on spI?e of the more significant aspeets in the 
agreement. 
Thus the crucial issue facing South Africa is that it develop its manufacturing sector and focus 
on the export of manufactured goods. The ED's response to the South African manufacturing 
sector makes it clear that it does not pose a threat to the EU market. The EU market for 
manufactured goods is already so saturated that the inefficient South African manufacturing 
sector can have no real impact on it. The agricultural sector is where South Africa could have 
had an impact on the EU market, and where South Africa has some chance of attaining 
comparative advantage. This is, however, not the sector that SA can use as its engine for 
growth and is also the sector that the EU has largely excluded from the agreement. 'Fighting 
for apples and pears is not going to gain many substantial benefits from a trade agreement for 
South Africa. 
The relationship between the parties is inherently unbalanced, with the EU being by far the 
dominant party. South Africa relies heavily on the ED's trade and investment as the region 
represents its largest trading partner. South Africa, however, represents just one of many 
developing country markets for the ED. From the outset, therefore, the relationship was 
disproportionate and South Africa has to watch the situation extremely carefully to prevent 
being bulldozed into an imperfect agreement by the ED. This explains SA's often cautious and 
hesitant approach to the agreement and the negotiations, and their insistence on comprehensive 
analyses being conducted before any negotiations can be embarked upon. 
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In order for South Africa to try to balance the relationship a little more it needs to insist on the 
inclusion of the Southern African region in all aspects of the proposed trade agreement. This is 
. also true in light of South Africa's various obligatipl!s to the region, both legally to the SADC 
and SACD, as well as to their markets in those regions. Of greatest importance is the fact that 
Southern Africa accounts for 40% of South Africa's manufactured goods exports. As 
_. -
manufacturing has been identified as the only available engine for SA's growth, the region's 
position as the greatest consumer of these products is extremely important to SA. South 
Africa identified its membership of the Lome Convention as the one mechanism that would 
have brought about some sort of benefits for the region. As a member of Lome, South Africa 
would have been included in the cumulation and rules of Qrigin clauses, and this alone would 
have allowed the country to reach much greater levels of co-operation with the region. The 
EUs approach to Southern Africa could also have become more holistic, treating South ¥rica 
as a member of the region, and not individually. Further, South Africa's inclusion as a possible 
tender for Southern African projects under the EDF would have meant that the region could 
have benefited further from Lome development projects in the region, by being responsible for 
the work carried out. South Africa could also have received some substantive benefits from 
the trade aspects of Lome. 
For the ED, the South African accession to Lome is not seen as an option because the country 
does not fit the ACP member profile. It is far too developed and the ED fears that the 
inclusion of SA within Lome would have a negative impact on the other members of the ACP 
and that South Africa would upset the balance of this organisation. The imminent demise of 
the Convention is also a factor speaking against South Africa's accession. Further, the ED 
would not gain anything from this situation. The ED requires some incentive to open its 
market to South Africa, and this incentive is not contained within the Lome Convention. 
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South Africa's request for a relationship that was as close as possible to the Lome Convention 
was designed to allow them to enter into a bilateral agreement with the EU that would also 
. allow - the regional ben.efits available from· Lome ·membership that are mentiont::d above. 
-~ ~ 
Perhaps the biggest mistake that South Africa made was that it did not present a detailed plan 
of what a relationship of this type should entail. The South African team should have created 
an outline of their envisaged agreement, and should have marketed this to the ED. As the 
weaker party in the relationship, South Africa should have made a much earlier attempt to gain 
power through thoroughly preparing an agreement proposal that would have both assisted 
SA's development and appeared attractive to the EU. 
The proposal by the EU to create a Free Trade Zone with South Africa was a logical step for 
the Union to take. It contained within it all the incentives required to enter into an agreement 
with South Africa. The agreement would require SA to open its market and would provide 
South Africa with some concessions. The EU did this while protecting its sensitive areas, a 
realistic ingredient in a competitive global environment. From the EU perspective the 
proposed mandate was perfectly reasonable. From the South African perspective the mandate 
was extremely disappointing as it did not present the golden platter of support that the country 
had envisaged. South Africa was suffering some illusions about its role in the global economy, 
and the value of its new found democracy to win it support. The South African response to 
the EUs proposal is indicative of this. The South African team should have been expecting an 
agreement envisaged by the EU, and should have had a constructive response ready to present 
to the Union. By failing to do this the country is losing credibility, time and ground. The 
further South Africa gets from its popular crest of 1994, the less likely the goodwill and 
accompanying concessions of the global community will be. The longer the negotiations are 
delayed the less likely it is that South Africa will gain much sympathy from the ED. The 
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internal problems facing the EU, coupled with those of its neighbours in Eastern Europe, will 
simply add to this. As the situation was develops, South Africa is playing an extremely 
. uncompetitive game in the international system. 
.< 
The eventual formulation of the concept of a Trade and Development Agreement is a large 
step in the right direction for South Africa. This proposal contains the South African 
approach, and details what South Africa seeks from an agreement with the EU in a 
constructive fashion. The demands on the EU are lower and more realistic, but so are the 
concessions that will be granted to the Union. It is difficult to assess this agreement as it has 
not been available for close scrutiny. As was mentioned at the end of Chapter 6, this 
unfortunately points, once again, to the incompetency and shroud of secrecy that has 
surrounded the South African negotiating team's approach. The FGDIFES workshop was 
supposed to introduce an element of transparency to the negotiation and decision making 
process. The TDA, however, was essentially an agreement that had already been formulated 
within the Department of Trade and Industry, and the presentation by the DTI at the workshop 
was very sketchy. It appears that SA has also not followed up on the proposal to include the 
region in the decision making process. This was blatantly apparent in the recent re-opening of 
negotiations between the EU and South Africa in Pretoria on 24 January 1997. South Mrica 
delivered its mandate for a trade agreement to the EU in mid-December 1996. However, this 
mandate was not made available to the SADC and SACU members until days before the 
negotiations (Financial Mail, 24 January 1997). This fact does not bode well for the region, or 
for the aspirations of regional integration. South Mrica's criticisms of the EUs FTA mandate 
could apply equally to the South African role in the Southern African region. South Africa's 
rhetorical support and commitment for regional integration is highly suspicious in light of their 
approach to the agreement. The South African team's insistence on the inclusion of the 
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region's interests in any agreement appears increasingly to have been used as a bargaining chip 
in the agreement, with any benefits for the region arising from the agreement being purely 
. coincidental. 
The importance of the agreement between the EU and SA must also be considered for its 
potential impact on future agreements of this type. The South African team has acknowledged 
the fact that the agreement has the potential to set a number of precedents. Amongst these are 
the precedents that could be set for post-Lome Convention agreements. The future of the 
Lome Convention is uncertain with various options for the future being assessed. An 
agreement between South Africa and the EU would be the first post WTO bilateral trade 
agreement between a developing country and the ED. If South Africa had settled for an 
agreement that was completely dictated by the EU it could have had serious implications for 
the ACP in the run up to the negotiations for a post Lome IV agreement which are' due to 
begin in 1998. For this reason issues such as the EU's exclusion of 39% of agricultural 
produce are extremely important. While it has been suggested here that this would have very 
little substantive impact on an SA-EU agreement, excluding 39% of ACP agricultural-trade 
from an agreement between the ACP and the EU would have a devastating impact on the ACP 
states that rely heavily on agricultural trade. 
The South African proposal to introduce new legislation with the WTO is the second area 
where a SA-EU agreement could have a large impact. The WTO regulations have on FT A's 
proved to be inadequate when dealing with an agreement between countries of disparate 
development that are not geographically approximate. The belief of the South African 
negotiation team that they could introduce new regulations to govern these types of relations 
would have tremendous implications for the entire globe. Numerous South American and 
Latin American countries have already sought closer links with the EU, and with NAFT A. 
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New WTO regulations could create a framework within which these interactions could take 
place. The creation of such a framework has the potential to impact either positively or 
. negatLvely on developing economies. It could either add to the mechanisms of domination that 
are identified by the globalists, or it could break this pattern. South Africa's negotiation of an 
agreement with the EU that could truly lead to closer co-operation, trade liberalisation and 
simultaneous sustainable development, would contribute tremendously to the plight of the 
South. 
As South Africa and the EU enter the next phase in this long negotiation process they will be 
charting new ground. In this round South Africa has largely set the margins in which the 
negotiations will take place. The EU should have a better idea of what the South African party 
wants from the agreement. South Africa must also be careful not to make unrealistic demands 
on the ED. As the weaker party with the most to gain and to lose from an agreement,"South 
Africa should consider its approach very carefully within the context of the current global 
environment. It should market its proposals and not expect concessions from the EU that are 
going to be of no benefit to the Union. If a constructive agreement is not forthcoming_South 
Africa should not push the issue, and should focus on its regional policy. Further, the 
negotiations with the EU have consumed a tremendous amount of resources. While the 
country has been focusing on an agreement with its largest trading partner, other regions are 
being sidelined. The Asian-rim countries represent large and rapidly growing economies which 
contain potentially massive markets for South Africa. South Africa needs to look beyond the 
traditional trading partners and develop new links within the global economy. 
Finally, the South African approach to the region must be consistent. The region represents 
not only South Africa's largest opportunity for growth, but also an area of potential conflict. 
South Africa should be careful not to propagate a microcosm of dependency in the region. 
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Any agreement with the EU must be implemented both with the best interests of the region in 
mind, and with the consent of the region. By pursuing a paternalistic approach with regard to 
. the region's involvement in the trade agreement, arid making all decisions on behalf of the 
-;{ ~ 
region, South Africa is undermining regional integration as much as the EU is. 
The central question identified in Chapter 1 was whether the international system, as it exists, 
would allow for the altruistic behaviour of states. Specifically: Would the European Union be 
able to follow up on its rhetorical support for the development of South Africa? As a result of 
this study it appears that the altruistic behaviour of states is not likely to occur. In the 
competitive environment there is a need for incentives. For South Africa, or for any other 
developing country, to succeed in the global environment it needs to begin by taking some sort 
of control. The evidence has shown that the globalist mechanisms of domination exist, and are 
.. ' 
controlled by the countries of the North. The Lome Convention's failure is definitely-linked to 
the failure of the ACP states to play an active role in the decision making and direction of the 
organisation. In this context the developing world, and South Africa, needs to play the game 
by the rules established by the global environment. Concessions and support will llet be 
obtained free of charge, they have to be fought for, and traded. South Africa would most 
likely have gained nothing from the EU's proposed FT A. However, by taking some command 
of the situation with the TDA, the country is taking its development into its own hands, rather 
than relying on the rhetorical goodwill exhibited by the North. 
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